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Modeling the occurrence of computer security incidents within a defined popula-
tion of computers can be used to help understand some of factors contributing to risk
and transmission of these incidents among the population. A better understanding
of these factors can be used to determine appropriate intervention actions that can
be applied to the population, which may also be evaluated through the application
of models. Explanatory models attempt to include and account for various primary
factors that affect the occurrence of computer security incidents.
Models based on observed security incidents may also be used to evaluate
interventions even when explanatory models may not exist or may be difficult to
formulate or express for a particular incident type. Forecasting models can be used
to project the occurrence of incidents in the future and these projections can be
compared to actual observations before and after interventions are applied.
The following aspects of modeling computer security incidents are explored: (1)
the presentation and discussion of adapting some commonly used infectious disease
models for modeling the spread of some types of computer security incidents along
with applicable intervention actions; (2) an illustration of how these types of models
could be applied to making resource allocation decisions regarding intervention
efforts; (3) the presentation and comparison of models that can be used for track-
ing/forecasting security incidents and monitoring the impact of interventions; (4) the
presentation of a method for estimating model features and parameter distributions
from observed data; and (5) the exploration of some population characteristics and
models for evaluating where to focus or target intervention actions.
When resources for responding to or preventing computer security incidents
are limited or constrained, the ability to accurately model and evaluate intervention
actions can be a useful tool for making the most of these resources.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
1.1 Overview
Computer and network security incidents have financial consequences both for
individuals and for organizations. Compromised computer resources often end up
being used as part of financially motivated attacks against others [1]. Examples
include large-scale botnets [2, 3] used for organized criminal activities [4] such as
extortion and phishing/pharming [5] attacks, as well as distribution of pop-up
advertisements, spam [1] and “scareware” [6]. However, other attacks may not be
motivated by financial gains for the attackers but do result in financial losses for the
victim. Examples from recent years of such attacks include those against HBGary
Federal [7] and Sony Playstation Network [8]. Laws and regulations may also require
companies to publicly disclose data breaches. This can negatively affect stock prices
and other valuations of the organization [9, 10].
In addition to the risks posed by security incidents (financial fraud, data
breaches, reputational damage), there are direct costs to organizations for responding
to such incidents. Organizations spend time and money developing and enforcing
policies designed to reduce the number or severity of incidents. For example, corpo-
rations may purchase intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention
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systems (IPS) to assist with monitoring and detecting incidents. Also, staff and
user resources are needed to fix and recover from incidents. Most importantly,
critical information technology infrastructure resources may be unavailable for use
during the recovery process. Identifying and responding to incidents quickly can
help minimize the impact within an organization, as well as to external entities that
may be targeted by the use of an organization’s resources (such as with reflector
based denial-of-service attacks).
Undetected and/or unaddressed security incidents can have more severe conse-
quences over time:
• Providing entry points to more critical systems or protected information;
• Being used as launching points for other attacks against the same or other
organizations;
• Being used to gather and collect information about an organization that can
be leveraged in the future (in the form of more targeted attacks or business
competition);
• Causing reputational damage if regulatory requirements mandate the disclosure
of applicable incidents or resulting breaches.
A recent example of a large scale breach illustrates some of the costs involved.
The South Carolina Department of Revenue was involved in a breach where data
involving 6.4 million consumers and businesses were stolen. One source [11] reports
the cost as $700,000 for the hiring of a security firm to review what occurred and
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make security suggestions. The same source reports that a similar security assessment
before the breach would have cost about $200,000, which shows some of the additional
costs resulting from the breach. In addition to the security assessment, the source
reports there is a $12 million contract with Experian to provide a year of free credit-
report monitoring to taxpayers; additional likely costs include hiring a PR firm and
outside lawyers.
In many cases this kind of breach is the result of several security failings that
have been combined or have cascaded into the detected and publicized or reported
breach. Smaller computer security incidents can often form the building blocks of
larger scale security breaches. Verizon reports that in 2011, 98% of breaches stemmed
from external agents and that 97% of breaches were avoidable through simple or
intermediate controls [12].
Sometimes the root causes of incidents may be well known and/or understood.
However, sometimes the root causes will never be determined due to time, technical,
and financial constraints. Even in cases where the root causes of incidents may
be well known or understood, determining mitigation strategies and measuring
the effectiveness of their implementation can be difficult. In the same way that
understanding the mechanics behind a disease’s effects on an organism does not
always directly lead to a prevention or cure (generating an effective immune system
response can still be a problem), determining effective responses to computer security
threats is not always straightforward. Also, even when effective intervention actions
are known, their timely implementation and deployment can still present additional
challenges.
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As concerns increase about the impact of such breaches, calls for changes in laws
and policies to improve cyber security have also increased. Some laws and policies
(such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986) outline activities subject to
penalties and fines to discourage certain types of activity. Other laws and policies
(such as the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of
2009) impose penalties against organizations or otherwise provide incentives for these
organizations to implement steps that may improve their resilience against some
of the attacks and scenarios that have led to large breaches in the past. However,
legislative measures can become outdated as technology and its use continue to
evolve. Threats and attacks will often evolve in response to new uses of technology
and to new defensive measures, similar to the way in which last year’s flu vaccine
may not be effective against this year’s influenza [13].
1.2 Statement of Problem
Computer security personnel need to be able both to prepare and to react to
incoming data from multiple sources in order to make assessments of changes in
the state of “health” of their organization’s information infrastructure, resources,
and assets, and to decide upon actions or interventions. These personnel also need
to have information regarding the types of appropriate interventions available, the
likely effectiveness of such interventions, and the means to measure the impact–even
when the root causes of a growing issue are not well known or understood. The
identification and quantification of risk factors can assist with the development and
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targeting of effective intervention and prevention strategies and models can play an
important role both in identifying potential risk factors and in evaluating intervention
and prevention implementations.
This dissertation addresses these key questions:
1. What are some of the available models that can be applied to computer security
incident data, and how are they applicable?
2. Are some models better suited to some incident types based on features or
properties of the incident type?
3. Can current models be adapted to better include relevant characteristics and
dynamics for some incident types?
4. Can some models be used to explore the use of different interventions relevant
to some incident types for planning purposes?
5. Are there properties or features of a computer population that may be useful
for guiding and targeting interventions to reduce the occurrence of computer
security incidents?
1.3 Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the
problem and relevant background. Chapter 2 provides a review of current literature
which covers current techniques in the area of modeling relevant to computer security
incidents. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 review and present the types of models applied to
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computer security incidents in this study, along with some illustrative examples and
simulations. Chapter 3 introduces models originally developed for modeling the
spread of infectious diseases in animals and humans. Chapter 4 discusses adaptation
of the infectious disease models to apply to incidents that spread via email. Chapter
5 examine two different types of quality control based models. Chapter 6 describes a
real world computer security data set and illustrates the application of models using
this data set. Chapter 7 discusses and illustrates how including additional factors to
the data could be applied to intervention efforts. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings
and provides recommendations for additional areas of study.
1.4 Background
1.4.1 Taxonomy/definition/description of computer security and inci-
dents
Some definitions of computer security include:
• Information security is defined as the preservation of confidentiality, integrity
and availability of information; in addition, other properties such as authenticity,
accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can be involved [14].
• Information system security is a system characteristic and a set of mechanisms
that span the system both logically and physically. The five security goals are
integrity, availability, confidentiality, accountability, and assurance [15].
• A computer is secure if you can depend on it and its software to behave as you
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expect [16].
It is easier to define and track instances of computer security failures than it is
to comprehensively define and assess the overall computer security “health” of an
organization. Conducting internal security audits is one method organizations can
use to verify that security measures are in place [17]. However, security audits do
not necessarily provide guidance or direct information regarding the effectiveness
of security measures. Additional information is needed for organizations to make
informed decisions regarding security measures.
Within organizations, computer security failings can often be simplified to a
failing of a component or several components of a simple system involving a computer
and its connections (network), human users, and often an external attacker.
• Computer/network–“hosts” and the communications/contacts between them.
Physical computer networks may have a variety of topologies overlaid onto
them–communications infrastructure (servers/clients), social contacts (email,
instant messaging, social media apps). The computer itself usually has several
subcomponents that can be part of a security failure–such as the operating
system, software applications, and some network services.
• External (attackers)–source of attempts to gain unauthorized access to resources.
Attacks can be active or passive (e.g., requiring some type of user action to occur
before executing), remote or local (which may result in privilege escalation),
and can target computers/networks as well as users.
• Human user(s)–interact(s) with local and remote computers, evaluates informa-
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tion, can be responsible for generating some of the observable computer/network
activity related to a computer.
The definition of what constitutes a computer or network security incident can
be very context dependent. Howard and Longstaff [18] distinguish an “event” as
the discrete change in state or status of a system as the result of a directed action
towards a target, where a target can be a specific computer, account, process, or other
logical or physical entity. An event may be part of normal operating and authorized
activities, or it may be part of an attack, which is defined by Howard and Longstaff
as “a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized result” [18].
An incident is later defined as “a group of attacks that can be distinguished from
other attacks because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, objectives, sites,
and timing.” Hansman and Hunt [19] give a similar but simpler definition of an
incident as “an attempt at violating security policy, such as attacking a computer or
attempting to gain unauthorised access to some data.” A common key distinction
made by various definitions is that an incident involves an aspect of unauthorized
action or access to some resource (network, data, other).
1.4.2 Purposes of modeling
Models are conceptual tools to explain how an object or system of objects
will behave. They range from simple to complex and usually involve trade-offs
among accuracy, transparency, and flexibility [20]. Models can have two distinct
roles–prediction and understanding. These roles are not necessarily independent nor
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in opposition to each other, but models may be employed to serve one role more than
the other. Models can also provide a means to isolate factors in a system and examine
their role in situations where they could be difficult to examine independently.
Organizations need to be able to recognize and quantify potential problems
quickly so that decisions can be made regarding preventative or corrective actions.
Organizations want to know if a particular problem is expected to get worse or
if any previous measures have affected the expected trajectory of an issue. Using
models to fit existing computer security incident data allows organizations to better
assess expected levels of incident occurrence as well as to compare expected levels
of incident occurrence with the number of actual occurrences following the use of
corrective measures.
Applicable models enable researchers to identify characteristics of incident
occurrence over time and quantify current trends to provide insight into expected
future trends. Predictive models developed from the analysis of security incident
data can be used by organizations to decide if corrective or preventative actions are
needed and to gauge or measure the impact of any changes made due to security
policies and practices. This can be accomplished by comparing model forecasts
to observed activity. If the observed number of incidents begins to deviate as an
increasing trend away from the forecast values, an external factor may have changed
(such as the development of a new variant of an attack), and an organization should
reevaluate its control measures to make necessary adjustments.
A similar strategy can be used for evaluating the impact of changes made to
the internal security environment (such as policy changes, IDS/IPS deployment,
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system updates, user-awareness campaigns, etc.). Model forecasts of future incident
levels can be compared to actual observed levels before and after implementing a
new control measure. The effectiveness of the change to the security environment
can be judged by comparing how well the observed number of incident occurrences
tracks the forecast values for the time period after the new control measure has been
implemented. Model forecasts for the use of different intervention types can also
be compared to determine which available option is most appropriate based on an
organization’s goals.
Most of the models presented involve the number of computer security incident
occurrences detected and confirmed. While each type of incident may have a different
impact on an organization’s overall security, counting the number of incidents provides
an accessible and quantifiable measure related to overall security. This is similar
to how counting the number of detected flaws in software code is used as a way
to measure the quality of the software development process, even though simple
counts may not differentiate between the types or severity of the detected flaws.
An essential question is how to quantify security (or software quality) and some
answers are implicit in the decisions made regarding the definition/selection of types
of security incidents or software flaws to track or count.
1.4.3 Types of models
As previously mentioned, models are often used for two purposes–prediction and
understanding. These roles may overlap and are not mutually exclusive. Models used
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mostly for forecasting or prediction may be part of a quality control or monitoring type
process. The models themselves may not shed much light on underlying dynamics nor
explicitly suggest applicable interventions, but can be used to compare the impact
of an applied corrective measure. Models used for understanding typically include
aspects meant to capture some of the underlying dynamics and can also be used to
explore potential outcomes based on implementing certain actions incorporated as
part of the model.
1.4.3.1 Underlying dynamics models
Since many computer security incidents may be the result of a computer virus
or worm and spread amongst computers, techniques used in the field of epidemiology
and infectious disease surveillance can provide a useful framework. One approach
to modeling infectious diseases in human and animal populations considers the
state transitions involved with infectious disease transmission and recovery. The
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model and its variants are an example of this
approach. These models involve sets of differential equations to relate transitions
between states and can include parameters for transmission and recovery rates.
More complex models may also factor in birth and death rates of a population
as well as the proportion of the population vaccinated against a particular disease.
Birth and death rates would be analogous to the rate at which new machines are
added and the rate at which old machines are decommissioned from a population
of computers. Vaccination would be similar to the installing a software update or
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“patch” that fixes a particular vulnerability. Examples of using epidemic models to
model computer worms and viruses include [21] and [22].
1.4.3.2 Quality control models
Two other types of models presented use historical data of incident occurrence
to provide forecasts of future incident levels in time. These two types of models focus
more on forecasting future levels than on accurately capturing underlying dynamics
or causes. We will apply two types of these models to different types of computer
security incidents to see which type of model may work best for different types of
incidents and to see if there are some general observations that can be made about
modeling the frequency of occurrence of computer security incidents.
When the symptoms or signs of a new type or strain of disease begin to
affect human populations at noticeable and recorded levels, the underlying cause(s)
may take time to determine. At this stage, often the frequency of symptom or
disease occurrence is the only information available to make projections regarding
future trends. The same is true with regard to computer security incidents. While
the causes of some types of computer security incidents may be known, such as
when a particular computer worm is known to exploit a specific operating system
vulnerability, the number of computers containing this specific vulnerability and
exploitable is often unknown. (The presence of the vulnerability may not be sufficient,
host-based antivirus software may provide protection or additional user action may
be required.) The causes of other types of incidents may never be determined and
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could be attributable to several different possible security failings. In some cases,
these incident types are only detected based on how the computers are being used
following an attack (such as for relaying spam), and thus the cause of the initial
exploit may remain unknown. However, occurrences of these incident types may
still follow a pattern related to other factors behind attacks rather than only the
distribution of vulnerabilities present in a population of computers.
One family of models comes from the field of software reliability. In the context
of software reliability, software reliability growth models have been used to describe
the software defect detection process. In general, two assumptions driving software
reliability models are that software failures are caused by unpredictable events that do
not have a corresponding remedy within the software and that the failures that occur
are independent of each other. These two assumptions led to Goel and Okumoto’s
(G-O) model [23]. Many similar models have been proposed [24–26].
If the exploitation of vulnerable computers is viewed as being similar to the
detection of faults in software, then software reliability growth models may have
some advantages over other types of models for forecasting the level of future incident
occurrence. In this view, attackers take the role of being testers of the software and
identifying software faults present in a system. We apply some software reliability
growth modeling concepts to computer security incidents to see if this view is useful.
Public health surveillance involves similar quality control and monitoring
models and processes related to disease outbreaks in human populations. Time series
analysis and models have been used as surrogates for the use of epidemic models
for monitoring and control purposes. Similar to software reliability growth models,
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time series models rely mostly on the time dependent structure present in a set
of observations. While time series models are often encountered in economics and
finance, they have also been described in [28] as a method to potentially identify
developing outbreaks.
1.4.4 Selecting and targeting interventions
There are many interacting factors that affect when and where a computer
security incident occurs. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of a computer
worm or virus is only part of the puzzle. Characteristics of the population being
attacked or affected are also important. This includes the distribution and prevalence
of vulnerable operating systems and applications, differences in user behavior [29]
in the type and frequency of use of the computer systems, and differences in local
management of network and computing resources.
In the study of human diseases, the number of cases of a disease is often divided
by some measure of population to obtain a rate of incidence. This incidence rate can
then be used to compare the frequency of disease cases among different populations
of varying size. Differences in incidence rates can sometimes be attributed to known
differences of properties of the populations, such as genetics, environment, habits,
etc.
For many diseases in humans, biological age is a known risk factor. It is
common to calculate incidence rates for several age stratifications or groupings when
making comparisons between two populations. This can help account for differences
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in the total incidence rate of two populations with different age demographics. For
example, if the total incidence rate for a type of cancer is higher for one population
than another, the population with the higher rate of incidence may also consist of a
higher percentage of older people (who may be more at risk for the type of cancer)
and yet the age-specific incidence rates for the two populations may be similar.
In addition, some environmental factors can change over time or in cycles (such
as seasonal weather patterns in some geographical climates). The social interaction
among segments of the population can fluctuate as well (e.g. school related social
interaction decreases during seasonal vacation breaks). These temporal factors can
be observed in patterns of human disease such as the common flu. Note that for
seasonal variations, time itself is not a risk factor but simply serves as a proxy
indicator for other risk factors that track the seasonal changes.
There is a need for empirical examinations of risk factors relevant to computer
security incidents using real-world data. This information can be useful for focusing
intervention efforts where they may be most effective. Verifying or quantifying risk
factors in actual environments can be challenging. Exploring the influence of some of
these factors using field collected data can be an important step to build upon both for
future simulations and for exploring other factors. Anbalagan and Vouk [30] present
a security model based on vulnerability states and rates of disclosure, exploitation
and correction tested with data.
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1.5 Purpose
This research applies concepts and models from Epidemiology and Public Health
frameworks to computer security. This includes the exploration and adaptation
of compartmental SIR models often applied to modeling the spread and control
of infectious diseases in human and animal populations. Additional methods for
analyzing incident data for the purposes of monitoring and forecasting expected
future incidence rates from the software reliability field are also covered. Comparing
actual incidence rates to expected rates can indicate if additional intervention actions
are needed and/or if existing intervention actions and preventative measures or
policies are being effectively deployed. This research also includes examples of
epidemiological type analysis for examining potential risk factors and risk markers
for incident occurrence which may be useful for intervention targeting.
1.6 Significance
The significance of this research is in showing how existing models can be
applied and adapted to cover computer security incidents. Some of these models
can be used as tools to identify, evaluate and compare potential interventions.
Modifications to some current models help to provide a more representative picture
of underlying dynamics and may also indicate additional intervention opportunities
for some incident types. This is useful to organizations deciding how to allocate
resources towards intervention efforts. Other models can be used to monitor and
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gauge the impact of enacted intervention efforts or policies. In turn, this can provide
organizations with feedback regarding their intervention actions.
1.7 Scope and Limitations
This research is scoped to study computer security incidents that have occurred
within one organization during a specified time period. The modeling of the incidents
includes aspects of the targeted computers and makes some limited assumptions
regarding user characteristics for some incident types. Aspects regarding attacker
incentives or motivations are not included for these models. The application of
models covers a range of incident types, as well as a range of potential targets, but
they are not applicable to modeling incidents that result from a directed or targeted
attack by a single or group of attackers.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides an overview of some relevant definitions and aspects
of current research pertaining to computer security incidents. These aspects are
important for modeling the occurrence of computer security incidents. One family
of models explored is compartmental (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered [SIR] and
variants) models based on modeling the spread of infectious diseases in human and
animal populations. Some general types of interventions applicable to the control and
containment of infectious diseases in human and animal populations are described
along with equivalent type interventions applicable to some types of computer security
incidents. Surveillance type models (software reliability growth and time series) often
used for quality control and process monitoring are also covered. These types of
models may be applicable to a broader range of incident types which may not be
easily modeled as an infectious process; thus the impact of interventions may be
more difficult to predict, but important to measure. Some weaknesses or gaps in
current research knowledge are also discussed.
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2.2 Computer Security Incidents
Although not required, many computer and network security incidents involve
the exploitation of software related errors, either in the form of exploitable vulnerabil-
ities or improper use and configuration. Howard and Longstaff define a vulnerability
as “a weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action.” This can include design,
implementation or configuration of the software. Arbaugh [31] describes a vulnera-
bility life-cycle model as one in which vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed,
patches are created and distributed, and unpatched systems are at risk of being
exploited until patched. This model is further explored by Frei [32] and includes
examination of the risk of time windows where a vulnerability has been discovered
but remains undisclosed, and a patch or fix has not yet been made available.
While vulnerabilities in software may contribute to the prevalence of many
types of computer or network security incidents, in some cases human users of these
systems are exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access or to initiate an
unauthorized action. Downs [33] describes some cognitive models to examine what
contributes to a successful phishing attack. Jagatic et al [34] also identify some
tactics used to trick users via email and mention some potential defenses. Brown et
al [35] warn that publicly available information regarding both social connections
and personal information can be used to craft more personalized and potentially
more successful email attacks against a large percentage of users. Fette et al [36]
propose a machine learning approach for filtering out phishing type attacks, while
Herley [37] suggests that users should not bother to determine if every email message
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is legitimate or not due to the time costs outweighing the potential benefits.
Weaver et al [38] list several ways incidents and attacks may be triggered. Some
attack types and incidents may be independently initiated, while others may involve
a form of self-replication where compromised systems autonomously initiate attacks
against other users or systems. The method of propagation can be important in
determining the best types of models and interventions applied towards an incident
type.
2.3 Infectious Disease Modeling
Modeling the propagation of network worms as analogous to an infectious
disease process has been applied to events such as the Code Red worm, as in the
work of Zou et al [39] and Chen et al [40]. Tailored defense strategies for this class of
malware have also been explored. Zou et al [22] propose the short-term quarantining
of suspected infected hosts to slow the spread of infected hosts, while Sidiroglou and
Keromytis [41] describe automated patch development based on deployed sensors
and heuristics identifying exploited vulnerabilities.
While several previous works have focused on modeling incident types that
spread over traditional wired computer networks, additional research has examined
some of the ways propagation over wireless connections affects the network topology
and therefore the spread of malware. Yoneki et al [42] examine the spread of an
infection in a time-dependent dynamic human network. Nodes would be in contact
with other nodes for changing periods of time throughout the day based on changing
20
physical proximity. This differs from the standard assumption of nodes having the
potential for constant contact with each other in a wired environment. Milliken, et
al [43] model the spread of a virus that infects wireless access points in its vicinity
through firmware modification. One reported finding is that in urban environments,
the density of wireless access points impacted the spread of the virus more than
susceptibility of a particular access point. They also describe two algorithms for
detecting such attacks in a laboratory environment.
2.3.1 Standard Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model
Most of the classic compartmental infectious disease models, such as the
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model and the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) model, are based on the assumption of a fully connected network topology
(each infected host has the ability to contact and infect any other susceptible host in
the population). This is different from some ecological models (such as the forest-fire
model, which limits contact to adjacent neighbors on a two-dimensional grid). The
impact and effect of different network topologies has also been explored in the
context of the spread of infectious diseases by Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani [44],
Keeling [45], and Danon et al [46], as has computer worm propagation by Kim et
al [21].
A property of infectious disease models that differentiates them from chronic
disease and other models is that the chances of a host becoming infected (transitioning
from the “Susceptible” compartment to the “Infected” compartment in an SIS or SIR
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compartmental model) depends on the number or proportion of other infected hosts
in the population. In most cases, these models assume that other than the initial
infection(s), any additional infected hosts result from contact with other infected
hosts within the population and are referred to as secondary infections.
However, a population may not be completely isolated from other sources of
infection, and additional hosts may become infected by exposure to external sources
(referred to as reservoir) and not by exposure to other infected hosts within the
population. An example of this is when a disease can spread from animals to humans
and also from humans to humans. Ongoing contact with animals can provide a
source of additional primary infections to the human population, as is explored by
Singh et al [47]. Differentiating the proportion of primary and secondary infections
based on the distribution in time of identified infected cases may not be feasible, as
is demonstrated by Singh et al [47]. In these cases, mitigation strategies need to
address both the primary causes (contact between susceptible hosts and an infected
reservoir) and the secondary causes (contact between susceptible and infected hosts
within the population).
2.3.2 Model for email propagation
While some of the assumptions included in the standard epidemic models may
be applicable to malware and security incidents that spread directly from device to
device, these assumptions may not be as applicable to computer viruses that spread
through email. The timing delays between when an infected message is received and
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when it is accessed or read may alter the overall pattern of spreading, as is illustrated
by Vazquez et al [48].
Other factors related to how users interact with email may also influence the
spreading behavior of an email virus. A common strategy used by email viruses is to
send out infected messages to any stored contacts in an infected user’s address book.
The number and interconnectedness of address book contacts largely creates the
topology of the network such a virus will use for spreading. This type of contacts
based topology has also been explored in the context of worms that may spread by
gathering targets from SSH “known hosts” files, as demonstrated by Schechter, et
al [49]. Also relevant to email virus propagation is the likelihood that a user will
open an infected message on a vulnerable computer. Gao et al [50] describe a model
that incorporates these factors and explores the impact of interventions which target
nodes in the contacts network based on their level of connectedness.
2.3.3 Types of interventions for controlling infectious diseases
Options for controlling the spread of infectious diseases in humans and/or
animals typically work by limiting the transmission between infectious and susceptible
hosts. Interventions include: (a) vaccination; (b) quarantining; and (c) culling.
Vaccination attempts to transition susceptible hosts directly to the recovered state
without becoming infected. This reduces the number of susceptible hosts that can
become infected. Quarantining isolates known or likely infected hosts from other
susceptible hosts. This reduces the number (or proportion) of infected hosts in
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contact with susceptible hosts, which also reduces the likelihood of transmission to a
susceptible host. Culling is a strategy sometimes used with rapidly spreading animal
or plant diseases. It involves reducing the overall size of a population by removing
(or killing) both infected and susceptible hosts, but mostly in limited or targeted
areas. Culling reduces both the number of infected, as well as susceptible, hosts.
Keeling and Rohani [20] include a more detailed description of these interventions
and their applications to human and animal infectious diseases.
There are similar or analogous options for controlling the spread of network
worms in a computer population. Vulnerable systems can be patched or updated
so they are no longer susceptible (analogous to being vaccinated), and network
connectivity can be disabled for systems identified as being infected (analogous
to being quarantined). Perhaps not as drastic as culling, an equivalent measure
could involve preemptively isolating critical hosts or subnets until other corrective
actions can be taken (such as either patching systems or migrating functionality to
non-vulnerable systems). This also reduces the size of the susceptible population.
Other options for controlling the spread of network worms in a computer
population include the use of anti-virus software to detect and block exploit actions
on vulnerable hosts as well as the use of a network based IPS to detect and block
potential exploit traffic on its way to systems (which may be susceptible, already
infected, or already recovered).
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2.4 Surveillance–quality control and monitoring
Public health surveillance is often defined as “the ongoing systematic collection,
analysis, and interpretation of data, closely integrated with the timely dissemination
of these data to those responsible for preventing and controlling disease and injury”
as stated in Klaucke et al [51]. A World Bank publication (Nsubuga et al [52]) states:
Because surveillance can directly measure what is going on in the popula-
tion, it is useful both for measuring the need for interventions and for
directly measuring the effects of interventions. The purpose of surveillance
is to empower decision makers to lead and manage more effectively by
providing timely, useful evidence.
According to a Center for Disease Control (CDC) publication [53], originally
public health surveillance involved the monitoring and tracking of communicable
and infectious diseases; however, it is not limited to this and can also include
the monitoring and tracking of injuries, birth defects, chronic diseases, and health
behaviors (such as diet, amount of sleep, and frequency of exercise).
Table 2.1 shows a list of purposes for monitoring health events from a CDC
publication [53] in the left column. The right column shows how each can be easily
adapted to apply to monitoring computer security incidents. Just as public health
surveillance is applied to help monitor, control, and understand the spread and
growth of diseases in human populations, a similar approach can be applied by
organizations to help monitor, control, and understand the occurrence and growth
25
Table 2.1: Purposes for monitoring health events and computer security incidents.
Purposes for monitoring health 
events: 
Purposes for monitoring computer security 
incidents: 
• To detect sudden changes in 
disease occurrence and 
distribution 
• To detect sudden changes in incident 
occurrence and distribution 
• To follow long-term trends and 
patterns of disease 
• To follow long-term trends and patterns 
of incident occurrence 
• To identify changes in agents 
(such as the flu virus) and host 
factors (such as smoking, 
alcohol use, and seat-belt use). 
• To identify changes in agents (such 
computer viruses) and host factors 
(such as use of host-based firewalls, 
host-based AV, peer-to-peer usage). 
• To detect changes in health care 
practices 
• To detect changes in IT practices 
 
of computer security incidents within their organization.
Based on the nature of an incident, epidemic models may not be suitable for
some computer security incident types. Applying other types of models developed
based on the analysis of security incident data can be used by organizations to assist
with the efficient allocation of resources and to provide feedback regarding the impact
of prevention and control measures or changes to security policies. One way this
can be accomplished is by comparing model forecasts to observed activity. If the
observed number of incidents begins to deviate as an increasing trend away from
the forecast values, an external factor may have changed (such as the development
of a new variant of an attack), and an organization should reevaluate its control
measures and make necessary adjustments.
A similar strategy can be used for evaluating the impact of changes to the
internal security environment (such as policy changes, IDS/IPS deployment, system
updates, etc.). Model forecasts can be compared to actual observations before and
after implementing a new control measure. The effectiveness of the change to the
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security environment can be gauged if the observations trend away from the forecast
values after the new control measure has been implemented. Although these types
of models do not provide as much insight into the underlying dynamics leading to
incident occurrence as epidemic models, they can be more easily applied to a wider
range of incident types and interventions and require less information to develop.
2.4.1 Software reliability growth models
In the context of computer security, two phenomena have been commonly
modeled using software reliability growth models: the trend of exploitations by
Browne et al [54] and Rescorla [55] and the vulnerability discovery process by
Alhazmi and Malaiya [56,57]. Regarding exploitations, Browne et al [54] used simple
mathematical models to fit computer security exploits. They used exploit data from
the reports repository of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). Some
delays may have occurred between the time the exploit was initiated and the time
the exploit was reported to CERT. Exploits were also reported by a wide range of
users; thus there is limited control over the data collection method.
Regarding modeling the security vulnerability discovery process, Anderson [58]
proposed an equation to estimate the probability of system failure as a result of
the vulnerabilities. Alhazmi and Malaiya [56] examined the vulnerability discovery
process in operating systems and treated vulnerabilities as equivalent to software
defects. A few models were used to fit the vulnerability detection data, including
the software reliability growth Goel-Okumoto (G-O) model. The authors indicated
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that if a model can accurately fit the observed data, then it could predict the
future vulnerability detection trend. Alhazmi and Malaiya [57] also examined the
vulnerabilities in the Apache and IIS HTTP servers. The Linear Vulnerability
Discovery model (LVD) and the Alhazmi-Malaiya Logistic model (AML) were used
to fit the vulnerability detection data and predict the future vulnerability discovery.
2.4.2 Time series models
Although epidemic models have been used in the past to model the spread
of incidents, there may be other factors not included in such models (such as the
academic calendar in a university setting) that can cause fluctuations in populations
and affect incident occurrence. Different interconnection topologies can result in
varying epidemic patterns even when other factors are the same, as shown by Watts
et al [59], and new strains (or variants) of viruses can emerge, thereby rendering
existing vaccinations less effective. Models that attempt to incorporate or account
for the influence of these factors become increasingly computationally complex. Also,
when it comes to modeling computer security incidents, some incident types may
not be aptly described as or result from a contagious process.
Another approach is to use time series analysis and modeling as a surrogate
for epidemic models for control purposes or to include the influence of factors not
easily incorporated into or applicable to epidemic models. Time series models are not
explanatory models and do not rely on knowing the underlying dynamics producing
the observed behavior. Instead, time series models attempt to make use of the
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time dependent structure present in a set of observations. This method is often
encountered in the fields of economics and finance, and it has been described by
Allard [28] as a general technique for the early identification of outbreaks of infectious
diseases with applications for intervention strategies. The use of time series modeling
is also illustrated by Trottier et al [60] when applied to childhood infectious disease
(pertussis, mumps, measles and rubella) data from Canada to gauge the impact of
mass vaccination. Lai [61] describes monitoring the SARS epidemic in China using
time series models, and Han and Leong [62] describe similar methods to evaluate
intervention measures taken in Singapore in response to SARS. Helfenstein [27]
suggests that classification of infectious diseases may be possible based on their time
series structure.
2.5 Targeting Interventions and Identifying Risk Factors
Often in human and animal populations, the risks of a particular individual
being affected by a disease (infectious or not) are not uniform throughout the
population. Factors such as age (with which susceptibility may vary) or geography
(which may affect exposure to contributing elements) can influence the risk of being
infected or becoming sick. In the case of an infectious disease, interventions may be
targeted to include groups more at risk or more likely to spread the disease to other
groups. This is an effort to minimize the spread of a disease while also efficiently
using available resources (such as available doses of a vaccine as well as deployment
of qualified administrators of the vaccine). In the case of a non-infectious disease,
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identifying risk factors can help direct intervention efforts towards groups with higher
risks even if underlying root causes are not well understood.
Michael et al [63] demonstrate the use of mathematical models to compare the
use of different drug combinations for controlling lymphatic filariasis (a parasitic
tropical disease carried by mosquitoes). Models were used to compare the potential
effectiveness of different control strategies, and it was determined that an optimal
strategy would need to include aspects for controlling the parasite itself as well as
controlling the transmission vector (mosquito population). Models were used to
support decisions regarding different intervention strategies to reduce the number of
disease cases within a desired time frame.
Hay and Ward [64] provide another example of applying disease models in
the context of decision support. They compare costs and effectiveness for applying
pertussis vaccinations to different age groups in the United States. Their cost-benefit
analysis concludes that there is an overall benefit to immunizing adolescents (ages 10-
19) with a pertussis booster vaccine. The analysis includes costs related to vaccination,
as well as costs resulting from pertussis and pertussis-related complications.
Hoggart et al [65] have developed a risk model for lung cancer. One of the
proposed applications of such a model is to identify high risk individuals who could
be encouraged to take steps to lower their risks. High risk individuals could also be
identified to undergo increased monitoring by clinicians or be selected for participation
in clinical trials or treatment programs. The model includes lifetime exposure to
cigarette smoke, age effects (including ages of initiation and cessation of smoking)
and duration of smoking. Similarly, identifying risk factors and developing a risk
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model for computer security incidents could provide guidance for the targeting of
intervention actions.
2.6 Existing Limitations
While the current research provides a good description of some of the problems
related to modeling and preventing computer security incidents, there are also
some weaknesses or gaps to be addressed. One potential intervention of dynamic
quarantine described by Zou et al [22] assumes such an intervention could be applied
or implemented to an entire population. If so, this type of intervention could slow
the propagation of an Internet worm. However, implementing such an intervention
on such a large-scale is unlikely, as it would involve the coordinated action of many
separate entities and organizations. It is unknown at what scale such an intervention
would need to be applied in order to see effects beyond the subpopulation to which
it has been applied.
The intervention explored by Gao et al [50] in response to a virus that propagates
using email examines the impact of targeting highly connected nodes (individuals
with large email address books). However, this assumes more complete knowledge
of interpersonal email network connection topology information than is typically
available. Also, their modeling efforts often relied on the assumption of a standard
normal distribution for human related factors (such as email checking frequency
and likelihood of opening infected messages). It is unknown if the assumption of
other distributions for some of these factors would lead to different observations or
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conclusions.
In several cases where epidemic models were used to explore observed behavior
and novel interventions, the utility or impact of existing or commonly available
interventions were not included for comparison. This leaves open whether or not
some of the proposed interventions are feasible or practical from a cost perspective, or
if they provide additional improvement to some more commonly available strategies.
Cost may not be an easy aspect to definitively measure, but outcomes of strategies
can be compared to provide to some guidance.
In terms of targeting intervention efforts, little research seems to be available
regarding population type risk factors for incident occurrence. While each incident
type likely disproportionately affects a certain subpopulation, information for gener-
ally identifying higher risk individuals is lacking. It is possible that due the changing
and dynamic nature of attacks and defenses, stable risk factors may not be easy to
identify or may not provide much utility for predicting future risk.
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Chapter 3: Infectious Disease Models
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we describe some infectious disease models and illustrate
some aspects and modifications relevant to modeling some types of computer and
network security incidents in an interconnected population of computers or devices.
Infectious diseases are typically modeled using both deterministic and stochastic
models. Deterministic models are more appropriate when modeling large populations
and the law of mass action applies. Stochastic models may be more applicable
for modeling smaller populations and for capturing variability due to randomness
of interactions or other factors. Stochastic models can also be more flexible for
incorporating features that may not adhere to assumptions made by deterministic
models (such as assuming a fully connected network topology). We review a standard
deterministic model and describe modifications we make to a particular stochastic
model in order to apply it to modeling the spread of some types of computer security
incidents and to include features linked to intervention actions.
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3.2 Deterministic SIR Models
The Kermack-McKendrick model [66] is a deterministic model that allows hosts
to be designated as part of three compartments or states: Susceptible (S), Infected
(I), or Removed/Recovered (R). The model specifies the transition of hosts between
states (from S → I and from I → R) where the recovered state is terminal (hosts do
not transition to another state after being recovered), and some hosts may always be















N = S(t) + I(t) +R(t)
where β is the infection rate (S → I) and γ is the recovery rate (I → R) and N is
the total size of the population being considered. The infection and recovery rate
parameters are assumed to remain relatively constant or fixed in time for the interval
being modeled.
An extension of the classic SIR model allows for a direct transition from
Susceptible to Recovered (S → R) without becoming infected. This accounts for the
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β            = 1.0
γ            = 0.5
ν                = 0.025
Figure 3.1: Deterministic examples of (a) an SIR model and (b) an SIR model with
vaccination.














= γI(t) + νS(t)
N = S(t) + I(t) +R(t)
where β is the infection rate (S → I) and γ is the recovery rate (I → R) and N is
the total size of the population being considered, and with ν as the vaccination rate
(S → R). Figure 3.1 shows examples of (a) an SIR model and (b) an SIR model
with vaccination.
3.3 Stochastic SIR Models
While a deterministic SIR model summarizes the overall behavior of the
population, a stochastic SIR model allows for modeling the state of each member
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of the population and allows for variations in the outcomes of repetitions using
the same parameter values. This can be useful for constructing a distribution of
outcomes and evaluating a “worst-case” scenario rather than limiting forecasts to
average expected behavior. Stochastic models can also be more flexible for exploring
different connection (or mixing) topologies. Since the state of individuals is being
modeled, it is also possible to specify non-uniform connection topologies without
knowing beforehand the effects on the aggregate behavior [44], [45], [46].
A stochastic algorithm for calculating a compartmental SIS model [where
infected nodes can return a Susceptible (S) state rather than to a terminal Recovered
(R) state] with network topology specified in the form of an adjacency matrix is
presented in [67]. We adapt this algorithm to simulate an SIR model, the assumption
being once an infected host has been identified and removed, it will only be replaced
if it is no longer susceptible to the original source of infection. First we review
the described SIS model and the presented algorithm, and then we explain the
changes made to simulate an SIR model using stochastic modeling code we created
(implemented in the R [68] programming language).
The standard SIS model involves two states: Susceptible (S) or Infected (I)
and there can be transitions from S → I as well as from I → S. The deterministic
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N = S(t) + I(t)
where β is the infection rate (S → I) and γ is the recovery rate (I → S) and
N is the total size of the population being considered.
Instead of allowing for complete mixing of the population as is done in the
deterministic model, the presented stochastic algorithm uses a defined adjacency
matrix A to represent how members or nodes of the network are connected to each
other and can interact. Figure 3.2 shows simple examples of two networks and their
corresponding adjacency matrices. (Note that each adjacency matrix is symmetrical
across its diagonal; this is because we are assuming bidirectional links. However,
this is not required and there may be instances where breaking such symmetry is
applicable.)
If v is a state vector at time t where vi is 1 if node i is infected and 0 if node
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i is not infected (and therefore susceptible), then the product components of Av
contain the number of infected neighbors of each node at time t. For example, if
nodes 1 and 4 from Figure 3.2(a) are infected, then:
Av =

0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1


















indicating nodes 2, 3 and 5 each have two infected neighbors, while nodes 1 and
4 each have one infected neighbor (although they are infected themselves, they do
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so only node 3 has two infected neighbors, while nodes 2 and 5 each have one infected
neighbor.
An infection (the transition of a node from S → I) is modeled as a Poisson
process with rate β, where the probability a susceptible node becomes infected in the
time interval (t+ ∆t) is approximated by (β ∗K/m) ∗∆t, where K is the number
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of infected neighbors for the node and m is the average degree of the network (or
average number of neighbors for each node). At each time step, the algorithm does
the following:
• For each susceptible node, generate a uniform random number “RAND” in the
interval [0,1];
• If: RAND < (β ∗K/m) ∗∆t, then change state of susceptible node to infected;
• Repeat for all susceptible nodes.
For the stochastic SIR model with vaccination, our algorithm does the following:
• Add the terminal Recovered (R) state;
• Keep the same susceptible-to-infected (S → I) transition used in the stochastic
SIS model;
• Change the SIS infected-to-susceptible (I → S) transition to be the SIR
infected-to-recovered (I → R) transition;
• Add a vaccination or susceptible-to-recovered transition (S → R);
• At each time step, state transitions are checked in the following order for
all nodes: S → I, then I → R, then S → R. (Only one change of state is
permitted for nodes at each time step.)
Figure 3.3 shows examples of (a) a stochastic SIR model and (b) a stochastic
SIR model with vaccination. For the SIR model with vaccination, Figure 3.3(c)
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β            = 1.0
γ            = 0.5
ν                =0.025
Figure 3.3: Stochastic examples (with ∆t = 0.1) of (a) SIR model and (b) SIR model
with vaccination, (c) breakdown recovered hosts as originating from infected hosts
[Ri(t)] or vaccinated hosts [Rs(t)].
identifying the number of recovered nodes that transitioned from originally susceptible
[Rs(t)] or originally infected [Ri(t)] states. Although a vaccination rate (ν) may be
lower than the recovery rate (γ), since the number of susceptible nodes is often larger
than the number of infected nodes, there are often more recovered nodes originating
from the susceptible state than the infected state. Our stochastic models have been
implemented using the R [68] programming language. An example of the R code
used for the SIR models is provided in Appendix B.
3.4 Isolating a Smaller Subset from a Larger Population
Often when epidemic models are used to examine the propagation and miti-
gation of network worms, there is an assumption that intervention actions can be
implemented on a scale affecting the whole population being modeled. However,
in many cases, individual organizations or businesses, while inter-connected with
a larger population, can only take steps to control malware that is spreading on
40
the subset of the population that is under their direct authority or control. For
example, a university may be allocated a Class B IPv4 network range (≈65,000
IPv4 addresses) and can take steps to remediate and control the spread of network
worms in this range of IP addresses, but it would be difficult to apply such measures
to the rest (≈4 billion) of IPv4 connected devices elsewhere in the world. Even
within an organization, it is possible for IT resources to be managed and controlled
separately by different departments or divisions. So while a network worm may be
spreading globally, efforts to contain it are likely to be uncoordinated and focused
on smaller subsets of a larger population. For incidents observed within the smaller
subset of the population, it may not be easy to determine how many resulted from
connections with externally infected hosts and how many resulted as secondary
infections from other internally infected hosts within the subset. This could be
important information to have when assessing mitigation options and strategies.
In this following scenario, we explore some of the properties that might be
observed from the perspective of a smaller population subset within a larger inter-
connected population. To accomplish this, we make some additional changes to our
adjacency matrix and to our algorithm for the stochastic SIR model described earlier.
Instead of using a single fully connected adjacency matrix A, we split it into two
component adjacency matrices. One component adjacency matrix Aext allows for
full interconnections between nodes not in the smaller population subset, as well as
between nodes in the smaller population subset and the rest of the larger population.
However, it does not include any interconnections between nodes only contained
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Figure 3.4: Example of decomposing (a) fully connected graph and adjacency matrix
[A] into parts (b) representing connections to/from outside [Aext] a defined subset
(nodes 4 and 5 in example) and (c) representing only internal connection [Aint] of
the subset where A = Aext + Aint.
for full interconnections between nodes within the smaller population subset and
does not allow for any connections between nodes in the subset and the rest of larger
population. Figure 3.4 shows (a) a fully connected network and its adjacency matrix
A along with the graphs and adjacency matrices for its components Aext and Aint
based on an example population subset (defined as containing nodes 4 and 5 as
shown in Figures 3.4(b) and 3.4(c)).
With two adjacency matrices, we can now calculateK as having two components
as well where K = Kext +Kint and values for Kext and Kint are obtained from Aextv
and Aintv, respectively. For a given node, Kint is the number of infected neighbors
that belong to the smaller subset of the population, while Kext is the number of
infected neighbors that are not part of the smaller subset of the population. Since K
has now been split into two components, our algorithm step for checking transitions
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from S → I must also be changed to reflect this and it becomes:
• If: RAND < (β∗(Kext +Kint)/m)∗∆t, then change state of susceptible node to
infected.
The result of this transition check can be compared to the result of an additional
check made at the same time (such that it uses the same “RAND” value):
• If: RAND < (β∗(Kext)/m)∗∆t, then change state of susceptible node to
infected.
If both of the above transition checks have the same result, then any infected
neighbors that are part of the smaller population subset had no impact on the result.
However, if there is a difference between these transition checks, then contact with
an infected node in the smaller population subset is responsible for the infection
and it can be considered a secondary infection. Making this distinction allows us to
determine which of the infections within the subset were caused by sources outside
the subset and which infections were secondary infections caused by sources within
the subset.
Figure 3.5 shows (a) an example of a stochastic SIR model behavior in a subset
(10%) of the total population, (b) the total number of infected hosts in the subset
population as well as how many infected hosts were due to contact with only external
or internal infected hosts (c) a comparison of number of unique infected hosts in the
subpopulation with causes internal and external to the subpopulation. Table 3.1
summarizes some comparisons for stochastic models using different parameter values





































































Figure 3.5: Contribution of subpopulation to overall number of infected hosts.































1,000 100 1.8 0.75 857.4 86.5 78.3 8.2 0.101 0.095 
10,000 100 1.8 0.75 8537 85.2 84.2 1.0 0.010 0.012 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 8528 854.6 770.9 83.7 0.100 0.098 
1,000 100 1.2 0.90 341.8 33.4 30.1 3.3 0.098 0.099 
10,000 100 1.2 0.90 2070 20.7 20.5 0.17 0.010 0.008 
10,000 1,000 1.2 0.90 1643 162.2 146.6 15.4 0.099 0.095 
infections within a subset of the population to the size of the population subset
typically reflects the same ratio as the size of the population subset to the full
population. However, this ratio and its variability could change for other than fully
connected network topologies.
Splitting the adjacency matrix into components (Aext and Aint) as described
above allows for another observation to be made. In some cases, the value of K could
be viewed as analogous to or an indicator of a network attack where an infected
computer attempted to contact and compromise another computer or device. In
these cases, the sum of the values of Kext across all nodes within the subset represents
the number of attacks or attack activity as seen from the perspective of the smaller
population subset. This is similar to activity that might be observed by an IDS/IPS
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Figure 3.6: Number of infection attempts from external to internal hosts.
the rest of the Internet. Figure 3.6 shows an example of Kext over time. Again,
with the simple example using fully connected populations, the results may only be
illustrative. However, other examples with different connection topologies may show
different patterns of attack activity and it may be possible to use these observations
to help infer properties of a network worm and the impact of external intervention
efforts.
Before examining impact of different interventions, there is one more property
to explore. Assuming that cases of initial infections originate outside of the smaller
population subset, how long will it take for the first case(s) of infection to occur
within a particular subset? The answer is likely to be dependent on the relevant rate
parameters for a particular worm or virus as well as the ratio of population sizes
(between the size of subset and the size of the overall population) and we can illustrate
this using our models. Time can be an important factor when evaluating intervention
options. IDS/IPS and anti-virus vendors usually need some time to develop effective
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Figure 3.7: Time to first infection in sub-population. [Population = 1,000; sub-
population = 100; β = 1.8; γ = 0.75].
signatures for identifying exploit activity while efforts to patch vulnerable systems
may also require time for preparation and testing before implementation. In some
cases, vendors of IDS/IPS products may release signatures earlier for premium
or paying customers, while non-paying customers could be relying on community
released signatures, which may take longer to become available. Being able to model
the expected results of such intervention delays and expected activity may help
determine if paying for early access to signatures is cost-effective for a particular
organization.
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of times when an infection first occurred
within the subset of the smaller population for several runs of the stochastic model
with fixed parameters. Table 3.2 summarizes the expected time to first infection
(TTFI) in the smaller population subset for models using different parameters and
population sizes. The results show an increase in time to first infection for smaller
population subset sizes and a decrease in time to first infection with higher ratios of
β/γ (which indicates an infection may spread faster than infections are removed).
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Table 3.2: Time to first infection (TTFI) in internal population.
Population Subpop. β γ R0(β/γ) TTFI
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 2.4 1.6± 0.8
10,000 100 1.8 0.75 2.4 3.6± 1.9
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 2.4 1.6± 0.9
1,000 100 1.2 0.8 1.5 2.2± 1.2
10,000 100 1.2 0.8 1.5 5.7± 4.4
10,000 1,000 1.2 0.8 1.5 2.1± 1.2
Next we will examine the impact of some of the different interventions available.
The two types of interventions we will be modeling are patching of vulnerable
systems (modeled as vaccination) and IPS blocking at the border between the subset
population and the rest of the population. The blocking activity at the border is
modeled by specifying some permeability factor in the range [0, 1] where 0 means all
worm attack traffic is blocked, 1 means no worm attack traffic is blocked and values
in between mean some worm attack traffic is blocked between the population subset
and nodes outside of the subset. Effectively, this parameter scales or reduces the
value of β for externally infected neighbors of the internal (subset) population, but
β remains unchanged for infected neighbors of external nodes to each other or for
internally infected nodes with other internal nodes.
When gauging the impact outcomes of different intervention strategies, we
consider two aspects. The first is the number of infections and the second is the
total time of infection across all nodes in the population subset. The second aspect
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Figure 3.8: Example of vaccination only within a subpopulation.
while there may be somewhat uniform costs for recovering or remediating infected
computers, there may also be additional risks the longer computers remain infected.
Compromised computers may become joined to a botnet and engage in additional
attacks against both internal and external information resources.
Figure 3.8 shows an example of patching vulnerable systems (of the population
subset only) at a certain rate while Figure 3.9 shows an example of blocking infectious
traffic between internal and external nodes of the population subset. Table 3.3
summarizes some of the outcomes of different patching or blocking rates. The
results shown in Table 3.3 illustrate that intervention actions applied only to the
smaller population subset can reduce the number of infections within the subset.
Depending on the relative size of the subset, these actions may also reduce the
number of infections outside the subset. Combining interventions also shows a
positive interaction effect on reducing the number of infections in the subset.
We also make and explore a modification to the typically modeled vaccination
or patching transition. Just as the infection rate depends on number of infected
































































Figure 3.9: Example of blocking some externally infection connections.
Table 3.3: Summary of different outcomes based on vaccinations or blocking values.
Population Subpop β γ Vac. Rate Blocking Total Inf. Sub Inf. Sub Inf. Time 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.0 1.0 853 85.6 104±16.2 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.1 1.0 803 46.9 56.6±12.5 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.0 0.2 784 34.6 43.6±9.7 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.1 0.2 752 14.4 16.7±7.1 
         
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.0 1.0 8,524 852 1,057±46 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.1 1.0 7,761 345 423±66 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.0 0.2 7,732 328 410±38 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.1 0.2 7,390 105 130±29 
of susceptible systems. The rationale behind this is that the effort to patch vulnerable
systems is not uniform and that some systems will be patched earlier and at a quicker
rate which will then decline as there are fewer susceptible systems to patch and the
ones remaining may require more effort to patch and will therefore be patched at a
slower rate. This is implemented by changing the susceptible-to-recovered transition
(S → R) to:
• If: RAND < (SS/NS) ∗ ν ∗ ∆t, then change state of susceptible node to
recovered.
However, this change is only applied to nodes within the smaller population subset
(nodes outside the subset are not being patched) where SS is the number of susceptible





































































Figure 3.10: Example of proportional vaccination rate in population subset.
Table 3.4: Comparison of fixed and proportional rate patching efforts.
Population Subpop β γ Vac. Rate Total Inf. Sub Inf. Sub Inf. Time 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.0 853 85.6 104±16.2 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.1 (fixed) 803 46.9 56.6±12.5 
1,000 100 1.8 0.75 0.1 (proportional) 813 56.2 72.0±14.8 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.0 8,524 852 1,057±46 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.1 (fixed) 7,761 345 423±66 
10,000 1,000 1.8 0.75 0.1 (proportional) 7,949 465 572±63 
subset.
Figure 3.10 shows an example of patching vulnerable systems (of the population
subset only) at a rate proportional to the number of susceptible systems. Table 3.4
compares some of the outcomes of proportional and fixed rate patching efforts. For
the same parameter value, the proportional patching efforts result in somewhat
higher infection rates. This is because the effective patching rate declines as more
systems are patched rather than remaining constant until all susceptible systems are
patched.
3.5 Model Application Illustration
Using models to better capture and understand the underlying dynamics affect-
ing the proliferation of computer security incidents provides a means for identifying,
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testing, and evaluating interventions designed to reduce the number of incidents. The
effect of different interventions can be factored into model simulations by adjusting
relevant model parameters and results for different interventions can be compared.
Cost information can also be combined with model results and intervention choices
to provide additional context for decision making.
3.5.1 Baseline scenario
First we define a baseline scenario that will be used as a starting point for
simulation comparisons. We examine the number of infected hosts in a population
of 10,000 initially susceptible hosts for a period of 60 days for 1,000 simulation runs
with parameter values for infection, vaccination, and recovery rates sampled from
uniform random distributions within specified ranges. For some interventions, a fixed
parameter value for a blocking rate is also used. Table 3.5 provides a summary of
the parameter descriptions, designations, and values used for the baseline. The next
section describes the different interventions and the impact each intervention may
have on the baseline parameter values.
3.5.2 Interventions
Next we describe several different types of interventions that could be employed
to control types of computer security incidents for which SIR models apply. These
interventions include the installation of IDS/IPS, implementation of large-scale patch
management, addition of human security analyst, or some combination of these
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Table 3.5: Properties of baseline case for comparisons of interventions.
Description Designation Value
# of nodes/computers P (for population) 10,000
Time range T 60 (days)
Infection rate β unif. random [0.9, 2.4]
Recovery rate γ unif. random [0.4, 0.8]
Patch/vaccination rate ν unif. random [0.015, 0.035]
Blocking rate ρ 0 (no blocking)
# of simulations N 1,000
options.
• IDS/IPS–this intervention works by monitoring network traffic between hosts
and then blocking identified suspected malicious traffic. Typically identification
of malicious traffic is based on some kind of pattern or signature matching.
Although it will vary depending on the specific exploit being used, this type
of pattern matching usually means there will be some trade-off between the
number of false positives and false negatives. A very specific signature is more
likely to reduce the number of false positives (i.e. the blocking of traffic that
is not malicious), while also increasing the number of false negatives (i.e. the
permitting of traffic that is malicious). There are both free, open-source and
commercial IDS/IPS options available. Typically, one of the differences between
free and commercial offerings is the time for signatures to become available
for detecting new threats as well as the quality of new initial signatures. For
this illustration, we assume a commercial IDS/IPS releases signatures for new
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threats one day after discovery and signatures block 80% of associated malicious
traffic without false positives. For comparison purposes, we assume a free
IDS/IPS releases signatures for new threats three days after discovery and
signatures block 70% of associated malicious traffic without false positives.
• Patch management–this intervention works by automating and/or simplifying
the process of installing updates and patches to fix known vulnerabilities. This
can increase the rate at which susceptible hosts are removed and directly
transition to the recovered state without first becoming infected. Patches may
be for vulnerabilities found in operating systems and/or installed applications.
The complexity of a patch management solution may be very dependent on the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of installed operating systems and applications
in a large population.
• Security analyst–this intervention works by adding human analyst to monitor,
review, evaluate reports of events and potential malicious activity. The analyst
has the ability to isolate or block hosts which are deemed to be threats to
other hosts. An analyst will also review attack trends and will actively look for
early signs of malicious activity. Because of this, we assume a decrease from
two days to one day for the time gap between infection and discovery of initial
incidents. We also assume an analyst will increase the general rate infected
hosts are detected and removed/recovered.
Table 3.6 summarizes the intervention options and identifies some of the
combinations of interventions explored. When applicable, differences from the
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Table 3.6: Intervention properties.
Delay Block Block Patch Recov.
Index Description Cost ($) (S → I) delay rate rate rate
1 Baseline 0 2 - 0 - -
2 Free IDS (fIDS) 10k 2 3 0.7 - -
3 Pay IDS (pIDS) 55k 2 1 0.8 - -
4 Patch mgt (PM) 30k 2 - 0 +0.025 -
5 Analyst 75k 1 - 0 - +0.15
6 fIDS & PM 40k 2 3 0.7 +0.025 -
7 pIDS & PM 85k 2 1 0.8 +0.025 -
8 fIDS & Analyst 85k 1 3 0.7 - +0.15
baseline scenario parameters are indicated. Also included in the table is an estimated
cost value for an intervention or combination of interventions. The options shown
satisfy a cost constraint that intervention implementations must not exceed $100,000
($100k). This constraint was imposed as an example of a constraint due to finite
resources. Cost aspects are further discussed in the next section.
3.5.3 Costs related to outcomes and interventions
Two cost aspects considered when comparing interventions are the cost of the
intervention itself as well as the costs related to the outcomes. The outcome costs
include estimated costs for recovering or restoring infected hosts (per host), estimated
costs for patching susceptible hosts (per host), and an estimated value related to
increased risk of other types of malicious activity from infected hosts during the
time they are infected. Table 3.6 shows values for each intervention option explored
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Table 3.7: Outcome related costs.
Description Cost ($)
Patched node (includes risk of bad patch) 1
Infected → Recovered node 5
Max. exposure (total time infected) risk cost 10,000
and Table 3.7 shows recovery and patching costs (per host) as well as the maximum
value attributable to the risk of infected hosts being used for other types of malicious
activity.
The associated risk cost is calculated using a logistic (or sigmoid) function
based on the simulation results of the baseline case. The total time infected across
hosts in a simulation is divided by the maximum total time infected across all
hosts using the baseline scenario (which was 21,673.8 “host-days”; the theoretical
maximum is 10,000 nodes * 60 days = 600,000 “host-days”), then an associated
risk cost value is determined. The curve centered around 12,500, which means if a
simulation results in 12,500 total time hosts are infected, the associated risk cost
value is $5,000 (or 1/2 of the maximum $10,000 cost). The cost value for patching
hosts is intended to include both the time and effort to test and apply patches, but
also additional costs that may be incurred if a patch does not work as intended and
causes downtime. The cost value for recovering nodes is intended to include the
time and effort to restore original functionality to a host while also ensuring it is no
longer susceptible. These cost values are likely to be organization dependent and
the values shown are for illustrative purposes only.
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Figure 3.11 shows the implementation costs for each intervention (labeled as
“Base costs”) as well as box plots for range of patching, recovery, and risk costs for
1,000 simulations for each intervention option. Figure 3.12 shows box plots for all of
the outcome related costs (patching, recovery, and risk) combined while Figure 3.13
also adds in the implementation costs for each option to show the range of total costs.
While total costs may be one of the factors considered when comparing intervention
options, reduction of uncertainty may be another factor used during evaluation of
choices.
Looking at the total costs shown in Figure 3.13, intervention option 2 (free IDS)
has the lowest median cost based on simulations. Intervention option 3 (commercial
IDS) has the fourth highest median cost based on simulations, but the least variability
among the five lowest median cost interventions.
In this chapter, we described and illustrated a method for modeling the spread
of computer security incidents based on the SIR compartmental type of model
originally applied to the spread of some types of diseases in human and animal
populations. We demonstrated how different types of typical intervention actions
(blocking and patching) could also be represented using the model. We illustrated
how the model could be modified to examine behavior within a particular subset
of the population and explained why this would be a desirable property. Using
the models, we illustrated how the time-to-first-infection in the population subset
decreased as the size of the population subset increased relative to the size of the
full population. We also explored and illustrated how a proportional rather than





















































































































Figure 3.11: Intervention cost components.
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Figure 3.12: Intervention options outcome costs combined.





























Figure 3.13: Intervention options total combined costs (implementation and out-
comes).
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of a decreased rate of patching over time as the number of remaining unpatched
computers also decreased. We provided an example illustrating the use of the models
(in combination with cost information) to evaluate and compare outcomes resulting
from different intervention decisions. This demonstrated a method for using the
models as a resource planning tool. The example showed how the different types of
cost information could be combined with the model outcomes to provide final costs
estimates which take into account intervention and outcomes costs. Several types of
intervention implementations were modeled and compared. For the values used in
the illustration, we saw that while total costs for some interventions were higher than
others, these intervention actions may also result in less variable outcomes which
could be a desirable aspect.
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Chapter 4: Email Propagation Models
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we describe a stochastic model for a worm or virus that spreads
using email, and we illustrate some aspects of the model in an interconnected popula-
tion of computers and users. This model is similar to the stochastic compartmental
SIR model covered previously, but there are some important differences. For some
transitions to occur in the email propagation model, several conditions may be re-
quired. While the previous SIR model assumes direct contact between computers and
does not include aspects of a user, the email propagation model includes two aspects
related to user interaction. These are the frequency at which email messages are
checked and the user likelihood for opening an infected email message. An overview
of the basic stochastic email propagation model is followed by more discussion and
illustration of some aspects of modeling and the use of interventions for controlling
the spread of computer security incidents that transfer via email.
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4.2 Stochastic Email Propagation Model
Like the previously described SIR models, the email propagation model desig-
nates hosts to be in one of three compartments or states: Susceptible (S), Infected
(I), or Removed/Recovered (R). However, the transition from S → I is defined
differently and requires more than one condition to be met before a transition will
occur. A summary of the steps taken to determine if a susceptible node transitions
to an infected node is as follows:
• For each susceptible node, identify already infected neighbors. Neighbors
are other nodes with a direct connection to the susceptible node. Different
connection topologies can be used, such as fully-connected, randomly connected,
or scale-free (power law).
• For each susceptible node, determine the number of new infected messages
received. A binomial distribution, based on the number of infected neighbors,
is used for determining the number of new infected messages sent.
• For each susceptible node, add the number of new infected messages received
to the number of previously unchecked infected messages.
• For each susceptible node, determine if the associated user (assuming a one-
to-one correspondence between number of nodes and number of users) checks
messages. At each time step, a uniform random probability distribution is used
to determine if a user has checked messages. For a large number of users, this
results in a approximation of a normal distribution.
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• If a user checks messages, then for each infected message present, determine
if the user has opened the infected message. Each user is assigned a value
representing the likelihood of opening an infected message. The assigned values
are based on an exponential distribution where most users have a low likelihood
of opening an infected message, but a very small number of users have a higher
likelihood of opening an infected message. If one or more infected messages
are opened, then that node changes from susceptible to infected.
The transition from I → R is the same as in the SIR models described previously
and depends on the recovery rate parameter γ. The transition from S → R is also
the same as in the previous models with ν as the vaccination rate; however, it should
be noted that the node becomes vaccinated, not the associated user. This means a
recovered node may still receive infected messages and the associated user may still
open the infected messages, but the node itself will no longer become infected and will
not send out infected messages to its neighbors. The recovery and vaccination rate
parameters are assumed to remain relatively constant or fixed in time for the interval
being modeled. Some of the previously described steps are similar to steps described
in [70]. However, our models are an entirely independent implementation using the
R [68] programming language and include variations not previously examined. An
example of the R code used for the email models is provided in Appendix C.
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4.3 Network Topology
The SIR models covered in Chapter 3 assume fully-connected networks. This
may be a reasonable assumption for worms that propagate directly from computer-to-
computer; however, malware that spreads via email may not fit with this assumption.
Email propagation involves a user component which is not present in the previously
described SIR models. While the computers themselves may be fully connected
through the same network links used by worms that spread directly from computer-
to-computer, the spread of malware through the exchange of email messages is more
likely to follow or be influenced by connections or contacts between users instead of
the network links between computers.
Scale-free (or power law) networks [69] are one type of connection topology
that have been used to model social connections and may be suitable for representing
email exchanges. Propagation in scale-free networks can be compared to propagation
in randomly connected networks that use approximately the same number of links but
have a different node-degree distribution. Figure 4.1 shows some example network
connection topologies and their associated frequency distribution of node-degrees.
While the fully-connected example with 10 nodes has a total of 45 connection links,
both the scale-free and randomly-connected examples have a total of 24 connection
links each. Although these examples only include 10 nodes, the node degree histogram
for the scale-free network is consistent with a power law distribution while the node











































































Figure 4.1: Network connection topology examples and node-degrees.
The arrangement of links in the network may influence the spread of an email
virus, but the overall level of connectedness may also have an impact. There is more
potential for an email virus to spread in a more fully connected network than in a
sparsely connected one. This aspect is explored and illustrated later.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of number of nodes in each state over time for a
scale-free network topology example. Also shown is the number of infected messages
sent at each time step along with a histogram of the node-degree distribution of
the network. Figure 4.3 shows the same information, but for a randomly connected
network topology example for the same number of nodes and approximately the
same number of links used in the scale-free example. Although a similar number of
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Figure 4.3: Random network topology example (≈20% connected, β = 1.0, γ = 0.3).
well as when many of the infected messages are sent, is different in each case. In
these examples, the infection appears to take longer before it begins to spread in
the randomly connected network than in the scale-free connected network. Table 4.1
shows some of the values used and obtained for the examples illustrated in Figures 4.2
and 4.3.














Scale-free 1,000 94,950 190 181 580 
Random 1,000 94,758 190 191 624 
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4.4 Human Factors
The previously covered SIR models do not include aspects of human user
activity on the infectious process. Those models assume that human action is not
necessary for a worm or virus to spread as an infection is passed directly from
computer-to-computer though a network connection. However, a model for how an
infection may spread through email does incorporate elements of human users. We
describe two primary aspects included in our models below.
4.4.1 Email checking interval rate
A network worm or virus that spreads directly from computer-to-computer
without requiring any user interaction can be approximated as a continuous process.
However, in the case of a worm or virus that spreads through email and requires
some kind of user interaction (such as opening an infected message), the spreading
process may be more discrete or event-driven in nature.
Because user interaction is required for an email worm or virus to spread, each
node in the model or simulation has an associated human user. One aspect of the
user included in the model is how often a user checks or reads new messages. For
each time step, the base model selects a value from a uniform random distribution
(between 0 and 1) for each user; if the value exceeds a threshold value (presented
simulations use a threshold value of 0.5), the user is defined as having checked
for messages at that time step. This results in an overall normal distribution for
frequency of message checking across all users.
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The above technique for modeling user email checking behavior treats all users
the same and samples from a uniform random distribution. However, other variations
could also be used. One modification could be to adjust the threshold value in
relation to the size of the time step so that the mean value is centered around a
desired target value. For example, to represent users having a 70% daily rate for
email checking, a threshold value of 0.70 could be used when one time step is equal
to one day, or a threshold value of 0.07 could be used when one time step is equal to
1/10 of a day. This would allow for the same mean value of email checks during the
same time interval (one day).
Another modification could be to sample from a different type of distribution,
such as a normal or an exponential distribution. An example of this is presented
in [70]. Another approach could be to model each user independently by assigning
each user a parameter value used for defining individual user-specific distributions
to sample from. This would capture the possibility that some users may consistently
check messages more frequently than others, and this behavior, when coupled with a
higher number of contacts, could change the spreading behavior of a worm or virus.
These variations are not explored in this document.
Figures 4.4 through 4.7 show examples of changing the threshold value used
for simulating the email checking frequency of the model. Figure 4.4 corresponds
to a user having a 25% chance of checking for new email messages at each time
step. Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 correspond to 50%, 75%, and 100% chances of a user
checking for new email messages at each time step respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Random topology, less frequent email checking.
times checking for emails during the 30-day simulation run (as seen in Figure 4.4(c)).
Figure 4.4(a) shows the lowest number of infected nodes during the time span
compared to Figures 4.5(a), 4.6(a), and 4.7(a). Figure 4.4(b) shows the lowest
number of infected messages being sent overall and at peak value compared to
Figures 4.5(b), 4.6(b), and 4.7(b). Since emails are checked less frequently, there are
fewer opportunities for the worm or virus to spread. Since the detection and removal
rate parameter is unchanged, infections that do occur are still removed at the same
rate. A slower infection rate combined with an unchanged removal rate results in
fewer overall infections during the same time window and likely for an extended
window as well. Increased email checking by the associated user population appears
to push the timing of peak infection occurrence and the timing of peak infected
messages sent earlier in the time interval; the magnitude of these peaks appear be
larger as well. Table 4.2 indicates that similar observations likely apply to scale-free
connected topologies, as the total number of infected nodes and the total time of





































Number of Inf. Messages













0 3 6 9 12 16 20 24 28
Medium frequency email checking
 (random link topology)
(c)





















































Number of Inf. Messages













0 3 6 9 12 16 20 24 28
High frequency email checking
 (random link topology)
(c)













































Number of Inf. Messages













0 3 6 9 12 16 20 24 28
Maximum frequency email checking
 (random link topology)
(c)


















Figure 4.7: Random topology, maximum email checking.
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Random 95,067±262 30 Low 54±38 180±141 
Random 94,940±307 70 Medium 212±34 690±140 
Random 94,957±302 83 High 293±16 969±79 
Scale-free 94,950 50 Low 62±33 193±113 
Scale-free 94,950 85 Medium 207±51 677±186 
Scale-free 94,950 95 High 285±14 949±84 
 
4.4.2 Likelihood to open infected message
Another user aspect included in the model is the likelihood that a user will open
an infected message. For modeling purposes, each user has an assigned likelihood
threshold value for opening an infected message. This value is compared to sampled
values to determine if a particular user opens a particular infected message. The
base model samples from a uniform random distribution (between 0 and 1). Then
for each infected email message, the sampled value is compared to the predefined
threshold value (also between 0 and 1)to determine if the infected message is opened.
If the sampled value is less than the threshold value for a particular user, the model
assumes the infected message was opened and an infection may occur. The assigned
threshold values remain unchanged for each user throughout a simulation.
The overall distribution of assigned likelihood (or threshold) values for all
users is based on an exponential distribution where the majority of users have low
likelihood values (i.e. these users are less likely to open an infected message), but a
few users have higher likelihood values. We explore the use of exponentially based
distributions for assigning likelihood values because it has previously been observed
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5,000 users (decreasing sorted values)
Uniform random user likelihood value
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Figure 4.8: User likelihood distribution examples with similar expected values. [Red
line shows the population expected value.]
that in many types of tasks, the distribution of the number of accidents among people
is better described by a Poisson distribution than a Gaussian distribution [71]. The
opening of infected email messages may follow a similar distribution to these accidents.
Other distributions for assigning user likelihood values for opening infected messages
are possible and we make comparisons between models using the uniform random
distribution for assigning user likelihood threshold values. The work presented in
[70] only illustrates using a Gaussian distribution for modeling this factor.
When making comparisons between models using different types of distributions
for assigning user likelihood threshold values, we attempt to keep the expected
values that an infected message would be opened the same for the populations (see
Figure 4.8). This means, if other factors are equal, about the same number of
infected messages would be opened, but the distribution of opened messages among
users (i.e. 10 different users opening one infected message each versus 1 user opening
10 infected messages alone) of opened infected messages would be different when
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Figure 4.9: Random topology (≈20% connected), expected user likelihood for opening
infected messages ≈12.5%, exponential distribution of likelihoods.
The user likelihood values for opening infected messages are assigned indepen-
dently of the associated node connection topology. There is likely an interaction
effect between these two factors. For example, a highly connected node with an
associated user that is assigned a high likelihood for opening infected messages may
extend the spread of a worm or virus that spreads through email. Because the node
is highly connected, it has a higher chance of receiving infected messages due to
having a higher number of neighbors. Since the associated user is also more likely to
open an infected message (thus infecting the node), the node also has the potential
to send out a larger number of infected messages due to being highly connected.
The comparison of Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 to Figure 4.12
shows an increase in the overall number of infections when a higher number of users is
more likely to open an infected message (regardless of the specific network topology)
for an exponentially based distribution of likelihood values. The magnitude of the
change appears to be larger for the random network topology, but Figures 4.9-4.12
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Figure 4.10: Random Topology (≈20% connected), expected user likelihood for
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Figure 4.11: Scale-free topology (≈20% connected), expected user likelihood for
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Figure 4.12: Scale-free topology (≈20% connected), expected user likelihood for
































Number in Recovered State






















Number in Recovered State






















Number in Recovered State






















Number in Recovered State














0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Figure 4.13: Uniform random likelihood to open infected messages; randomly con-
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Figure 4.14: Uniform random likelihood to open infected messages; scale-free con-
nected network with different link levels.
Figures 4.13-4.16 show boxplots summarizing the number of recovered nodes
for 2,500 simulations using 5,000 nodes for both random and scale-free network
topologies at several different connectivity levels. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the
results of using a uniform random distribution of values for user likelihoods for
opening infected messages. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the results of using an
exponentially based distribution of values with the same overall expected value as
the uniform random distribution used in Figures 4.13 and 4.14. More variability
in the results is seen in the randomly connected topology examples Figures 4.13
and 4.15) compared to the scale-free examples (Figures 4.14 and 4.16). In particular,
instances of non-spreading infections appear in some of the 25% connectivity level
examples (Figures 4.13(c) and 4.15(c)), while non-spreading infections first appear
in the 12.5% connectivity level scale-free examples (Figures 4.14(d) and 4.16(d)).
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Figure 4.15: Exponential based likelihood to open infected messages; randomly
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Figure 4.16: Exponential based likelihood to open infected messages; scale-free
connected network with different link levels.
of network connection topologies, the exponentially based distribution of values for
user likelihoods for opening infected messages results in fewer overall infected (or
recovered) nodes for the same overall expected value of infected messages opened.
4.5 Interventions (Blocking and Patching)
The two interventions discussed in regard to the SIR model in Chapter 3 can
also be applied to the email propagation model–blocking and patching. However,
instead of blocking at a network “border” as discussed for the previous SIR models,
blocking could occur at a mail server that receives/delivers messages for the set or
subset of users associated with the nodes or hosts. Messages being sent from one
node to another node will traverse a mail server which can be set to detect and
block transmission of infected messages. The implementation for the blocking (or
filtering) of messages may not happen right away. In cases of a delay, it is possible
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for unopened infected messages to exist (and potentially cause new infections) even
after blocking is implemented; however, further spreading beyond the newly infected
node(s) would be blocked.
Patching underlying vulnerabilities is applied in the same way as in the previous
SIR models in Chapter 3. Patching is applied to nodes or hosts. It does not prevent
infected messages from being received or opened by a user, but it would prevent a
node or host from becoming infected if a user were to open an infected message.
By including human user aspects in the email propagation model, an additional
intervention can be explored. Because a user needs to open an infected message
(on a susceptible host) in order for an infection to occur, user education or user-
awareness training can try to reduce the likelihood users will open infected messages.
As previously mentioned, the impact of changing a user’s likelihood for opening
an infected message will partially depend on the number of contacts for the user
(reflected in the connectedness of the associated node).
Figures 4.17-4.18 show examples of the results of applying patching, blocking,
and a combination of both interventions for randomly and scale-free connected
network topologies at different connectivity levels. The randomly connected topol-
ogy examples use a uniform random distribution for the user likelihood values for
opening infected messages, while the scale-free examples use an exponentially based
distribution (with the same overall expected value) for these values. Shown are
boxplots of the number of recovered nodes for 2,500 simulations using 5,000 nodes.
For examples where the patching intervention is used, the boxplots show only the
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Figure 4.17: Effect of patching vulnerable computers; random topology, unif. random
likelihood for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for number of patched
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Figure 4.18: Effect of patching vulnerable computers; scale-free topology, exp. based
likelihood for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for number of patched
nodes for reference, green line is mean value for nodes that become infected before
being recovered.]
include nodes that were patched (and transitioned directed from the susceptible state
to the recovered state). The red lines in Figures 4.17 and 4.18 provide a reference
for the mean value of the number of nodes that become recovered by being patched.
The red lines in Figures 4.19-4.22 show the mean value of the number of nodes in
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Figure 4.19: Effect of blocking most infected emails; random topology, unif. ran-
dom likelihood for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for unblocked
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Figure 4.20: Effect of blocking most infected emails; scale-free topology; exp. based
likelihood for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for unblocked simula-
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Figure 4.21: Effect of blocking and patching; random topology, unif. random
likelihood for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for unblocked and

































Infected to Recovered Transitions






















Infected to Recovered Transitions






















Infected to Recovered Transitions






















Infected to Recovered Transitions














0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Figure 4.22: Effect of blocking and patching; scale-free toplogy; exp. based likelihood
for opening infected emails. [Red line is mean value for unblocked and unpatched
simulations for reference, green line is mean value for simulations with blocking and
patching.]
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The following observations regarding the simulation examples shown in Fig-
ures 4.17-4.22 can be made:
• Blocking (Figures 4.19 and 4.20) seems to slow the spread of the infection, but
does not seem to reduce the total number of infections as much as patching
(although this does depend on the specific parameter values used for these
simulations);
• More notably, Figures 4.19(e) and 4.20(e) indicate that the effectiveness of
blocking declines as the network becomes more sparsely connected;
• Comparing Figures 4.17(e) and 4.18(e) with Figures 4.19(e) and 4.20(e) respec-
tively, indicates that patching retains its effectiveness in reducing the spread
of infections better than blocking across declining levels of connection links
(for the specific parameter values used for these simulations).
4.6 Model Application Illustration
This section provides illustration of using the previously described models to
compare different interventions and including cost information to provide additional
context for decision making.
4.6.1 Baseline scenario
First we define a baseline scenario that will be used as a starting point for
simulation comparisons. We examine the number of infected hosts in a population of
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Table 4.3: Properties of baseline case for comparisons of interventions.
Description Designation Value
# of nodes/computers P (for population) 10,000
Connection topology Topo scale-free
Fraction connected nodes FC unif. random [0.1, 0.2]
Time range T 90 (days)
Infection rate β unif. random [0.2, 1.2]
Recovery rate γ unif. random [0.2, 1.0]
Patch/vaccination rate ν unif. random [0.015, 0.035]
Blocking/filtering rate ρ 0 (no blocking/filtering)
User likelihood for opening UL unif. random [0.05, 0.15]
# of simulations N 1,000
10,000 initially susceptible hosts for a period of 90 days for 1,000 simulation runs each
with parameter values for infection, vaccination, and recovery rates sampled from
uniform random distributions within specified ranges. All of the simulations included
in this section use a scale-free network connection topology and an exponential
based distribution for user likelihood values for opening infected messages. For some
interventions, a fixed parameter value for a blocking rate is also used, but no messages
are blocked or filtered in the baseline scenario. Table 4.3 provides a summary of
the parameter descriptions, designations, and values used for the baseline. The next
section describes the different interventions and the impact each intervention may
have on the baseline parameter values.
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4.6.2 Interventions
Next we describe several different types of interventions that could be em-
ployed to control types of computer security incidents for which the described email
propagation model applies. These interventions include the installation of mail
blocking/filtering, implementation of large-scale patch management, implementation
of user awareness training, or some combination of these options.
• Mail blocking/filtering–this intervention works by scanning email traffic content
arriving at a mail server then blocking identified suspected malicious messages.
Typically identification of malicious email content is based on some kind of
pattern or signature matching of several of the email message and email header
components. Although it will vary depending on the attack vector being
used, this type of pattern matching usually means there will be some trade-
off between the number of false positives and false negatives. A very specific
signature is more likely to reduce the number of false positives (i.e. the blocking
of messages that are not malicious), while also increasing the number of false
negatives (i.e. the permitting of messages that are malicious). There are both
free, open-source and commercial mail filtering options available. Typically,
one of the differences between free and commercial offerings is the time for
signatures to become available for detecting new threats as well as the quality
of new initial signatures. For this illustration, we assume a commercial mail
filtering product releases signatures for new threats one day after discovery and
signatures block 99% of associated malicious messages without false positives.
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For comparison purposes, we assume a free mail filtering product releases
signatures for new threats three days after discovery and signatures block 95%
of associated malicious traffic without false positives.
• Patch management–this intervention works by automating and/or simplifying
the process of installing updates and patches to fix known vulnerabilities. This
can increase the rate at which susceptible hosts are removed and directly
transition to the recovered state without first becoming infected. Patches may
be for vulnerabilities found in operating systems and/or installed applications.
The complexity of a patch management solution may be very dependent on the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of installed operating systems and applications in
a large population. As previously noted, the computers or nodes are patched,
not the associated users.
• User awareness training–this intervention aims to work by increasing user
awareness to the possibility and signs of malicious messages to reduce the
overall likelihood of users to open infected or malicious email messages. For
illustration purposes, we assume an awareness training campaign decreases the
overall user population expected likelihood value for opening infected messages
by 4%.
Table 4.4 summarizes the intervention options and identifies some of the
combinations of interventions explored. When applicable, differences from the
baseline scenario parameters are indicated. Also included in the table is an estimated
cost value for an intervention or combination of interventions. The options shown
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Table 4.4: Intervention properties.
Block Block Patch User
Index Description Cost ($) delay rate rate likelihood
1 Baseline 0 - 0 - -
2 Free filter (FF) 10k 3 0.95 - -
3 Pay filter (PF) 55k 1 0.99 - -
4 Patch mgt (PM) 30k - 0 +0.025 -
5 User training (UT) 25k - 0 - –0.04
6 FF & PM 40k 3 0.95 +0.025 -
7 FF & UT 35k 3 0.95 - –0.04
8 PM & UT 55k - 0 +0.025 –0.04
satisfy a cost constraint that intervention implementations must not exceed $60,000
($60k). This constraint was imposed as an example of a constraint due to finite
resources. Cost aspects are further discussed in the next section.
4.6.3 Costs related to outcomes and interventions
Two cost aspects considered when comparing interventions are the cost of the
intervention itself as well as the costs related to the outcomes. The outcome costs
include estimated costs for recovering or restoring infected hosts (per host), estimated
costs for patching susceptible hosts (per host), and an estimated value related to
increased risk of other types of malicious activity from infected hosts during the
time they are infected. Table 4.4 shows values for each intervention option explored
and Table 4.5 shows recovery and patching costs (per host) as well as the maximum
value attributable to the risk of infected hosts being used for other types of malicious
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Table 4.5: Outcome related costs.
Description Cost ($)
Patched node (includes risk of bad patch) 1
Infected → Recovered node 5
Max. exposure (total time infected) risk cost 10,000
activity.
The associated risk cost is calculated using a logistic (or sigmoid) function
based on the simulation results of the baseline case. The total time infected across
hosts in a simulation is divided by the maximum total time infected across all hosts
using the baseline scenario (which was 34,159 “host-days”; the theoretical maximum
is 10,000 nodes * 90 days = 900,000 “host-days”), then an associated risk cost value
is determined. The curve is centered around 17,500, which means if a simulation
results in 17,500 total time hosts are infected, the associated risk cost value is $5,000
(or 1/2 of the maximum $10,000 cost). The cost value for patching hosts is intended
to include both the time and effort to test and apply patches, but also additional
costs that may be incurred if a patch does not work as intended and causes downtime.
The cost value for recovering nodes is intended to include the time and effort to
restore original functionality to a host while also ensuring it is no longer susceptible.
These cost values are likely to be organization dependent and the values shown are
for illustrative purposes only.
Figure 4.23 shows the implementation costs for each intervention (labeled as
“Base costs”) as well as box plots for range of patching, recovery, and risk costs for
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1,000 simulations for each intervention option. Figure 4.24 shows box plots for all of
the outcome related costs (patching, recovery, and risk) combined while Figure 4.25
also adds in the implementation costs for each option to show the range of total costs.
While total costs may be one of the factors considered when comparing intervention
options, reduction of uncertainty may be another factor used during evaluation of
choices.
Looking at the total costs shown in Figure 4.25, intervention option 2 (free
filtering) has the lowest median cost based on simulations (except for the baseline
scenario which involves no interventions). Intervention option 7 (free filtering
combined with user awareness training) is in the middle in terms of median cost
of interventions based on the simulations, but has least variability among the
interventions explored.
In this chapter, we presented a model for email virus propagation and discussed
some potential influencing factors such as different network connection topologies and
aspects of user behavior–most notably, the distribution of user likelihoods to open
an infected email message. We show how decreasing connectivity levels decreases the
total number of infected nodes and that this decrease is more variable for randomly
connected networks than for scale-free networks with the same number of total
connection links (for both uniform and exponential based user likelihoods for opening
infected messages). We also covered how two available types of interventions (patching
and blocking) can be explored with the model. This included an illustration of how
intervention outcomes could be affected by network topology, level of connection links





















































































































Figure 4.23: Intervention cost components.
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Figure 4.24: Intervention options outcome costs combined.




























Figure 4.25: Intervention options total combined costs (implementation and out-
comes).
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appeared to become less effective for both connection topologies as the level of
connection links decreases while the patching intervention appeared to retain its
effectiveness better in the same circumstances. We provided an example illustrating
the use of the models (in combination with cost information) to evaluate and
compare outcomes resulting from different intervention implementations (including
an intervention targeting user-awareness). This example demonstrated a method
for using the models as a resource planning tool. The example showed how the
different types of cost information could be combined with the model outcomes to
provide final costs estimates which take into account intervention and outcomes costs.
Several types of intervention implementations were modeled and compared. For the
values used in the illustration, we saw that intervention implementations employing
an aspect of user-awareness training were more cost effective than implementation
involving patching.
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Chapter 5: Software Reliability Growth and Time Series Models
5.1 Overview
When the symptoms or signs of a new type or strain of disease begins to affect
human populations at noticeable and recorded levels, the underlying cause(s) may
take time to determine. At this stage, often the frequency of symptom or disease
occurrence is the only information available to make projections regarding future
trends. The same can be true with regards to computer security incidents. The
models presented in this chapter differ from the previously covered SIR and email
propagation models. Two types of models described in this chapter can be used
with historical data of incident occurrence over time to provide forecasts of future
incident levels in time. These two types of models depend on different assumptions
regarding the data being modeled. In Chapter 6, both types of models are applied
to forecasting different types of computer security incidents to see which type of
model may work best for certain types of incidents and to see if there are some
general observations that can be made about forecasting the frequency of occurrence
of computer security incidents.
The models presented in this chapter are less explanatory in nature and do not
try to mimic or replicate the underlying dynamics and instead only try to describe
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and forecast the observed data based on certain assumptions and simplifications
regarding the underlying dynamics. While the causes of some types of computer
security incidents may be known, such as when a particular computer worm is known
to exploit a specific operating system vulnerability, the number of computers that
contain this specific vulnerability and are exploitable is often unknown (the presence
of the vulnerability itself may not be a sufficient condition for an event to occur; or
some form of host-based antivirus software may provide additional protection). The
causes of other types of incidents may never be determined and could be attributable
to several different possible security failings. In some cases, these incident types are
only detected based on how the computers are being used following an attack (such
as acting as a relay for spam) and not by how the initial exploit occurred or was
created. However, occurrences of these incident types may follow a pattern related
to motivations behind an attack rather than with the distribution of vulnerabilities
present in a population of computers.
5.2 Software Reliability Growth Models
In the context of software reliability, software reliability growth models have
been used to describe the software defect detection process. In general, the as-
sumptions driving software reliability include that software failures are caused by
unpredictable events that do not have a corresponding remedy within the software
and the failures that occur are independent. If the exploitation of vulnerable com-
puters is viewed as being similar to the detection of faults in software, then software
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reliability growth models may be suitable for forecasting the level of future incident
occurrence. In this view, attackers take the role of being testers of the software and
identifying software faults present in a system. As illustrated in the previous discus-
sion regarding SIR models, if only a part of a larger population is being examined,
the assumption that failures or incidents are independent may still be valid even
for incidents that can spread from computer to computer. Some software reliability
growth modeling concepts are applied to computer security incidents to see if this
view is useful. Computers may be vulnerable due to flaws in software coding, but
may also be vulnerable due to other factors such as improper or weak configurations.
5.2.1 Trend analysis
Trend analysis is a useful tool for gauging the applicability of using software
reliability growth models. One test of reliability growth for a given time interval is
to compare the expected number of failures in a given subinterval of time to the
expected number of failures in a same size subinterval of time occurring earlier in the
overall set. If, on average, the expected number of failures during the later subinterval
of time is less than the expected number of failures for the earlier subinterval, the
data indicate reliability growth [72]. The Laplace test is an analytical trend test that
can be used to gauge reliability growth.
The time interval for a category of incidents is defined as being from the first
day an incident of that type was observed through the last day such an incident
was observed. Alternate starting points for time intervals were also considered,
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such as vulnerability discovery dates published by CERT or software vendors (such
as Microsoft). Release dates for various operating systems are another possibility.
However, since some incidents are not easily connected to a single vulnerability and
others work across multiple operating system versions and types, these methods were
not used. It is also unknown precisely when detection capabilities for a particular
incident type were added to the IDS or how much time occurred between watching for
and observation of the first detected incident for a category of incidents. Therefore,
the first day an incident was observed was selected to be the start of the time interval
used.
Usually failure data is reported either as the time between failures (interfailure
times) or as the number of failures for equally sized intervals of time. Because
there are days in which a high number of incidents are detected and little specific
information regarding the time of day the incidents occurred, the equation used for













where a time interval [0, T ] is divided into k equal units of time (days are used as
the unit of time for our data) and n(i) is the number of failures (incidents) observed
during the ith unit of time. According to reference [72], the practical interpretation
of the Laplace test regarding reliability growth can be summarized as:
1. Negative values of the Laplace factor indicate a decreasing failure intensity
92
(reliability growth);
2. Positive values suggest an increasing failure intensity (reliability decay);
3. Values varying between -2 and +2 indicate stable reliability.
Plotting the Laplace factor over the time period of collected data is useful for
viewing the trend evolution. Such a plot may indicate problems to be examined
more closely by someone familiar with the context of the data. Changes in the slope
of the plotted values may indicate a local shift in the reliability growth or decay of
the data. This may merit closer examination to look for causal factors for the shift.
The information shown in a plot of the Laplace factor values can be used to aid
the selection of reliability growth models that will provide better estimates. Models
can be selected whose assumptions are more consistent with the data as indicated
by the trends [74].
5.2.2 Software reliability growth models
Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGMs) are often used to describe and
predict failures and faults in software systems. In many systems, reliability is assumed
to increase over time as faults are found and fixed and as users become more familiar
with the features of a system and can avoid or adjust to different failure states.
Most Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) models assume the cumula-
tive number of failures that occur over a time interval can be described by a Poisson
process with a mean value function µ(t) and the number of detected failures is
proportional to the total number of faults in a system. The mean value functions
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for NHPP models examined are nonlinear and defined by two parameters. Detected
failures or observed computer security incidents may correspond to the R(t) output
of an SIR model, which may be represented using NHPP models. There are widely
accepted and well-defined methods for estimating NHPP model parameters from
observed data.
The results provided in Chapter 6 are based on four different NHPP models:
the Goel-Okumoto (G-O) model [23], the S-Shaped model [24], the K-Stage Curve
model [25], and the Duane model [26]. These models were selected because they
represent some of the common NHPP models in use today. Three of them belong
to the finite failures model class, except for the Duane model, which is an infinite
failures model. In the NHPP models, the mean value function equals zero at time
zero (zero failures found at the very beginning). The parameters of the model are
estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique. The likelihood
function, L(θ)|ti), for the NHPP models is [75]:




where θ is a set of model parameters, T is the observation duration, and ti are the
observed failure times, i = 1, 2 . . . N . The estimated model parameters are those
which maximize the likelihood function. The natural logarithm of this likelihood, or
the log-likelihood `, is more convenient to work with when computing each estimate.
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The mean value function for the G-O model is given by
µ(t) = α(1− e−βt). (5.3)
The mean value function for the S-Shaped model is given by
µ(t)− α
[
1− (1 + βt)e−βt
]
. (5.4)










The mean value function for the Duane model is given by
µ(t) = αtβ. (5.6)
For three of the models (G-O, S-Shaped, K-Stage) the parameter α can be interpreted
as the total number of errors in the system as t→∞, and β can be interpreted as
the error detection rate. These interpretations do not apply to the Duane model.
5.3 Time Series Models
In the previous sections, the use of software reliability growth models was
described for fitting and forecasting the number of computer security incidents
occurring in some time interval. These types of models were chosen based on the
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idea that computer security incidents could be viewed as analogous to faults in a
system where external attackers are functioning as testers of the system.
However, other types of models with fewer assumptions than either SIR or SRG
models can be applied. Since many computer security incidents may be the result of
a computer virus or worm, techniques used in the field of epidemiology and infectious
disease surveillance can also provide a useful framework. Chapters 3 and 4 examined
aspects of the standard SIR model and an adaptation to include propagation by
email. Previous discussion of the email propagation model illustrated how different
interconnection topologies can produce varying epidemic patterns even when other
factors are the same [59], and new strains (or variants) of viruses can emerge rendering
existing vaccinations less effective. Models attempting to incorporate or account for
the influence of these factors can increase in computational complexity. When it
comes to modeling computer security incidents, the dynamics behind some incident
types may not be well understood or simply may not be aptly described by or result
from a contagious or infectious process model.
Another approach is to use time series analysis and modeling. Just as epidemic
models based on the spread of diseases in human populations have been applied to
modeling computer security incidents, techniques for applying time series models to




Univariate time series models can be used to predict future values of a variable
based only on its past measurements. These models do not rely on being able
to measure or explain the causal factors underlying the behavior of the observed
variable. Instead, the time series models are constructed to account for patterns
in past movements in a manner useful for forecasting future behavior [76]. This is
different from many other types of models.
While there are many types of time series models, we focus on a widely used
and commonly applied class of linear models presented by Box and Jenkins [77]
for univariate time series. These models combine autoregressive (AR) and moving
average (MA) models into the combined autoregressive moving average (ARMA)
models. In particular, we explore using autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) models, which are one of the most commonly used models for univariate
time series. The ARIMA model is a generalization of the ARMA model but includes
a parameter for a differencing transformation of the data.
An AR model of order p denoted AR(p) expresses the observed value at time t
as:




where X is a weighted average of the previous p values in time with weights φi, εt an
additional random error term and c a constant. The error term is generally assumed
to be sampled from a white noise process of a mean of zero and constant variance.
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Similarly, an MA model of order q denoted MA(q) expresses the observed value
at time t as:




where Xt is a weighted average of the previous q random error terms with weights
θi, εt an additional random error term and c a constant.
The AR(p) and MA(q) models can be combined to form an ARMA(p, q) model
expressed as:







These models assume the underlying stochastic process being observed is time
invariant or stationary. It is common to apply transformations to nonstationary data
to obtain a stationary series before modeling.
Differencing is one technique for stabilizing the mean and it refers to successive
applications of the following transformation:
∇Xt = Xt −Xt−1. (5.10)
A backshift operator is commonly defined as:
BXt = Xt−1, (5.11)
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which allows differencing to be expressed as:
∇dXt = (1−B)dXt (5.12)
with d as the number of repeated applications of the differencing transformation. An
ARIMA(p, d, q) model is an ARMA(p, q) model but with the differencing transfor-
mation applied d times. For data that exhibits cycles or seasonality, a form of the
backshift operator can also be applied to remove these effects and can be incorporated
into a multiplicative seasonal ARIMA model (SARIMA), see [78] for more details.
The use of different transformations can be explored if the variance changes
over time. Common transforms include logarithm, square root, and reciprocal.
Mean-range plots may indicate if a particular transformation is appropriate.
It is also common to plot and examine the sample autocorrelation function
(ACF) to check for seasonality in the data and to assist with selection of model
parameters. The sample ACF provides an estimate of the interdependency between
data points Xt and Xt+k usually expressed as a function of k where k is referred as
the lag value. Stationary data will have ACF values that decay towards zero quickly
as k increases.
Another related function is the partial autocorrelation function (PACF). Pat-
terns in the ACF and PACF plots can sometimes indicate order values to try for the
MA and AR parts of the models, respectively. For a discussion of ACF and PACF
properties for different MA(q) and AR(p) ordered processes, see [79].
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5.3.2 Model selection criteria
Because time series models involve fewer assumptions and the model order
(p, q) is usually not known in advance, it is common to generate many different time
series models and then select certain ones to retain and apply. This is different
from the maximum likelihood approach to parameter estimation used by software
reliability growth models. Two information-based selection criteria are typically used
for choosing model order (p, q) when applying to actual incident data. Examining
the residuals (also referred to as innovations) of one-step-ahead model predictions
can provide an indication of model fit. However, to ensure the best forecasts, it
is important to avoid selecting model orders (p,q) which may overfit the data and
forecast poorly.
Akaike [80] described an approach to selecting models that attempts to minimize
a measure consisting of two parts. The first part is a term to measure model fit
and the second part is a penalty term for adding parameters (since including more
parameters might result in overfitting). The form presented in [81] is used and








(n− k − 2)
, (5.13)
where RSS is the sum of squared residuals, n is the number of observations, and k
is number of parameters (k = p+ q).
A second information criterion examined uses a different penalty term based
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on Bayes factors [82] and is known as Bayesian information criterion (BIC), but
can also be referred to as Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The equation for












where RSS is the sum of squared residuals, n is the number of observations, and k
is number of parameters (k = p+ q). Chapter 6 provides examples of using AIC and
BIC for selecting model order for time series models applied to computer security
incident data.
This chapter reviews two types of models that can be applied to computer
security incident data for forecasting purposes. These include several software
reliability growth models applicable for modeling non-homogeneous Poisson processes.
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, observed computer security incident data may
correspond to the R(t) output of an SIR based model for some incident types
and modeled as an NHPP. Software reliability engineering practices provide widely
used and accepted methods for estimating NHPP based SRGM parameters from
observed data. ARIMA time series models are also presented as an additional type
of model (requiring fewer assumptions) with forecasting applications. The process
for estimating model parameters from data and the available criteria for selecting
models are also discussed. Examples of applying these models to computer security
incident data are presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6: Illustrations using Campus Data
Previous chapters described and illustrated several different types of models
and aspects applicable to computer security incident data. This chapter shows some
of the ways these models can be applied using actual incident data. Some aspects
of each type of model previously described will be applied to and illustrated with
collected incident data from a university network.
6.1 Description of data
The Division of Information Technology (DIT) at the University of Maryland
provided the data set used in this analysis. This data set consists of almost 12,000
security incidents recorded over a period of about 9 years (from June 2001 through
July 2010). This data set includes 51 different incident types. The number of
incidents detected in a single day varies from 0 to 580.
The incidents recorded were based on three sources:
1. an intrusion detection system (IDS) (Snort [83] using a combination of regular
rules and in-house rules),
2. reports from users, and
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3. reports from other system administrators.
Since recorded incidents led to the blocking of the suspected computer’s IP address,
DIT verified the authenticity of each incident. Therefore, all incidents obtained
from these three sources were manually reviewed. DIT launched port scans and
packet captures to validate the suspicious behavior of identified hosts. Based on
the IDS rule that raised an alert, about 60% of the alerts were inconclusive (e.g.,
when a detection rule was too broad). Among the remaining 40%, about half led to
the direct action of DIT blocking the IP address and half required a confirmation.
Among the incident alerts, very few were reports from users. The reports from other
system administrators were defined as incidents in roughly 75% of the cases based
on the source trustworthiness.
Because of the method used by DIT to validate the incidents, all incidents were
real. Thus, there are no false positives among the incidents reported. However, the
number of undetected attacks and intrusions that did not lead to a security incident
is not quantified.
In this chapter, we mostly focus on the ten incident types that occurred
most frequently in the data set between June 2001 and March 2007 (many of the
incidents occurred between 2002 and 2005). The ten types of incidents out of 51 total
represented only ≈20% of the incident types classified. However, these ten incident
types accounted for ≈76% of the number of incidents in the full dataset. Details
on the ten incident types examined for this time period are provided in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 contains the number of incidents recorded and the incident type. Most
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incident type names are self-explanatory. Note, however, that “nethicsreq” usually
represents the identification of an illegal use of copyrighted material (such as music
and movies). The “Start Date” indicates the date when the first incident associated
with that incident type was recorded. The “End Date” represents the date when
the last incident associated with the incident type was recorded or the end data
of the data collection, whichever is earlier. “# of Days” is the inclusive number
of days in the interval bounded by “Start Date” and “End Date”. The “Transfer”
column indicates if a particular incident type is likely to be transmissible. A value of
“Direct” means it is possible for that incident type to spread directly from computer
to computer without user interaction. A value of “Email” means it is likely for that
incident type to spread through infected emails messages. A value of “Other” means
an incident either is not likely to be transmissible or the method is unknown. The
value of “Multiple” is used when considering all incident types. It is possible for
incident types to actually include variants and the method of transmission may not
be the same for all variants. The raw data for some incident types is provided in
Appendix A.
Figure 6.1 shows a timeline of the intervals for all of the data and for the top
ten most frequent incident types. Figure 6.2 shows the cumulative number of all the
incident types for the full time interval. There is a noticeable sharp increase around
day 790. This increase is attributable to the start of the “worm blaster” incident
detections. Similarly, around days 244 and 994 are two other examples of a rapid
increase in the number of incidents in a short period of time. Day 244 coincides
with the start of detections for “virus klez” incidents, and there were a large number
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Incidents # of Incidents Start Date End Date # of Days Transfer 
All data 11966 6/14/2001 3/14/2007 2100 Multiple 
worm_msblast 2133 8/12/2003 9/12/2003 32 Direct 
virus_generic_bot 1940 6/8/2004 3/12/2007 1008 Other 
virus_klez 1118 2/12/2002 12/2/2003 659 Email 
bagle_worm 849 1/20/2004 11/28/2005 679 Email 
irc_bot 690 4/8/2002 3/14/2007 1802 Other 
virus_agobot 589 10/13/2003 9/13/2005 702 Email 
rogue_ftp 500 4/19/2002 2/7/2007 1756 Other 
nethicsreq 509 11/12/2001 3/14/2007 1949 Other 
spamrelay 429 6/11/2002 3/9/2007 1733 Other 
worm_nachi 317 9/16/2003 4/1/2004 199 Direct 
Table 6.1: Summary of incident data.
of “bagle worm” incidents detected around day 994, which were likely due to a new
variant of this worm being released at the time. Not all incident types included in
the data set are easily linked with a particular cause and in some cases the incident
type name represents a detected symptom or behavior (such as “spamrelay”) instead
of identifying an underlying cause.
6.2 Approximate Bayesian Computation
It is usually desirable to estimate or infer parameter settings for these models
to closely approximate a particular setting or environment. Models can be used to
evaluate interventions for a particular environment, however, measuring or identifying
the model parameter values to use for a particular environment may not be simple.
For example, the full set of email contacts and links within an organization may not
be well known, or the distribution of user likelihoods to open a infected messages
may also be difficult to measure. Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) [84]
is one method for model parameter inference in cases where a model is complex or
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of incident data.
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Figure 6.2: Cumulative number of incidents.
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not well suited to other parameter inference methods (such as maximum likelihood
estimation). ABC can also be used for selecting between several types of models.
We use ABC for both purposes when exploring stochastic email propagation models
using real incident data. We use MLE for software reliability growth model parameter
inference because it is less computationally expensive, and AICc/BIC for time series
model selection because they include a penalty term based on the number of model
parameters to reduce the chances of overfitting the data.
Essentially, ABC involves generating model outcomes for a range of parameter
values and comparing these outcomes with a set of observations. A distance value or
some measure of fit between the generated outcomes and the set of observations is
calculated. Then a threshold is used to retain a smaller subset of the specific models
that generated the outcomes. Several best fitting models are retained to help avoid
overfitting. The threshold could be in the form of some maximum allowable distance
value between model outcomes and observations or it could be simply a number
or percentage of model outcomes with the smallest distance values from the set of
observations. The parameters settings of the specific models retained in the selected
subset can then form an estimate of a posterior distribution of the parameter values.
In [85], ABC is compared with MCMC for the standard SIR model and similar
posterior parameter distributions are obtained. An ABC based method for selecting
between different SIR based models is presented in [86].
Although ABC can be used parameter value inference, we will first explore
using it for identifying or classifying which model types may fit better with the
underlying processes that produced a set of observations. In this case, we generate
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model outcomes over a range of parameters for several model types. Then we combine
the model outcomes and retain a certain number of the models generating outcomes
with the closest fit values to the set of observations. We use the sum of the Euclidean
distances of between model outcome data points and test case data points as our
measure of fit value. From this set of closest fitting models, we then count how
many resulted from each type of model and use this as an indicator of the relative
likelihood the set of observations resulted from a specific model type for the range of
parameters used.
6.3 SIR Models
For this section, we explore two types of SIR models and generate a test case of
observations for each. Model outcomes are then computed over a range of parameter
values to compare outcomes of both model types to both test cases. We do this for
different ranges of parameter values to explore how the range of parameter values
used may affect model identification. We then compare the two model types to
two sets of incident observations to identify which models or model features are
most applicable to the incident observations. This is done by selecting a range of




Previously, we presented examples of how patching and the rate of patching in
a network of hosts or nodes could affect the spread of a worm or virus that propagates
through direct (node-to-node) communication between computers. We presented
two model types to illustrate two ways patching may occur (either at a constant rate
or at a rate proportional the number of remaining unpatched nodes). In this section,
we generate a set of test case observations for each model type. We define the two
model types as follows:
• Model A–uses a constant patching rate parameter where the chances of partic-
ular susceptible node being patched are the same at each time step.
• Model B–uses a variable or proportional patching rate parameter where the
chances of particular susceptible node being patched are proportional to the
number of unpatched or susceptible nodes at each time step (so as the number
of susceptible nodes decreases in time, their chances of being patched also
decreases in time).
When applicable, the same parameter values are used for generating the set of
observations for the test cases. All test cases and model outcomes are based on a
fully connected network topology.
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6.3.2 Test parameter sets
We explore how using different parameter value ranges for generating model
outcomes are to see how this may affect identification of the original model type
used to generate at test case. It is expected the distribution of distance values for
the generated model outcomes will flatten or diffuse as the range of parameter values
broadens to include values farther away from the original parameter values used
to generate the test cases. However, it is unknown if or how much effect this may
have on the closest fitting model outcomes that will be retained for identifying or
classifying the model type originally used to generate the test case. Four parameter
sets are used and are described as follows:
• Parameter Set 1–this set is same as the parameters used for generating the test
cases. There are 5,000 nodes which are fully connected; β = 1.0; γ = 0.5; ν =
0.025.
• Parameter Set 2–same as Parameter Set 1, except allow value for β to range
uniformly between [0.9, 1.1]; the value for γ to range uniformly between [0.4,
0.6]; the value for ν to range uniformly between [0.015, 0.035].
• Parameter Set 3–same as Parameter Set 2, except expand the range for β
to [0.7, 1.3]; value for γ in the range [0.2, 0.8]; and the value for ν to range
uniformly between [0.005, 0.045].
• Parameter Set 4–same as Parameter Set 3, except for the addition of allowing
the total number of nodes to vary uniformly within the range [4750, 5250].
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6.3.3 Test results and observations
For each model type (A and B) 2,500 simulations are run for each of the four
parameter sets described above. All resulting model outputs are compared with each
test case to obtain a distance or fit value. For a particular test case, outputs for both
model types (using the same set of parameter values) are combined (so there are
5,000 total model outputs being compared for each test case for each parameter set).
The models that produced the 50 closest set of outputs to the test case are retained
and then the number of each model type in this set of 50 is counted and used as
an indicator of how likely it is that the test case data was originally generated by a
model of this type.
Figure 6.3(a) shows a time curve of outcomes that make up Test Case A (origi-
nally generated by Model Type A and parameter values stated earlier). Figure 6.3(b)
shows a histogram of all of the model fit values produced by Model Type A using
Parameter Set 1 when compared with Test Case A. Similarly, Figures 6.3(c)-6.3(e)
show the same but using Parameter Sets 2-4 respectively. The figures show that the
overall distribution of model fit values flattens out as the set of parameter values
expands (except for the spike around 5,000 which corresponds to cases where the
infection does not spread and the final total number of infected cases is very low).
However, in the range of parameter values used for these simulations, there are
several model output results which are close in distance to the test case.
Figure 6.4 shows the number of each model type that created the closest 50
model outputs to the original test case for each of the parameter ranges explored.
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of model types for the 50 best fitting model outputs for Test
Case A for different parameter sets.
Figure 6.4(a) shows all of the closest 50 model outputs to Test Case A were generated
by Model Type A. Figures 6.4(b)-6.4(d) show that about 30 of the closest 50 model
outputs to Test Case A were generated by Model Type A, while about 20 were
generated by Model Type B (for Parameter Sets 2-4). Based on these results, one
could infer that there is a 60% chance that Test Case A resulted from Model Type
A and a 40% chance Test Case A resulted from Model Type B (when considering
the parameter ranges in Parameter Sets 2-4).
6.3.4 Application using incident data
In this section, ABC is used to compare actual incident data to the two types
of models described in the previous section. The goal is to see if the method can
provide some indication of which model type that would better describe the dynamics
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Figure 6.5: Incident Type A and histograms of model fit values for model types A
and B.
of an environment from a set of models and a range of parameter values.
6.3.4.1 Incident data
From the original incident data set, occurrences of two different types of inci-
dents that could potentially spread directly from computer to computer were selected.
Although referred to in this section as Incident Types A and B, they correspond to
the “worm msblast” and “worm nachi” incidents, respectively, presented earlier in
Table 6.1. The full time period for “worm msblast” is used, but the time interval for
“worm nachi” is limited to the first 120 days (when the bulk of the incidents occur).
Figure 6.5(a) shows the plot of values for Incident Type A.
6.3.4.2 Applied parameter ranges
For each of the two types of models described in the previous section, 5,000
model outcomes are computed using a range of model parameter values, for a total
of 10,000 model outcomes each for Incident Types A and B. Each of the model
outcomes is compared with each type of the selected incident data and a distance or
fit value is calculated. The following parameters and value ranges are used:
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• β (infection rate) using a uniform random distribution with the range of [0.1,
5.0].
• γ (removal rate) using a uniform random distribution with the range of [0.1,
5.0].
• ν (patching rate) using a uniform random distribution with the range of [0,
0.1].
• The total number of nodes was kept fixed with a value of 10,000.
6.3.4.3 Applied results and observations
Figure 6.5(a) shows a plot of the data for Incident Type A. Figures 6.5(b)
and 6.5(c) show histograms of the model fit values for Incident Type A to model
outcomes generated by model types A and B, respectively, over the parameter value
ranges described above. While the histograms of model fit values appear to be very
similar, the important visible difference is that the frequency of Model B outcomes at
the lowest model fit values is slightly higher than the frequency of Model A outcomes
for the same model fit values. This is the region of fit values for the retained models.
After all model outcomes and fit values were calculated, the distribution of
model types that produced the 20 best fitting model outcomes for each email incident
type were examined. These results are shown in Figures 6.6(a) and 6.6(b) for incident
types A and B respectively. Figures 6.6(c) and 6.6(d) show histograms of the model
fit values for the 20 retained best fits for each incident type (from both Model A
and Model B types).
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Figure 6.6: Frequency of model types generating best 20 fitting model outputs and
histograms of best 20 fit values.
We make the following observations:
• From Figure 6.6(a), we could conclude that there is a 30% chance (6/20)
the observations for Incident Type A resulted from Model Type A (constant
vaccination rate) and a 70% chance (14/20) the observations resulted from
Model Type B (variable vaccination rate).
• From Figure 6.6(b), we could conclude that there is a 40% chance (8/20)
the observations for Incident Type A resulted from Model Type A (constant
vaccination rate) and a 60% chance (12/20) the observations resulted from
Model Type B (variable vaccination rate).
• For both incident types, Model Type B (variable vaccination rate) is the most
likely model type (of the two tested) to have generated the observed data.
6.4 Email Propagation Models
For this section, four types of models are explored and test cases for each are
generated. The four types of models vary in terms of network connection topologies
and distributions of user likelihood values. Model outcomes are generated to compare
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all model types to all test cases. This is done for several ranges of parameter values
to explore how the range of parameter values used may affect model classification. A
range of parameter values is selected for generating model outcomes for comparing
the four model types to three sets of incident observations to determine which models
or model features are most applicable to the incident observations.
6.4.1 Test cases
Chapter 4 presents illustrations of how network connection topology and the
distribution of user actions in the network can affect the spread of an email virus.
Four model types which cover the ways these properties can be combined are explored
further and a set of test case observations for each model type is generated. The
four model types used are described as follows:
• Model A–uses a randomly connected network topology and a uniform random
distribution for assigning user likelihood values for opening infected messages.
• Model B–uses a randomly connected network topology and an exponential
based distribution for assigning user likelihood values for opening infected
messages.
• Model C–uses a scale-free network topology and a uniform random distribution
for user likelihood values for opening infected messages.
• Model D–uses a scale-free network topology and an exponential based distribu-
tion for assigning user likelihood values for opening infected messages.
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When applicable, the same parameter values were used for generating the
set of observations for the test cases. Approximately the same total number of
edges or links are used for the randomly connected and scale-free connected network
topologies. The uniform random and exponential based distributions for assigning
user likelihood values for opening infected messages have similar expected values for
the population.
6.4.2 Test parameter sets
Different parameter ranges for generating model outcomes are used to explore
how this may affect model classification. Four parameter sets are used and are
described below:
• Parameter Set 1–this set is same as the parameters used for generating the
test cases. There are 5,000 nodes with about 2,500,000 edges or links ( 20%
connected); β = 1.0; γ = 0.3; an expected value of 10% for user likelihood for
opening an infected message.
• Parameter Set 2–same as Parameter Set 1, except allow value for β to range
uniformly between [0.9, 1.1]; the value for γ to range uniformly between [0.2, 0.4];
the number of links to range from 17% to 23% of a fully connected graph; and
the expected user likelihood value in the interval [0.07, 0.13].
• Parameter Set 3–same as Parameter Set 2, except expand the range for β to
[0.8, 1.2]; value for γ in the range [0.1, 0.5]; number of links from 15% to 25%
of a fully connected graph; and expected user likelihood values in the interval
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[0.05, 0.15].
• Parameter Set 4–same as Parameter Set 3, except for the addition of allowing
the total number of nodes to vary uniformly within the range [4750, 5250].
It was expected the distribution of distance values for generated model outcomes
would flatten or diffuse as the range of parameter values broadened farther away from
the parameter values used to generate the test cases. However, what was unknown
was if or how much affect this might have on the closest fitting model outcomes used
for identifying or classifying the model type originally used to generate a test case.
6.4.3 Test results and observations
For each model type (A, B, C, and D) we run 2,500 simulations for each set of
parameter values described above. All resulting model outputs are compared with
each test case to obtain a distance or fit value. For a particular test case, outputs for
each model type (using the same set of parameter values) are combined (so there are
10,000 total model outputs being compared for each test case for each parameter set).
The models that produced the 100 closest set of outputs to the test case are retained
and then the number of each model type in this set of 100 is counted and used as
an indicator of how likely it is that the test case data was originally generated by a
model of this type.
Figure 6.7(a) shows the time curve for Test Case D (originally generated by
Model Type D and parameter values stated earlier). Figure 6.7(b) shows a histogram
of all of the model fit (or distance) values produced by Model Type D using Parameter
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Set 1 when compared with Test Case D. Similarly, Figures 6.7(c)-6.7(e) show the
same but for Parameter Sets 2-4 respectively. We observe that the overall distribution
of model fit values flattens out as the set of parameter values expands. However, for
the range of parameter values used in these simulations, we see there are still several
model output results which are close in distance to the test case (i.e. have low model
distance values).
Figure 6.8 shows the frequency of each model type making up the closest 100
model outputs to the original test case. We see in Figure 6.8(a) that 98 of the closest
100 model outputs to Test Case D were generated by Model Type D while 2 were
generated by Model Type B. Based on these results, we would infer that there is a
98% chance that Test Case D resulted from Model Type D and a 2% chance Test
Case D resulted from Model Type B (when restricting parameter values to those in
Parameter Set 1).
In Figures 6.8(b)-6.8(d), we see that as the range of parameters used increases,
it becomes more difficult to discriminate between Model Type D and Model Type
B as the most likely model type responsible for creating the test data. However,
we see that for the broadest range of parameter values used (Parameter Set 4),
discriminating between models using uniform random user likelihood distributions
(Models A and C) and models using exponential user likelihood distributions (Models
B and D) is still possible in this example.
When comparing Model Types B and D, we can see from Figure 4.15(c) and
Figure 4.16(c) that at similar network connectivity levels, the difference between
the time curves of nodes in the recovered state is slight for the randomly connected
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Figure 6.7: Test Case D and histograms of model fit values for Model D for
different parameter sets.
and scale-free connected examples shown. This test case result is consistent with
these previously shown examples. For the range of parameters used in the test
cases, results show more differentiation due to the different types of user likelihood
distributions than due to the different types of network topology.
Figure 6.9 shows the prior and posterior distributions for the user likelihood pa-
rameter for Model D with Test Case D for each parameter set. The prior distribution
density (shown as a dashed red line) shows all of the initial 2,500 sampled parameter
values used for each parameter set. The posterior distribution density (shown as a
density histogram in grey) is obtained from the user likelihood values used by the
Model D simulations present in the top 100 models retained. The number of each
model type retained is indicated in Figure 6.8. We see that the posterior distribution
is a closer reflection of the actual parameter value (0.10, shown as a vertical dotted
line) used to generate Test Case D compared to the prior (or sampling) distribution.
This is true even as the range of sampled parameter values increases.
6.4.4 Application using email incident data
In this section, we use ABC to compare actual email virus incident data to
the four types of models described in the previous section. Our goal is to see if the
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Figure 6.8: Distribution of model types for the 100 best fitting model outputs
for Test Case D for different parameter sets.
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Figure 6.9: User likelihood parameter distributions (prior in red, posterior in
grey) for Model Type D of the 100 best fitting model outputs for Test Case D
across parameter sets. [Actual User Likelihood Parameter value = 0.10.]
method can provide some indication of the model type and parameter values that
would better describe the setting from a set of models and a range of parameter
values.
6.4.4.1 Email incident data
From the original UMD incident data set, we extracted occurrences of three
different types of viruses that could potentially spread through email, we refer to them
as Incident Types A, B, and C. Since some of the incident types potentially involved
multiple variants which may also exploit different vulnerabilities, we selected a 120-
day time window for each incident type to use for the analysis. The collected data
reflects number of nodes removed/recovered over time (i.e. the I → R transition);
no information is available regarding when an infection actually occurred (i.e. the
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S → I transition). Although referred to in this section as Incident Types A, B, and
C, they correspond to the “bagle worm”, “virus klez”, and “virus agobot” incidents,
respectively, presented earlier in Table 6.1. Figure 6.10(a) shows the plot of values
for Incident Type C.
6.4.4.2 Parameter ranges
For each of the four types of models described in the previous section, we
compute 6,250 model outcomes using a range of model parameter values, for a total
of 25,000 model outcomes. Each of the model outcomes is compared with each type
of the extracted email incident data and a distance or fit value is calculated. The
following parameters and value ranges were used:
• β using a uniform random distribution with the range of [0.1, 2.0].
• γ (removal rate) using a uniform random distribution with the range of
[0.01, 2.0].
• ν (patching rate) using a uniform random distribution with the range of [0, 0.5].
• Number of links or edges as a percentage of a fully connected graph using a
uniform random distribution with the range of [2%, 25%].
• Expected value of user likelihood to open an infected message with the range
of [0.01, 0.4]
• The total number of nodes was kept fixed with a value of 10,000.
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Figure 6.10: Type C and histograms of model fit values for different model
types.
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Figure 6.11: Frequency of model types generating best 50 fitting model
outputs and histograms of best 50 fit values.
6.4.4.3 Results and observations
Figures 6.10(b)-(e) shows histograms of the model fit values for Incident Type
C to model outcomes generated by model types A, B, C, and D, respectively, over
the parameter value ranges stated above. The full range of model fit values is not
shown, but includes all of the 50 best fitting models. After all model outcomes and
fit values were calculated, we looked at the distribution of model types producing
the 50 best fitting model outcomes for each email incident type. The distributions
of retained models are shown in Figures 6.11(a)-(c) for incident types A, B, and C
respectively. Figures 6.11(d)-(f) show histograms of the model fit values for the 50
best fits for each incident type.
Figure 6.12 shows prior and posterior distributions of parameters for the Model
Type B simulations when compared to the Incident Type C data. The comparison
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Figure 6.12: Incident Type C, Model Type B–parameter distributions (prior
density in red, posterior density in black, posterior density histogram in grey).
of the prior and posterior distributions can be used to help gauge if an appropriate
prior (sampled) range was used and/or if the number or percent of retained samples
should be changed (which may also mean changing the overall number of simulations
used). The obtained posterior distributions can be used to help guide future selection
of prior distributions to sample from.
We make the following observations:
• From Figure 6.11(a), we could conclude that of the models tested, there is a
18% chance (9/50) the Incident Type A observations resulted from Model Type
A, a 28% chance (14/50) from Model Type B, a 16% chance (8/50) from Model
Type C, and a 38% chance (19/50) from Model Type D for the tested range of
parameter values. Also, we could interpret the results to indicate there is 66%
chance (33/50) the observations involved an exponential based distribution of
user likelihoods to open infected email messages compared to a 34% chance
(17/50) of a uniform random distribution of likelihoods. However, it is possible
that a different distribution (other than uniform random or exponential) is
actually responsible. The ABC method only provides estimates of aspects
included in the testing process. Similar inferences can be stated based on
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Figures 6.11(b) and 6.11(c).
• For two of the three incident types, Model Type B (randomly connected
network topology and exponential based distribution of user likelihood values
to open infected messages) is the most likely model type (of those tested)
to have generated the observed data. The remaining incident type (C) was
best matched to Model Type D (scale-free network topology and exponential
distribution of user likelihood values to open infected messages).
• For the three incident types, the retained models are more likely (66%, 64%,
and 68% for Incident Types A, B, and C, respectively) to have used an
exponential distribution than a uniform random distribution for the user
likelihood parameter.
• Figure 6.12(e) indicates better fitting model B simulations to Incident Type C
data are more likely to have user distributions based on smaller (5% or less)
average expected values of user likelihoods to open infected messages. This
may indicate there are a small number of users who are more likely to open
infected messages and implementing interventions that account for this could
be beneficial (e.g. targeted blocking or patching of computers used by these
users).
This section presented and tested a method for using Approximate Bayesian
Computation to evaluate model types for a set of test case data. This method was
applied to three email virus incident types. For the model types tested and for
the range of parameter values explored, model types using an exponential based
125
distribution of user likelihood of opening infected messages produced the best fit
values as well as models based on a scale-free network topology.
6.5 Software Reliability Growth and Time Series Models
The previous applications of SIR and Email Propagation models focused on
using the models to compare which features of the models best describe or account
for the observed incident data for the applicable incident types. However, not all
computer security incident data involves processes which are transmissible or fit with
an infectious disease model approach. In these cases, while it may be difficult to create
an explanatory model for the anticipated impact of a particular intervention (such as
implementing a policy change), it is still desirable to gauge the impact of intervention
actions. One way to do this is to use data collected before an intervention is applied
to project future levels and then compare these projections to actual incident levels
after one or more intervention actions has be taken. Software reliability growth
models and time series models are potential ways to make projections based on
collected data.
6.5.1 Trend analysis and software reliability growth models
While incident data is not the same as software failure data in systems, there
are some similarities. It is reasonable to assume for incidents that can be linked
to a direct cause such as a particular worm or virus variant that exploits a single
vulnerability, the frequency of detection will begin to decline at some point as infected
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machines are removed and repaired. Vulnerabilities in remaining machines will also
be patched against the exploit to prevent future incidents of the same type as user
awareness increases and antivirus software is updated. User awareness of particular
issues and incident types may also improve over time and lead to a decrease in
observed incidents. These possibilities may result in observed incident data which
show a variable and declining rate of incident occurrence for which software reliability
growth models may provide a good fit and may be useful for making projections.
Figure 6.13 shows the Laplace trend values for the all incidents. The plot shows
there are a few brief periods of rapidly increasing Laplace trend values followed by
a slower decline in values. The first rapid increase is attributable to detections of
“virus klez” incidents. The largest increase in Laplace trend values occurs around
day 790 and coincides with the start of “worm msblaster” incidents. The smaller
increase but noticeable peak in Laplace factor values results from a sudden spike in
the number of “bagle worm” incidents recorded (likely due to the release of a new
variant of the worm). While these changes can be seen when viewing the cumulative
number of incidents as shown in Figure 6.2, they are more noticeable in the Laplace
trend values as shown in Figure 6.13.
Although the cumulative total number of incidents may not fit well to a
reliability growth model (indicated by the Laplace trend plot shown in Figure 6.13)
in part due to the dynamic nature of the observed system (the number of networked
devices fluctuates over time; the relative proportion and versions of operating systems
in the system evolves as new operating systems and devices come to market) and
the data not being fully consistent with some of the assumptions made by such
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models, it seems reasonable to expect that some of the different types of incidents
can be described with reliability growth models. Incident types with narrow and
well-defined causes or vulnerabilities (such as “worm msblast”) are more easily fixed
and patched against. These types of incidents are more likely to show characteristics
in common with reliability growth models. Other types of incidents may not be
attributable to a single cause or vulnerability (such as “spamrelay”). Reliability
may improve as systems are identified and fixed, but reliability may also decrease or
remain stable if new sources of vulnerabilities are found to cause incidents of the
same type. This suggests that relating incident types to their causes instead of their
symptoms may be useful for modeling purposes, however, obtaining the necessary
information for this is not always practical for some incident types.
We now take a closer look at some of the individual incident data. The trend
values for individual incident types are calculated using different time windows for
each incident type. The time windows are based on when incidents of a particular
type where first and last observed. This information is provided in Table 6.1 under
the columns labeled “Start Date” and “End Date.” Figure 6.14 shows the evolution
of the daily Laplace trend values for the “worm msblast” data. The negative values
indicate reliability growth throughout the interval. Most reliability growth models
can be applied to this data. The beginning part of Figure 6.15 indicates a decrease in
reliability as illustrated by the positive Laplace factor values. Since applied models
would need to allow for increasing failure intensity, the G-O [23] model would not
be expected to work well for the “spamrelay” data. Figure 6.16 indicates an initial
decrease in reliability followed by reliability growth as illustrated by the change in
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@all dataD Laplace Trend Values @uHkLD vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.13: Laplace trend values for
all incident data.














@worm_msblastD Laplace Trend Values @uHkLD vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.14: Laplace trend values for
“ms blast” incident data.















@spamrelayD Laplace Trend Values @uHkLD vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.15: Laplace trend values for
“spamrelay” incident data.













@virus_agobotD Laplace Trend Values @uHkLD vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.16: Laplace trend values for
“virus agobot” incident data.
Laplace factor values from positive to negative. An S-Shaped [24] or K-Stage [25]
model might work best for the “virus agobot” data. Laplace trend values were
plotted each of the incident types considered in the paper, but not all are shown.
Figures 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 were included to illustrate examples of features to look
for when considering models to apply. Some of the other incident types had more
complex trend features. For example, “bagle worm” has many small peaks across
the considered time interval that likely coincide with the release of new variants of
the worm.












All data 797,069 333,191 213,386 774,200 
worm_msblast 496 3,049 10,804 3,807 
virus_generic_bot 21,721 38,239 177,952 43,025 
virus_klez 15,452 125,272 647,881 8,914 
bagle_worm 10,975 15,115 25,594 52,068 
irc_bot 25,486 251,787 7,966,766 17,292 
virus_agobot 30,996 24,568 109,530 59,942 
rogue_ftp 37,277 38,573 1,104,622 41,978 
Nethicsreq 21,852 12,561 689,714 24,848 
Spamrelay 57,250 13,724 2,997,065 10,662 
worm_nachi 826 9,174 71,563 2,630 
Table 6.2: Chi-square fit values for incident models over full time intervals.







where oi is the observed cumulative number of incidents at day i and ei is the
estimated cumulative number of incidents at day i.
From Table 6.2, the G-O model (α = 2, 141.1, β = 0.17428) appears to have the
best chi-square fit for the “worm msblast” incident data and this is consistent with
the Laplace trend evolution shown in Figure 6.14. The S-Shaped model (α = 591.34,
β = 0.010963) appears to fit the “virus agobot” incident data better than the other
models (also consistent with Laplace trend evolution shown in Figure 6.16), but
the K-Stage model (α = 589.41, β = 0.016632) provides the poorest chi-square fit.
This is not expected as the initial increase in Laplace trend values indicates the G-O
model will not be a good fit and could be expected to have a higher chi-square fit
value than the S-Shaped and K-Stage models. Figure 6.15 shows mostly positive
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@irc_botD@G-O ModelD@ c2 = 25,486D # of Incidents vs. Time
fit
data
Figure 6.17: G-O model fit and data
for “irc bot”.













@irc_botD@G-O ModelD@ c2 values vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.18: Chi-square residuals for
G-O model fit of “irc bot” data.
trend values and the Duane model (α = 2.8061 × 10−4, β = 1.9095) provides the
best chi-square fit for the “spamrelay” incident data.
For the “irc bot” incident type, Figure 6.17 shows a G-O model fit to the
data while Figure 6.19 shows the K-Stage model fit to the same data. Visually the
models appear similar (except for the first few days). However, as shown in the
Table 6.2, the calculated chi-square value for the K-Stage model is extremely high
when compared to the calculated chi-square value for the G-O model. Comparing
the plot of chi-square residual values (Figures 6.18 and 6.20) shows the influence of
the first few predicted values on the overall chi-square total for the K-Stage model.
The large values early in the interval result from division by the very small expected
number of incidents for these days. Using the chi-square values to evaluate model
fits is useful, but should be interpreted with caution for this data. Unlike typical
software reliability data, the incident data includes some uncertainty regarding the
start of the measurement interval and contains days where very large increases in
the number of incidents are observed. The chi-square results for the incident data
need to be reviewed in this context.
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@irc_botD@K-Stage, K = 3D@ c2 = 7.97 x 106D # of Incidents vs. Time HdaysL
fit
data
Figure 6.19: K-Stage model fit and
data for “irc bot”.













@irc_botD@K-Stage, K = 3D@ c2 values vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.20: Chi-square residuals for
K-Stage model fit of “irc bot” data.
Since the interest is in developing models to be used for forecasting, model
selection can be based on the accuracy of model predictions for unseen data. This is
evaluated by splitting the data and using the hold-out cross-validation technique [87]
for comparing models. Using this method, some of the data is withheld and not
used for estimating parameters and then models are used to forecast values which
are compared to the withheld data. An advantage of using this method for model
selection is that it reduces the risk of selecting models which may “overfit” the data
(i.e. a model that only provides a good fit to the data in the range used for estimating
parameters and provides a poor fit for data outside this range). This is an important
selection consideration for models that will be used to forecast beyond the range of
the currently available data.
Table 6.3 shows how the data was split for each incident type. Table 6.4 shows
the chi-square fit values for both the data used for model parameter estimations
and for the hold-out data. Figures 6.21-6.24 show some examples of model fits to
parameter estimation data and hold-out data. Table 6.4 shows the G-O model created
using the training data for parameter estimation best fits the held-out “worm msblast”
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# days w/ 
incidents 
# days w/ 
incidents 
All data 2100 11966 1400 700 9692 2274 901 412 
worm_msblast 32 2133 21 11 2033 100 15 8 
virus_generic_bot 1008 1940 672 336 1550 390 225 106 
virus_klez 659 1118 439 220 1083 35 168 19 
bagle_worm 679 849 452 227 828 21 69 10 
irc_bot 1802 690 1201 601 565 125 220 30 
virus_agobot 702 589 468 234 588 1 66 1 
rogue_ftp 1756 500 1170 586 467 33 204 25 
nethicsreq 1949 509 1299 650 374 135 157 56 
spamrelay 1733 429 1155 578 191 238 110 128 
worm_nachi 199 317 132 67 308 9 24 6 
 
Table 6.3: Splitting incident data for hold-out validation.
incident data when compared to other models. The K-Stage model created using the
training data provides the best fit to the held-out “virus agobot” incident data. This
is more consistent with the Laplace trend analysis for this data than the chi-square fit
values shown in Table 6.2 for models with parameters estimated using the full data
interval. Table 6.4 also shows that although the K-Stage model does not provide the
best predictions for the “irc bot” incident data, it is not the worst predictor as one
might conclude from the chi-square fit values in Table 6.2. The Duane model predicts
the “spamrelay” incident values better than the other models. Trend analysis showed
a decreasing to stable reliability growth trend which typically means the G-O model
would perform poorly (as indicated in Tables 6.2 and 6.4). The Duane model is
unique from the other reliability growth models examined in this paper as it was
derived from the hardware reliability area where the other models were developed
from software reliability observations.
Laplace trend information and plots of data and model fits are not shown for
the “worm nachi” incident data, but is similar to what is shown for “worm msblast.”
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All data 820,773 151,563 187,151 162,992 90,866 234,888 49,126 590,994 
worm_msblast 466 1,876 5,875 2,146 8 15 16 377 
virus_generic_bot 21,841 23,123 83,239 33,908 145 4,406 8,332 5,475 
virus_klez 17,487 114,529 542,605 4,084 45 84 148 2,215 
bagle_worm 9,783 10,122 14,689 32,504 20 26 26 6,573 
irc_bot 30,761 289,602 7,329,742 16,483 4,376 1,778 4,323 1,963 
virus_agobot 27,456 23,812 116,668 25,047 1,206 159 29 34,363 
rogue_ftp 27,834 44,220 1,705,429 17,823 11,280 11,925 4,200 21,468 
nethicsreq 19,370 10,305 366,672 12,807 4,283 730 806 12,691 
spamrelay 19,092 13,487 2,022,188 11,514 17,225 1,987 8,441 915 
worm_nachi 547 5,634 37,744 903 1.4 1.6 1.6 1,094 
 
Table 6.4: Chi-square fit values for split incident data.















@all dataD@K-Stage, K =3D Cumulative # of Incidents vs. Time HdaysL
Figure 6.21: K-Shaped model fit and
data with hold-out data included for
“All data”.






Figure 6.22: G-O model fit and
data with hold-out data included for
“worm msblast”.









Figure 6.23: S-Shaped model fit and
data with hold-out data included
“irc bot”.





Figure 6.24: Duane model fit and data
with hold-out data included for “spam-
relay”.
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This is expected as the Blaster and Nachi worms exploited similar vulnerabilities
and occurred during a similar time frame.
6.5.2 Time series models
The use of time series modeling is explored for a range of computer security
incident data. As previously discussed, several incident types may spread due to
factors directly analogous to those affecting the spread of contagious diseases in
animals. The occurrences of other incident types are potentially more influenced by
factors not included in the infectious disease based models. Since time series models
do not attempt to directly account for or use information about causal factors, they
can be applied to a broader range of incident types.
Figure 6.25 shows the cumulative values for the “spamrelay” data and associated
sample ACF values for d = 0 and d = 2. Also shown is a once differenced series of
the log transformed weekly values and corresponding ACF plot. We see that there is
a high amount of autocorrelation present in the cumulative values indicating that
this data is nonstationary. Differencing the cumulative data (d = 2) appears to
stabilize the mean. Applying the log transformation appears to reduce some of the
variance. The actual transform was log[x+ 1] because there are weeks in which no
incidents occurred. We explored the use of this transformation for all of the top
incident types.
Models were calculated for combinations of p and q values each ranging from
0− 5 and the models with the lowest AICc and BIC values were identified. (There
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[spamrelay] ACF of Cumulative data













[spamrelay] ACF of Differenced cumul.data (d = 2)













[spamrelay] ACF of Differenced Log(weekly.data) (d = 1)
Figure 6.25: Difference transformations and ACF values for “spamrelay”.
are methods for evaluating models with AICc or BIC values within a certain range
of closeness to the lowest values, however, these methods can involve some subjective
judgments and were not explored.)
6.5.2.1 Fitting and forecasting observed data with time series models
A basic modeling process is followed. First, transformations (differencing,
log) are applied to the data to stabilize the mean and variance. Next, models are
generated for a range of parameters (p, q). From the generated models, models are
selected based on lowest AICc and BIC values.
The interest is in developing models for forecasting the number of computer
security incidents in a future time interval, so the accuracy of model predictions are
compared to unseen incident data. This is done by splitting the data and using the
hold-out cross-validation technique [87] for comparing model predictions. Using this
method, some of the data is withheld and not used for parameter estimations or
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model selection. Then model forecast values are compared to the data that have been
withheld. Model parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood method with
the R statistical software package [68]. An example of the R code used is provided
in Appendix D.
A decision was made to split the data by time (instead of by number of
incidents). It is of more interest to examine the expected trends over time instead of
forecasting when a specific number of incidents will have occurred. Data from the
first two-thirds of the time interval was used for model order selection and model
parameter estimation. The remaining data was used for forecast validation. This is
the same method used when estimating software reliability growth model parameters
and selecting models.
In addition, some multiplicative seasonal ARIMA (SARIMA) models are
examined. A one year period was used when possible to explore possible influences
of the academic calendar schedule on occurrences of incidents. Since the length of
the data interval being modeled must be at least twice the length of the seasonal
period to allow for differencing, not all of the incident types could be modeled using
a 52 week period after being split into modeling and validation sets. A period of
26 weeks was used for incidents with shorter intervals of observation because it is
a factor of 52 and provides some overlapping of spring and fall semester activity.
While it seems reasonable to expect some incident types might be affected by the
academic calendar (observed occurrences increase during spring and fall semesters),
it is difficult to capture using a single lag offset value due to variations in the lengths
of semester breaks. In the case of the “nachi” incident type, a period of 5 weeks was
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  Not Seasonal Seasonal  
  Cumulative Log weekly Cumulative Log weekly  
Incident Selection Forecast Data Forecast Data Forecast Data Forecast Data Seasonal Period 
Type Criterion RMS RMS RMS RMS Weeks 
all data AICc 1418.04 224.59 2104.02 869.32 52 
msblast AICc 1333.48 53.31 n/a n/a n/a 
genbot AICc 182.01 117.50 220.93 36.46 26 
klez AICc 66.93 86.61 43.54 53.43 26 
bagle AICc 72.62 6.35 220.03 17.86 26 
ircbot AICc 80.58 58.20 153.43 93.26 52 
agobot AICc 21.59 1.96 1.58 5.46 26 
rogueftp AICc 124.22 52.67 767.64 34.60 52 
nethicsreq AICc 27.96 41.09 137.11 63.47 52 
spamrelay AICc 72.35 111.08 35.25 55.66 52 
nachi AICc 4.14 4.03 27.43 7.61 5 
Shaded cells indicate lower RMS values compared to BIC selected models 
 
Table 6.5: ARIMA models and forecasts (AICc based selection).
chosen due to the shorter time interval of the data. A period of 5 weeks may capture
some monthly influences if present. Closer examination of the ACF plots for each
incident type may also indicate other seasonal periods to try.
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the models selected for each incident type based on
lowest AICc and BIC values. AICc and BIC are widely used information criteria
for model selection, but alternate selection criteria have been proposed such as the
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQC) [88]. Model selection was independent
of the data withheld for validation. The root-mean-squared (RMS) errors were
calculated to compare forecasts from the selected models to data withheld for
validation. Table 6.5 shows results of the AICc selected models using the cumulative
values and log transformed weekly values, while Table 6.6 shows the results for the
BIC selected models. The forecasts for the log transformed weekly value models were
converted to cumulative values for comparison purposes. The “msblast” incident
type did not have enough weeks of data to calculate seasonal models.
We can compare how the choice of model selection criteria affects forecasting.
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  Not Seasonal Seasonal  
  Cumulative Log weekly Cumulative Log weekly  
Incident Selection Forecast Data Forecast Data Forecast Data Forecast Data Seasonal Period 
Type Criterion RMS RMS RMS RMS Weeks 
all data BIC ** 273.14 ** ** 52 
msblast BIC 1222.72 ** n/a n/a n/a 
genbot BIC ** 108.99 ** 65.37 26 
klez BIC ** ** 430.62 ** 26 
bagle BIC ** 8.90 ** ** 26 
ircbot BIC 84.76 93.79 72.54 88.14 52 
agobot BIC 0.17 0.17 ** ** 26 
rogueftp BIC * 48.48 ** ** 52 
nethicsreq BIC 26.15 41.23 ** 65.24 52 
spamrelay BIC ** 120.74 35.44 54.27 52 
nachi BIC 20.03 ** ** 6.86 5 
** indicates same model selected using AICc, see Table 6 for RMS value 
Shaded cells indicate lower RMS values compared to AICc selected models 
 
Table 6.6: ARIMA models and forecasts (BIC based selection).
In half of the cases (21 out of 42), AICc and BIC select the same model. Of the
remaining 21 cases where AICc and BIC select different models, using AICc resulted
in picking a better predictive model 11 times, while using BIC resulted in better
predictive models in 10 instances. Simply using AICc to select models did slightly
better than using BIC. If overfitting is a concern, another strategy would be to
examine the models selected using AICc and BIC and then choose the one of lower
order. Although the model orders are not shown in Table 6.5 or Table 6.6, this
strategy would not have improved upon using only AICc for model selection.
Comparing the non-seasonal models constructed using the cumulative values to
the ones using the log transformed values shows improved forecasting performance
using the log values in eight out of eleven incident categories. Overall, it seems
using the log transform improves forecasts in more cases than it degrades forecasts.
The magnitude of forecasting improvements also appears to be larger than most
forecasting degradations that occur.
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Including a seasonal element into the models improved forecasts using the
cumulative data for three incident types: “klez”, “spamrelay”, and “ircbot”, while
for the log transformed values it improved forecasts for four incident types: “genbot”,
“klez”, “rogueftp”, and “spamrelay”. Other than “klez”, the incident types benefiting
from including a seasonal factor are named after an observed function of a compro-
mised machine and these types are not easily associated with a particular piece of
malware or exploited vulnerability. Incidents in these categories could potentially
result from several different underlying causes yet exhibit the same outward behavior.
The frequency of these incident types are more likely to be influenced by the number
of active machines on the campus network than the exploitation of a particular
vulnerability.
Some forms of malware are modular in nature and have multiple variants.
These variants can incorporate exploits for new vulnerabilities as they are discovered.
Malware of this type often provides some desired functionality to an attacker (such
as relaying spam or becoming part of botnet to be rented out for distributed denial-
of-service attacks or phishing schemes). These incident types may persist even as
specific vulnerabilities are patched, as long as an economic incentive exists for the
desired functionality provided.
Besides academic calendar, another potential source of periodic behavior could
result from monthly patch cycles used by some vendors. To examine this, the data
could be grouped by months and scaled to account for differences in the number of
days per month. This could be applied to the complete set of incidents as well as
some individual incident types.
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6.5.3 Comparing software reliability growth and time series models
Software reliability growth (SRG) models are often used to describe and predict
failures and faults in software systems. In many systems, reliability is assumed to
increase over time as faults are found and fixed and as users become more familiar
with the features of a system and can avoid or adjust to different failure states. This
often leads to an observed decreasing rate of failures.
While security incident data is not the same as software failure data in systems,
there are some similarities. A previous study explored the concept of viewing
computer security incidents on a network as analogous to software errors in a system
and tested the prediction ability of some common SRG models [89]. time series
models have also been applied to modeling SARS epidemic data [61]. Another
study (involving several small sets of data from different types of repairable systems)
compared forecasts from ARIMA time series models to forecasts from an SRG model
and found the time series models forecasts to be similar in most cases and slightly
better in a few instances [90].
The comparisons provided in this section are based on the four different SRG
models previously discussed: the Goel-Okumoto (G-O) model, the S-Shaped model,
the K-Stage Curve model, and the Duane model. These models were selected because
they represent some of the common NHPP models in use today.
Table 6.7 shows a comparison of the best time series model forecasts to the
best SRG model forecasts for each incident type. The best SRG model yields
better forecasts than the best selected time series model in seven of eleven cases.
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Incident 
Type TS SRG 
all 224.59 937.44 
msblast 53.31 6.14 
genbot 36.46 26.89 
klez 43.54 15.36 
bagle 6.35 8.44 
ircbot 58.20 43.00 
agobot 0.17 8.90 
rogueftp 34.60 64.67 
nethicsreq 26.15 22.05 
spamrelay 35.25 19.51 
nachi 4.03 3.88 
Shaded cells indicate lower RMS values 
Table 6.7: Comparison of best model forecast RMS values for time series and SRG
models.
This result suggests viewing computer security incident data (when separated into
different types) as similar to a class of detected errors in a software system can
be a useful approach for monitoring and forecasting. However, when modeling the
total aggregate number of incidents over time (resulting from the combination of all
incident types) a time series model may be more appropriate. This is not surprising
as even if factors affecting the propagation and occurrence for each different incident
type were well understood, the intervals at which new incident types are found is
likely a less understood process and better captured by time series models.
Of the individual incident types modeled, the “spamrelay” incident type is
unique in that it displays a slight increasing trend over time and the best fit was
the Duane model. This continued increasing trend probably results from economic
incentives behind attacks to compromise machines to use for sending and relaying
spam. These incentives drive innovation to develop new techniques for compromising
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machines for this purpose.
In some cases, applying a single SRG model across a whole interval may not be
appropriate. The observed “agobot” incidents mostly fall into two distinct groupings–
a small group at the beginning and much larger group about a third of the way
into the interval. Only a few occurrences are observed after week 40. Agobot is an
example of modular malware that can easily be modified to include new exploits.
The second grouping of incidents likely results from a different exploited vulnerability
than the first group. If so, it would be more appropriate to apply SRG models to
each group. The data does not identify different variants of the agobot malware.
The most frequently observed incident types were examined. These incident
types likely attracted enough attention for some form of intervention and control
measures to be taken to reduce the number of occurrences. As each measure has
some cost involved (labor, equipment, inconvenience to users, etc.), being able to
gauge the effectiveness of the measures is important. Comparing model forecasts to
actual observations before and after implementing a control measure can provide
valuable feedback regarding a control measure.
6.5.4 Update regarding “spamrelay” incident type
While many of the incident types examined have a “closed” time interval of
occurrence (a date after which no more incidents of the type are observed), the
“spamrelay” incident type continued to be observed after the original SRG and TS
model analysis was performed. This provides an opportunity to follow-up with
143
additional observations and provide additional insight regarding this incident type
relative to the campus environment.
The “spamrelay” incident type classification reflects only the observed behavior
of a compromised computer and is not related to a particular type of vulnerability or
exploit. This means there are many possible ways an affected computer could have
been compromised and there is unlikely to be a single patch or update that can be
applied that would effectively address this incident type. The growth of this incident
type displayed during the original time interval analyzed (June 2002 to March 2007)
is likely due to the increase of economic incentives as a driving motivation behind
more types of computer security incidents [91]. In particular, resources (such as
verified email address lists and open mail relays) related to the practice of spamming
have been observed on underground markets dealing in “illicit digital goods and
services in the support of criminal activities” [92].
One of the purposes of control type models (such as SRG models) is to provide
feedback regarding a process and whether or not a particular action or intervention
has a measurable impact. This can be useful for examining if a particular policy
change or intervention has an effect on an incident type which may not have easily
identifiable vulnerabilities or exploits to address (such as “spamrelay”).
Figure 6.26 shows the Duane model projection and actual incident data for an
additional time interval (April 2007 to April 2010). The Duane model projection
is still based on the same original training data time interval. As can be seen in
Figure 6.26, the numbers of observed incidents are noticeably fewer than the model’s
projected values in the additional time interval. A possible explanation for this
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Figure 6.26: Duane model fit and incident data for “spamrelay” with additional time
interval.
145
difference is that during the spring and summer of 2007, the campus consolidated
many disparate email systems and accounts to a centrally managed system. Email
servers on the campus borders could then be configured to be more selective regarding
which internal campus IP addresses outgoing mail would be accepted from rather
than being configured to accept outgoing mail from any internal campus IP address.
This change reduced the value of a compromised internal campus computer for the
purposes of relaying spam through the campus mail servers to external destinations.
However, while these changes in the campus email environment may have
reduced the value and therefore the incentive to compromise computers for the
purposes of relaying spam, the changes also likely increased the value of compromised
campus email accounts for purposes of sending spam through the campus mail servers
(since the validation of outgoing mail shifted more to a valid campus email account
away from a valid campus IP address). An analysis of successful campus email
account phishing attacks in 2008 is presented in [93] and an increase in these types
of attacks could partly be in response to changes to the campus mail environment.
This section illustrates the use of an SRG model to potentially identify the
impact of a change in an email environment on the occurrence of the “spamrelay”
incident type. Since the occurrence to this particular incident type is most likely
a reflection of the economic incentives attackers have for this resource, an effective
intervention is likely to be one that either reduces the value of this resource and/or
increases the cost to attackers for obtaining this resource.
This chapter illustrates the application of several different types of models to a
set of computer security incident data. Some types of models are used for gaining a
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better understanding of the factors and dynamics relevant to incident occurrence. A
better understanding of these factors and dynamics can lead to better interventions
and focusing of intervention efforts. Other types of models are used for developing
forecasts of future levels of incident occurrence. These models can be used to evaluate
the impact of interventions or policies on incident occurrence, even when the relevant
underlying factors or dynamics are unknown or not easily modeled.
147
Chapter 7: Exploring Population Risk Factors
Previous chapters cover some models which incorporate factors that could
potentially influence the spread of worms or viruses. These factors include the
distribution of individual likelihoods to open infected email messages, the number
and structure of social contacts that connect the nodes in a network, and assumptions
regarding the prevalence of software vulnerabilities and the rate at which vulnerabil-
ities are patched. Although these may all be important and influential factors, they
can also be difficult to directly measure or quantify. However, other features may be
more easily measured or estimated and some of these features may either correlate
or in some way function as a proxy measure (or indicator) for factors included in
previously covered models. If some of the observable factors are associated with an
increased risk of incidents, then they may provide an opportunity for targeting or
focusing intervention efforts (such as patching, blocking, or user-awareness training).
7.1 Description of data
In this chapter, we use the full range of incident data as we are not using it
to model individual incident types. Instead, we are exploring relationships between
population characteristics and computer security incidents of all types. In addition to
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the incident data described in the previous chapter, the following data was also made
available. Log files from some of the network routing equipment on campus provided
monthly address resolution protocol (ARP) cache information. As collected, the ARP
cache information indicates when a particular IP address and MAC address pairing
was first and last seen in use during the month (the amount of actual time connected
between the first and last seen timestamps cannot be determined conclusively from
this information). A recorded IP address and MAC address pairing may have been
in use continuously or intermittently between the first and last seen timestamps.
An initial intention was to examine differences between several campus sub-
populations and grouped the campus subnets by colleges and administrative units.
However, because the dominant observable difference in incidence rates was between
hosts on the housing networks (dorms, on-campus apartments, residence halls) and
hosts on any other part of the campus network (academic departments, research
labs, and administrative units), the categorization of subpopulations was simplified
to “Housing” and “Other.” Dial-up, wireless, VPN and other dynamically addressed
networks are excluded from either category.
To calculate incidence rates that could be compared across groups of different
size, the number of incidents was divided by the number of “host-months” where a
“host-month” is defined as the presence of one unique IP/MAC address pair on the
campus network at any time during a particular month. The number of “host-months”
for any given month is used as the population count of hosts on the campus network
for that month. A unit of “host-month” does not differentiate between a computer
connected to the campus network for the entire month vs. a computer connected to
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the campus network for only a few days that month.
The time interval between the first and last seen timestamps for each IP/MAC
address pairing was calculated. Only pairings with time intervals of 24 hours or
greater were retained. This was done because in some cases the router caches retained
IP/MAC address pairings for a few hours even if the actual usage was only for a few
minutes. Pairings with intervals of less than 24 hours were discarded to increase the
likelihood that an IP/MAC address pairing was actively being used on the network
instead of appearing in the ARP cache data as the result of configuration errors.
It is possible for more than one MAC address to be associated with the same
IP address within a month. In some cases, this may be caused by misconfigurations
where two (or more) machines attempt to use the same IP address at the same
time. In other cases, the same IP address may be used by several machines but
only at different times such that no more than one device with that IP address
is actually connected to the network at any time. From the recorded timestamp
information alone, it is not possible to determine when each different device was
used on the network in a given month if there are overlapping timestamps. In these
cases, the MAC address with the longest time interval between the first and last seen
timestamp was retained as being associated with the IP address while other MAC
addresses associated with the same IP address were discarded for that month. MAC
addresses were also checked and limited to being associated with a single IP address
per month. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the MAC addresses and
IP addresses retained for each month.
The monthly data are grouped by academic calendar year. The starting month
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is defined as August and the ending month as the following July. There were 11,979
incidents in the original data. After removing IP/MAC address pairs from the ARP
cache data, there were 9,334 incidents with IP/MAC address pairs remaining in the
data for the month the incident was recorded. The percentage of original incidents
retained per academic year ranges from 67% to 87% with an overall average of 78%.
7.2 Population Characteristics
The data includes information about the following population characteristics.
Each characteristic is examined to look for associations with the observed computer
security incidents. These associations may not be causal in nature, yet may be useful
for identifying machines more at risk of being involved with an incident.
7.2.1 Network affiliation of host (Housing/Other)
This population characteristic identifies if a particular IP/MAC address pair
is part of the housing subnets on-campus (“Housing”) or part of other subnets
(“Other”). Table 7.1 shows the total number of host-months per academic year for
each group as well as the number of incidents and the incidence rate (IR) per 1,000
host-months. The last column in Table 7.1 shows the ratio of [Housing IR]/[Other
IR]. Except for 2001/02, the incidence rate on the “Housing” networks has been
from 2 to almost 10 times higher than the incidence rate on the “Other” networks
for the same academic year.
Potential reasons for the difference in incidence rates between the two groups
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IR per 1,000 
host-months 
Ratio of  
[Housing IR]/  
[Other IR] 
2001/02 110,123 133 1.21 190,910 242 1.27 0.95 
2002/03 113,013 569 5.03 202,291 162 0.80 6.29 
2003/04 117,214 2,345 20.01 201,598 2,003 9.94 2.01 
2004/05 124,720 1,337 10.72 204,491 357 1.75 6.14 
2005/06 124,631 799 6.41 212,456 212 1.00 6.42 
2006/07 133,110 481 3.61 209,851 188 0.90 4.03 
2007/08 96,112 230 2.39 213,373 52 0.24 9.82 
2008/09 53,638 80 1.49 215,304 42 0.20 7.65 
2009/10 46,973 53 1.13 199,169 49 0.25 4.59 
 
could be due to differences related to user behavior or how the computers are used.
Or, there could be differences related to characteristics of the computers, such as how
current the operating system is or whether the machine is always on and connected to
the network. Other available information is used to examine if there are identifiable
and measurable factors that may account for some of the differences in the incidence
rates of these two groups.
7.2.2 Age
For our analysis, we define the “age” of a host as the time in months (plus
one) between when a particular MAC address was first seen on the campus network
and any particular month in the data that the same MAC address was present
(independent of its IP address). Since identification of individual machines was based
on MAC addresses and not IP addresses, the “age” of a host was always calculated
based on the month its MAC address was first seen on the campus network, regardless
if its IP address has changed.
This variable was included as it may be associated with the age and/or patch
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IR per 1,000 
host-months 
Ratio of  
[Low-aged IR]/  
[High-aged IR] 
2001/02 158,981 233 1.47 142,052 142 1.00 1.47 
2002/03 165,755 507 3.06 149,549 224 1.50 2.04 
2003/04 162,173 2,720 16.77 156,639 1,628 10.39 1.61 
2004/05 167,980 1,261 7.51 161,231 433 2.69 2.80 
2005/06 177,374 698 3.94 159,713 313 1.96 2.01 
2006/07 179,398 370 2.06 163,563 299 1.83 1.13 
2007/08 157,269 206 1.31 152,216 76 0.50 2.62 
2008/09 137,280 92 0.67 131,662 30 0.23 2.94 
2009/10 124,547 56 0.45 121,595 46 0.38 1.19 
 
level of a computer’s operating system (and/or other installed software). Older
machines may be running older operating systems (or software) which contain more
identified vulnerabilities and increase their risk of being involved in an incident
(for incident types that target vulnerable software). It is also possible that older
machines still connected to the network have been hardened in some way or run less
vulnerable operating systems so they may have a decreased risk of being involved
in an incident. On the “Housing” networks, older machines may also be associated
with older students who may have different usage behaviors.
Table 7.2 shows the incidence rates per academic year for machines grouped
into two age categories–“Low” and “High.” For each month within an academic year,
the median age of the machines was identified and machines with ages less than or
equal to the median age were categorized as “Low”; machines with ages greater than
the median age were categorized as “High.” The number of incidents for machines in
each category was also counted for each month. The counts were done on a monthly
basis to minimize the effect of threats and risks that may change over the time
period of the academic calendar year. For example, if a particular incident type
exploits several machines in October of a particular academic year, it may appear
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Figure 7.1: Median ages by months.
that machines that are three months old are more at risk of incidents. However, there
may just be more three-month-old machines in October because many new machines
are connected to the campus network sometime in late August (or the typical start
of the academic year). Of more interest is examining the following: of the machines
on the campus network in October, is there a difference in risk of incidents related
to the ages of the machines present? Table 7.2 indicates that for each academic year,
the incidence rate of “Low” machines ranged between 1.2–2.8 times higher compared
to the incidence rate for “High” machines in the same academic year.
One possible reason for difference in incidence rates between “Low” and “High”
machines is that there may simply be different distributions of “Low” and “High”
machines on the “Housing” and “Other” networks. Figure 7.1 shows the monthly
median ages for the entire population as well as for the housing and other groups. It
can be seen there is often a 15-20 month “age” difference between the median ages
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of the two populations. It should also be noted that since the ARP cache data used
to calculate ages only goes back to January 2000, the ages are underestimated for
some of the population. The effect of this underestimation is mostly seen in the first
few years and is visible as the steady increase in median age for “Other” between
2001 and 2004.
7.2.3 Calendar month
Next the data are grouped by calendar month to see if there is any seasonal
variation present. For this analysis, a scaled or proportional incidence rate is used
that is calculated by dividing the proportion of incidents per calendar month per
academic year by the proportion of hosts per calendar month per academic calendar
year. This was done to allow each year to have equal weight and avoid cases where
calendar months in years with more incidents are weighted more that those in years
with fewer incidents. For example, if for a particular academic year, the month of
January had 10% of all the incidents for that academic year and January also had
10% of all the host-months for that year, then it would have scaled IR value of 1.0.
A scaled incidence rate value was calculated for each month of each academic year
and Figure 7.2 shows boxplots of the scaled values for each calendar month. The
figure on the left shows the boxplots for values calculated using all of the data, while
the other two boxplots are for “Housing” network hosts only (the middle plot) and
“Other” network hosts only (the plot on the right).
The pattern of the boxplots is similar for the different populations (all, housing,
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Figure 7.2: Boxplots of yearly scaled incidence rates by Calendar Month.
other) where proportionally there are more incidents that occur in September and
October and the fewest in June.
7.2.4 Academic semester
In addition to looking at the separate calendar months, the data are also
grouped into designations that align with parts of the academic calendar. Three
designations are used: Fall (August-December), Spring (January-May), and Summer
(June-July). We use the same approach for calculating a scaled incidence rate for
each semester designation of each academic year as described in the previous section
for Calendar Month.
Figure 7.3 shows the scaled incidence rates of each designation for each academic
year of data. While for many years in the middle, the Fall semester had proportionally
more incidents and the Summer season had proportionally less, in more recent years
the proportionally scaled incident rates have become more similar for the different
semester categories. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show similar patterns for the “Housing” and
“Other” networks, but there is a little more separation between the Fall and Summer
rates for “Other” compared to “Housing.”
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Figure 7.3: Scaled incidence rates per semester by Academic Year.




















































Figure 7.4: Scaled incidence rate per
semester by Academic Year (Housing).




















































Figure 7.5: Scaled incidence rate per
semester by Academic Year (Other).
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7.2.5 Vendor ID from MAC address
From the ARP cache data, the MAC addresses of machines on the network can
be obtained. The first part of the MAC address identifies the vendor or manufacturer
of the network interface. Three groups (Apple, Dell, Other) are designated based on
the available vendor ID part of the MAC (or Ethernet) addresses of hosts present on
the campus network. Although the relative number of hosts with Apple Ethernet
addresses was comparatively low (from 5.5% in 2003/04 to 10% in 2009/10) there is
likely a strong correlation between hosts with Apple Ethernet addresses and hosts
running an Apple operating system (such as OS X). If a host’s operating system
affects its risk of being involved with a security incident, this designation may capture
some of this association. The most prevalent MAC address vendor ID was Dell which
is why it was used as a separate category. Although only 15% of hosts in 2001/02
had Dell Ethernet addresses, in 2009/10 this number was over 52%. Remaining
Ethernet address vendor IDs were grouped into Other (as opposed to “Other” which
is used for the Housing/Other subnet groupings).
Figure 7.6 shows the scaled incidence rate (calculated similarly as described
for Calendar Month) for the three different MAC address vendor ID categories. The
most notable feature in Figure 7.6 is the increasing trend seen in the Apple category.
This increase means the proportion of incidents involving hosts with Apple Ethernet
addresses has been increasing faster than the proportion of hosts with Apple Ethernet
addresses connected to the campus network in general. This same trend is seen in
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 which show the scaled incidence rates for the “Housing”
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Figure 7.6: Scaled incidence rate per MAC vendor by Academic Year.



























































Figure 7.7: Scaled incidence rate per
MAC vendor by Academic Year (Hous-
ing).

























































Figure 7.8: Scaled incidence rate
per MAC vendor by Academic Year
(Other).
and “Other” network populations. One difference between Figures 7.7 and 7.8 is
there is a larger separation between the Dell and Other categories in the “Other”
network population than in the “Housing” network population. One potential reason
for this could be that many of the Dell hosts in the “Other” network population
group may be part of large institutional purchases and therefore more likely to
be centrally managed and maintained (and therefore having a lower risk of being
involved in an incident), while most Dell hosts present in the “Housing” network
population group may be individually owned and managed and have more similar
risk as “Other” machines.
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7.2.6 Network time
When calculating incidence rates, the number of “host-months” has been used
as the denominator which gives equal weight to each host seen on the campus
network each month. However, other denominators could be used. One possible
denominator could be expressed as host-network time, where network time would
reflect the amount of time a host was connected to the campus network. This would
reflect a difference between a host that was present and connected for a few days
compared to a host that was present and connected everyday. Using the ARP cache
data, the difference in time is calculated between when an IP/MAC address pair was
first and last seen for a given month. However, there is some uncertainty involved
with this measure as the status of the machine in between these two timestamps is
unknown–two hosts that were connected for the same number of days would have
the same value of network time even if one was left on all the time and one was
turned off each night. The reason for including network time is that some incident
types (such as worms that spread directly from machine to machine without user
action) may affect hosts that are connected for longer periods of time than hosts
that are connected for shorter periods of time. The counter-argument to this is that
some incident types require a user action to occur and what really matters may be
the amount of time a user uses a particular host instead of just how long a particular
host is on and connected to the network.
To examine the effect of network time, four equal-sized time categories (Q1,
Q2, Q3, Q4) are defined with boundaries determined by splitting a 30-day month
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Table 7.3: Incomplete timestamp data.
Academic Year Months with incomplete data
2001/02 2001-Sep







2009/10 2009-Sep, 2010-Feb, 2010-Apr, 2010-May
into four equally spaced intervals by time. Then for each academic year, the number
of hosts for each time category and the number of hosts with incidents for each time
category are counted. Then the proportion of incidents per category is divided by
the proportion of hosts per category for each academic year to obtain the scaled
incidence rates. Scaled incidence rates are calculated so that each academic year has
equal weight. For some months, the ARP cache data was incomplete and network
times could not be calculated for all categories. The months affected are shown in
Table 7.3 and data from those months were not included in the plots shown in this
section. However, when creating regression models in a later section, the maximum
network time was substituted for the missing values.
Figure 7.9 shows boxplots of the scaled incidence rates for each time category
for all hosts (left), “Housing” network hosts (middle), and “Other” network hosts
(right). Hosts in the Q2 category appear in some cases to have a higher proportional
incidence rate, but Q2 also shows a broader range in values than the other categories.
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Figure 7.9: Boxplots of scaled incidence rates for network time categories.
7.2.7 On at beginning of month
Since the calculated time values do not differentiate between hosts that are
always on and hosts that are on intermittently, an attempt to gauge if a machine
is likely to be on all the time is made by looking at the time value of its first seen
timestamp. A host was classified as “On” if its first seen timestamp is within 4 hours
of the beginning of the month (between 00:00 and 04:00 of the first day), otherwise
it was classified as “Off.” The reason for the 4-hour window is due to how the ARP
cache data is collected. The rationale is that hosts that are on at midnight at the
beginning of the month are more likely to be on all the time when compared to
hosts not on at midnight at the beginning of the month. Similar to network time,
there is uncertainty that this value actually captures the information it is intended
to measure.
Since this measurement also depends on the ARP cache timestamp information,
the same months listed in Table 7.3 were removed from the analysis in this section.
For creating regression models in a later section, the missing values were substituted
with the value indicating the hosts were “On.”
Figure 7.10 shows the scaled incidence rates for each group (On/Off) by
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Figure 7.10: Scaled incidence rate per On/Off groups by Academic Year.


























































Figure 7.11: Scaled incidence rate
per On/Off groups by Academic Year
(Housing).


























































Figure 7.12: Scaled incidence rate
per On/Off groups by Academic Year
(Other).
academic year for the full population while Figure 7.11 shows the same information
for the “Housing” network population and Figure 7.12 for the “Other” network
population. For the last few academic years (2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10), the
relationship appears to be fairly consistent for the population as a whole with
machines indicated as being “On” at the beginning of the month have a slightly
higher proportional rate of incidents compared to machines indicated as being “Off”
at the beginning of the month. For the same academic years, the difference between
these two groups seems to be increasing for the “Housing” network population, while
it has flipped back and forth for the “Other” network population.
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7.3 Modeling and Evaluation Methodology
Logistic regression models were created using full sets of data from either one
academic calendar year or from three consecutive academic calendar years. Logistic
regression is appropriate for modeling events with binary dependent variables [94].
Univariate models were created as well as models containing the full set of variables.
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) was calculated for each model to evaluate
its classification ability. Due to the unknown number of false negatives (undetected
incidents) in the data, some measures may be biased. This biasing situation also
occurs with medical screening tests [95] where follow-up evaluations are not performed
if an initial screening test is negative.
Models were also evaluated by using the logistic regression model outputs for
each entry as a set of probability weights in combination with unequal probability
sampling. Sample sizes were set based on the total number of host-months and
incidents within a data set so there would be 10 expected incidents (true positives)
within selected samples if all entries had an equal probability (the population
incidence rate) of being involved in a computer security incident. The number of
true positives was recorded for each sample and the sampling was repeated 100 times
using the model data. The results were then averaged to obtain a measurement value.
The expected number of incidents was kept constant to allow for comparisons across
years even though the number of host-months and incidents varies for each time
period. A value of 10 should be large enough to obtain a nontruncated distribution
of results from working with nonnegative values. Table 7.4 summarizes the data
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Table 7.4: Data and sizes of samples used for evaluations of models and forecasts.

















2001/02 301,033 375 1.25 8,028 
2002/03 315,304 731 2.32 4,314 
2003/04 318,812 4,348 13.64 734 
2004/05 329,211 1,694 5.15 1,944 
2005/06 337,087 1,011 3.00 3,335 
2006/07 342,961 669 1.95 5,127 
2007/08 309,485 282 0.91 10,975 
2008/09 268,942 122 0.45 22,045 
2009/10 246,142 102 0.41 24,132 
Three-year 
2001/04 935,149 5,454 5.83 1,715 
2002/05 963,327 6,773 7.03 1,423 
2003/06 985,110 7,053 7.16 1,397 
2004/07 1,009,259 3,374 3.34 2,992 
2005/08 989,533 1,962 1.98 5,044 
2006/09 921,388 1,073 1.16 8,587 
sets and sample sizes used. Calculations were performed using the R statistical
software [68]. An example of the R code used for the logistic regression models is
provided in Appendix E.
The performance of the models on testing data (data not used for creation
of the models) was evaluated using a similar process. Logistic regression outputs
were calculated for the single academic year that follows the data set used for model
construction. Model outputs from the testing data were used with unequal probability
sampling to select hosts which may be involved in an incident. The sample sizes were
selected so that there would be an expected number of 10 incidents in the sample if
all entries had an equal probability (the population incidence rate) of being involved
in an incident. Sampling was repeated 1,000 times and the results (number of true
positives in the sample) were averaged to obtain a value that could be compared
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across models.
Models were created using from one or three consecutive years of data to
determine if including more historical data added any benefit to the forecasts. On
one hand, since threats and defenses evolve over time, what occurred in the past
may not be very relevant to identifying current or predicting future incidents. On
the other hand, although technical aspects (such as the particular vulnerabilities
exploited and the prevalence of defensive measures such as host-based firewalls
and antivirus software) may change over time, some underlying aspects (such as
user-related behaviors and motivations) may be more stable and remain relevant
over time.
7.4 Modeling and Evaluation Results
Figure 7.13 shows the “area under the ROC curve” (AUC) values and the
number of true positives in the sampling results for models created using a single
year of data applied to both the model data and the testing data (the academic year
immediately following the model data). A higher AUC value is often interpreted as
indicating better discriminating ability of the model [96] and higher AUC values
appear to be associated with higher numbers of true positives in the samples from
the model data. Overall, models using all of the variables have higher AUC values
than the univariate models and higher numbers of true positives for both the model
and testing data samples. The “Housing/Other” variable seems to provide better
performance than most other individual variables, especially for more recent years
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(such as 2008/09), although the “Calendar.Month” variable also has higher AUC
values compared to other individual variables for some of the years in the middle
(such as 2003/04 and 2005/06).
For five out of the eight years of testing data shown in Figure 7.13, models using
all of the variables had the highest number of true positives in samples, and were very
close to the best for a sixth year. The model based on the “Housing/Other” variable
had the highest number of true positives for the 2003/04 testing data compared to
other models, and typically was the second best performer for other years. While
the model based on “Age” had the highest number of true positives for the 2002/03
testing data, the improvement over assuming an equal probability of incidents (based
on the population incident rate) is negligible.
Figure 7.14 shows the AUC values for models and the number true positives of
sampling results for models created using three consecutive years of data applied
to both the model data and the testing data (the single academic year immediately
following the model data). Same as for the single-year models, models using all of the
variables have higher AUC values than the univariate models and more true positives
in the model data samples. However, the number of true positives in the model
data samples for the three-year models tends to be lower than the number of true
positives in the model data samples for the one-year models. The “Housing/Other”
variable models have higher AUC values than most other individual variables for
later years, while “Calendar.Month” models have higher AUC values for some of the
earlier years compared to other univariate models. Similar to the single-year models,
three-year models using all of the variables had the highest number of true positives
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in the testing data samples. The models based on the “Housing/Other” variable
had the next highest number of true positives for all years of testing data samples.
Table 7.5 summarizes the highest average number of true positives from the testing
data samples for both the one-year and three-year models. For years with testing
data samples available using both models, the one-year models perform better in all
cases except one (2007/08), but the difference between the one-year and three-year
models for 2009/10 is minimal. In general, it appears the performance (measured by
the number of true positives in the testing data samples) of single-year models using
all of the variables is often the best or near-best. Among the univariate models, the
“Housing/Other” variable performs better for more recent years for both the one- and
three-year models.
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Figure 7.13: Summary of AUC values
and number of true positives in samples
for single-year models and testing data.
Figure 7.14: Summary of AUC vaues
and number of true positives in samples
for three-year models and testing data.
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Table 7.5: Comparison of best forecasts.
Single-year model Three-year model 
Year of forecast data Variables mean std. Variables mean std. 
2002/03 Age 10.6 3.2 - - - 
2003/04 Housing/Other 13.3 3.7 - - - 
2004/05 All 13.6 3.5 All 13.5 3.7 
2005/06 All 23.4 4.8 All 16.1 3.9 
2006/07 All 23.4 4.7 All 14.6 3.8 
2007/08 All 21.5 4.4 All 25.6 4.8 
2008/09 All 26.3 4.2 All 22.2 4.1 
2009/10 Housing/Other 18.8 3.6 All 18.3 3.6 
This chapter explored the association between different computer population
characteristics and incident occurrence. The strongest association was seen based on
whether a computer or device was part of the on-campus housing network or part of
the remaining academic and research networks. Additional modeling could indicate
if the effects of other factors would be observable for different individual incident
types, or if targeted interventions based on population characteristic information
would be beneficial.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work
This document explores the use of many types of models that can be applied
to computer security incident data. Examples of how some of these models can
be used with actual computer security incident data are also shown. Some of the
observations and conclusions that can be made from the model illustrations and
examples are enumerated and described below.
8.1 Observations and Conclusions
Although SIR and other types of infectious disease models have been applied
to computer security incidents in the past, these applications typically have focused
on the population as a whole and have proposed interventions that were dependent
on this assumption. By using a stochastic SIR model, the effects on a subpopulation
can be examined in more detail and intervention actions limited in scope to the
subpopulation can be evaluated. In this scenario, the larger population acts as a
reservoir of potential infection sources in addition to any infection sources already
present in the subpopulation. Connections that cross the boundary between the larger
population and the subpopulation can provide information regarding external threats
and attack activity. If the larger population is sufficiently greater in size than the
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subpopulation, observed incidents within the subpopulation are likely to be caused
by external sources rather than other internal sources. This indicates that blocking
attack activity at the border of a subpopulation could be an effective measure to
reduce the number of internal infections. This kind of blocking intervention would
be more effective than another type of intervention that depends on being applied to
the overall population in its entirety.
Another assumption commonly included in deterministic SIR models that
include a vaccination (or patching) parameter, is that the rate parameter for vacci-
nation remains relatively constant over the time period of interest. As previously
discussed, this assumption may not fit with the way patching activity actually takes
place. Easier to patch and centrally managed computers are more likely to be patched
first (which would more quickly reduce the number of susceptible computers), but
then other computers may be more difficult to locate or undesirable to patch and
may remain in a susceptible or vulnerable state. One type of stochastic SIR model
that associates the rate of patching with the number or proportion of susceptible
computers is presented and simulations indicate this type of model is more likely
consistent with a set of incident data observed on a university network.
While the SIR models used for incident types that can spread directly from
computer to computer without the need for specific user action usually assume a
fully connected network topology (every node is directly connected to every other
node), incident types that propagate through email usually involve less connected
network topologies. Even when the same number of connection links is present
and the average node degree is similar, different spreading behavior can result from
172
different arrangements or topologies. A scale-free or power-law network is a common
topology used to describe social networks and simulations indicate this topology
affects the number of observed incidents and is more likely consistent with email
related incident data observed on a university network than a randomly connected
topology.
Besides connection topology, email propagation can depend on user factors,
such as the likelihoods of users to open infected messages. Some models have included
this factor, but have treated all users as having the same likelihoods to open infected
messages. A stochastic model has been presented where individual users are assigned
a threshold value based on an exponential distribution and this threshold value is
used to determine if a user opens infected messages. Simulations indicate this type
of model (where most users are unlikely open infected messages, but a few are very
likely to do so) is more likely consistent with observed email related incident data
on a university network than a model that uses a uniform random distribution to
assign threshold values. This indicates that accounting for and including user related
factors in models can be important for matching observations and improving model
performance. This can be important when considering types of interventions to use
and evaluating their potential impact.
For example, if blocking or filtering of infected messages is applied, its impact
may not be directly related to the overall number of infected messages blocked,
but rather by the number of infected messages blocked which are being sent to a
subset of nodes which are highly connected and have associated users more likely to
open infected messages. Some form of targeted intervention (such as patching or
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user awareness training) for this subset could produce better results in reducing the
spread of infections than a more uniform application of intervention measures.
Targeted interventions may also be more effective for reducing the number
of other computer security incident types even when infectious disease models are
not applicable. Identifying and exploring a risk factor with a model (such as the
likelihood a user will open an infected message) can be a simpler task than isolating
and measuring such a risk factor in an actual setting. However, other observable or
quantifiable factors may correlate or be associated with a risk factor and provide an
opportunity for guiding intervention efforts. Observed incidents can be compared
with observable characteristics of a population to try to identify potential factors
that correlate or contribute to the risk of incident occurrence.
Modeling can be used to get a better understanding of factors that affect the
occurrence and spread of computer security incidents. Examples of some compart-
mental infectious disease models have been presented and compared with incident
data. These comparisons show that models using a variable patching rate may be
a better reflection of actual patching behavior. Also, for incidents propagating by
email, a scale-free network topology provides a better match to observed incident
data compared to when a random network topology is used. Incidents requiring
some type of user action for propagation (such as in the presented email propagation
models) are more appropriately modeled using an exponential based distribution
rather than a uniform random based distribution for representing the likelihood
particular users will perform an action.
To the extent that these types of models aptly describe the observed data, they
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can be used to test and explore some common intervention options applicable to
infectious diseases. However, some incident types are not adequately modeled or
described as an infectious process and other interventions may be more applicable.
Regardless of the type of intervention actions taken, it is useful to have a way to
gauge or measure the impact of such actions. One way to do so is to compare
forecasts of the number of expected incidents before and after an intervention was
started. If the observed number of incidents is less than the number forecast, then
this difference may be attributable to the intervention actions taken.
Software reliability growth models and time series models are two types of
forecasting models than can be applied to a range of incident types. Obtaining
estimates for model parameters from observed or collected data can be simpler and
faster for these models than for some of the compartmental models described for
modeling infectious diseases. The models themselves do not account for or include
any intervention actions and therefore are not as useful for simulating interventions,
however, they can be used for forecasting and then tracking and monitoring the
impact of applied interventions. As illustrated with the “spamrelay” example in
Chapter 6 using the Duane model with additional data, this process can also be used
in reverse. Observed differences between model forecasts and actual observations
can indicate when something influential has changed (either increasing or decreasing
the number of expected observed incidents) and whether the selected forecasting
model is still applicable or if it should be adjusted or replaced. Software reliability
growth models appear better for forecasting incidents types attributable to known
causes or vulnerabilities compared to time series models.
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8.2 Future Work
The connection activity crossing or blocked at the border of subpopulation
using an SIR model is in some ways analogous to the observed attack activity blocked
or logged by an IDS/IPS that examines border traffic on a network. The modeled
border activity in an SIR model could be compared with observed IDS/IPS detection
alerts to see if external attack activity is consistent with expected activity from an
infectious process, or if the attack activity is either more targeted or random in
nature.
Similarly, the email propagation model includes information regarding the levels
of infected messages filtered or blocked over time that could be compared to mail
filter logs. This could provide additional information regarding aspects of the model
(such as connection topology and distribution of user likelihoods for opening infected
messages). The origins of infected or blocked messages could also be examined to
determine if internal or external sources pose more of a risk.
Although the email propagation model includes some aspects related to the
human users of the computers, none of the models include aspects related to human
attackers who may be responsible for some of the observed attack activity. For
example, is there any evidence of feedback from intervention efforts on relevant attack
activity? If a certain type of attack becomes less effective because of intervention
efforts, does attack decline as attack resources are applied elsewhere, or do occurrences
of the attack activity increase to make up for the decline in successful attacks?
It is becoming more common for computer security incidents to be motivated in
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part by financial incentives. A successful compromise or attack may financially benefit
the attacker in some way. Identifying or classifying apparent motivations behind
attacks could lead to better modeling and intervention planning as interventions
that reduce attacker motivations for targeting resources could be more effective than
interventions that simply thwart a particular attack venue and do not reduce attacker
motivations.
Modeling can be a useful tool for gaining a better understanding of factors that
can affect the occurrence of computer security incidents. A better understanding
of these factors can lead to more effective use of limited resources available for
intervention efforts. Modeling can also be a useful tool for evaluating the effectiveness
of applied interventions and identifying if changes are needed to obtain the desired
results.
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Appendix A: Incident Data
A.1 Description
• Included below are the incident data for the “worm msblast”, “worm nachi”,
“bagle worm”, “virus klez”, “virus agobot”, and “spamrelay” incident types.
• Each number represents an observed incident and the number itself represents
the day the incident observation was recorded. Day 0 corresponds to June 13,
2001.
A.2 Worm msblast data
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
178
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790, 790,
790, 790, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791,
791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 791, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792, 792,
792, 792, 792, 792, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793, 793,
793, 793, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794,
794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 794, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795, 795,
179
795, 795, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796,
796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 796, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797, 797,
797, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
180
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798,
798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 798, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799,
799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 799, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800, 800,
801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801, 801,
801, 801, 801, 801, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804,
804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 804, 806, 806, 806, 806, 810, 811, 811, 811, 811, 811, 812,
812, 812, 812, 812, 812, 812, 812, 812, 813, 813, 813, 813, 813, 813, 813, 817, 817,
817, 817, 817, 817, 817, 817, 817, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818,
818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818,
818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 818, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819,
819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 819, 820, 820, 820, 820, 820, 820, 820, 820, 820,
820, 821, 821, 821, 821, 821, 821, 821, 821
A.3 Worm nachi data
825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825,
825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825,
825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825,
825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825, 825,
825, 825, 825, 825, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826,
826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826, 826,
826, 831, 831, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838,
838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839,
839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839,
839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840,
840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840,
840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 840, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841,
841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 841, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848,
848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848, 848,
849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 849, 852, 852, 852, 852, 853,
853, 853, 853, 853, 853, 853, 853, 853, 853, 854, 854, 854, 854, 854, 862, 863, 869,
869, 869, 869, 869, 881, 881, 881, 881, 881, 888, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889,
889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 889, 890, 902, 903, 916, 916,
916, 917, 919, 971, 999, 1001, 1017, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1023
181
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951, 951, 951, 953, 953, 956, 956, 956, 956, 956, 956, 956, 956, 957, 957, 957,
957, 957, 957, 957, 957, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979,
979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 979, 980, 980, 981, 981, 993, 993, 993, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994,
994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 994, 995, 995,
995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995,
995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995,
995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 995,
995, 995, 995, 995, 995, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996, 996,
996, 996, 997, 997, 997, 997, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001, 1001,
1001, 1001, 1001, 1002, 1002, 1003, 1003, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006,
1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1006, 1007, 1007, 1007, 1007, 1007,
1015, 1015, 1016, 1019, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1020, 1021, 1021, 1021, 1022,
1022, 1023, 1028, 1036, 1036, 1037, 1041, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1049, 1049, 1049,
1049, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050,
1050, 1050, 1050, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1055, 1055, 1059, 1063, 1077,
1077, 1129, 1129, 1129, 1129, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132,
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1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1132, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133,
1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133,
1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1135, 1139, 1139, 1141, 1154, 1154, 1169,
1171, 1172, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1177, 1188, 1197, 1203, 1204, 1204, 1204, 1204, 1204,
1204, 1204, 1204, 1204, 1204, 1205, 1205, 1209, 1210, 1227, 1227, 1234, 1234, 1234,
1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234,
1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1234, 1237,
1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1237, 1238, 1238, 1238, 1238,
1238, 1241, 1244, 1246, 1247, 1273, 1325, 1325, 1344, 1560, 1560, 1562, 1562, 1562,
1562, 1562, 1562, 1563, 1563, 1566, 1566, 1567, 1568, 1568, 1568, 1570, 1575, 1616,
1616, 1629
A.5 Virus klez data
244, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246, 246,
246, 246, 246, 246, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247,
247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247,
247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 247, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248,
248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 248, 249, 249, 249, 249, 249, 249, 250,
250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250,
250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250,
250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 250, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251,
251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 251, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252,
252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252,
252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252, 252,
252, 252, 252, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253,
253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253,
253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253,
253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253,
253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253, 253,
253, 253, 253, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254, 254,
254, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256,
256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 256, 257, 257, 257, 257, 257, 257, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258,
258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258,
258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 258, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259, 259,
259, 259, 260, 260, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261, 261,
261, 261, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 262, 263, 263, 264, 264,
264, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 265, 267, 268, 268,
268, 271, 271, 271, 271, 271, 272, 272, 273, 273, 277, 277, 277, 277, 277, 277, 278,
279, 279, 279, 279, 279, 281, 281, 281, 281, 281, 281, 282, 287, 292, 292, 292, 292,
292, 292, 293, 293, 293, 294, 294, 295, 295, 295, 295, 296, 296, 299, 299, 299, 299,
299, 299, 299, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 301, 301, 301, 302, 302, 302, 302, 302,
303, 303, 303, 303, 305, 305, 305, 305, 305, 305, 305, 305, 305, 306, 306, 306, 306,
308, 308, 308, 308, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 309, 310, 311, 311,
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311, 313, 313, 313, 313, 313, 313, 313, 313, 314, 314, 314, 314, 314, 314, 316, 316,
316, 316, 316, 317, 317, 317, 317, 317, 317, 317, 317, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320,
320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 320, 321, 321, 321, 321, 322, 322, 322,
322, 322, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 323, 324, 324, 324, 325,
325, 325, 325, 325, 326, 326, 326, 326, 327, 327, 327, 327, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328,
328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 328, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329,
329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 329, 330, 331, 331, 331, 331, 331,
334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 334, 335,
335, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 337, 338, 338, 338, 338, 338, 338,
338, 341, 341, 341, 341, 341, 341, 341, 341, 342, 342, 342, 342, 342, 342, 342, 343,
343, 349, 349, 350, 352, 358, 426, 439, 440, 443, 443, 443, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447,
447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447,
447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 447, 448, 448, 448, 448, 449, 449, 449,
450, 453, 453, 453, 453, 453, 453, 453, 454, 455, 455, 455, 456, 456, 456, 457, 457,
457, 457, 461, 461, 461, 461, 461, 461, 463, 463, 463, 463, 463, 463, 463, 463, 463,
463, 463, 463, 463, 463, 464, 464, 464, 468, 468, 468, 468, 468, 473, 473, 474, 474,
474, 475, 475, 477, 477, 477, 477, 477, 481, 481, 481, 481, 481, 481, 481, 481, 483,
483, 483, 483, 483, 485, 485, 488, 488, 488, 488, 488, 488, 490, 490, 490, 490, 490,
492, 492, 495, 495, 495, 497, 497, 497, 497, 497, 497, 497, 499, 499, 499, 499, 502,
502, 502, 502, 502, 502, 502, 506, 506, 506, 506, 506, 506, 506, 509, 509, 509, 509,
509, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 516, 516, 516, 516, 516, 517, 517, 517,
517, 517, 517, 518, 518, 518, 518, 519, 519, 520, 520, 520, 520, 523, 523, 523, 523,
523, 527, 527, 527, 527, 527, 527, 527, 527, 531, 531, 531, 531, 531, 531, 540, 540,
544, 544, 544, 544, 544, 545, 545, 545, 546, 546, 546, 547, 547, 547, 547, 548, 548,
548, 548, 548, 548, 551, 551, 551, 551, 551, 551, 573, 573, 579, 579, 581, 582, 594,
594, 594, 594, 594, 594, 595, 596, 596, 596, 596, 596, 597, 597, 597, 597, 597, 597,
600, 600, 600, 600, 600, 600, 601, 601, 601, 601, 601, 602, 602, 602, 602, 602, 608,
608, 608, 608, 608, 610, 611, 611, 611, 611, 611, 611, 611, 611, 617, 617, 617, 617,
617, 617, 617, 617, 617, 618, 618, 618, 618, 621, 621, 621, 621, 621, 621, 621, 621,
621, 621, 621, 621, 621, 622, 622, 622, 622, 622, 623, 623, 623, 623, 624, 628, 628,
628, 628, 628, 629, 631, 631, 631, 631, 631, 632, 636, 636, 636, 636, 636, 636, 636,
637, 638, 638, 638, 638, 639, 642, 642, 642, 644, 645, 646, 656, 656, 656, 656, 656,
656, 658, 658, 659, 659, 659, 660, 660, 660, 663, 665, 670, 670, 670, 670, 671, 671,
674, 674, 677, 677, 677, 677, 677, 677, 677, 678, 678, 679, 681, 685, 686, 686, 686,
687, 687, 688, 692, 692, 693, 693, 694, 694, 694, 694, 698, 698, 698, 699, 700, 700,
705, 705, 705, 705, 705, 706, 706, 708, 756, 826, 848, 852, 859, 902
A.6 Virus agobot data
852, 852, 852, 852, 853, 853, 853, 854, 854, 854, 854, 854, 854, 855, 855, 855,
861, 861, 861, 861, 861, 862, 862, 862, 866, 866, 866, 867, 867, 867, 867, 985, 1008,
1008, 1008, 1008, 1008, 1008, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009,
1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009,
1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1009, 1010, 1013, 1013, 1015, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1021,
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1021, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1022, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024, 1024,
1024, 1024, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027,
1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027,
1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1027, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028,
1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028,
1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1028, 1029, 1029, 1029, 1029, 1029, 1029, 1029,
1029, 1029, 1029, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031, 1031,
1031, 1031, 1031, 1033, 1033, 1033, 1033, 1033, 1033, 1033, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034,
1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034,
1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1035,
1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1035, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036,
1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036, 1036,
1036, 1037, 1037, 1037, 1037, 1037, 1038, 1038, 1038, 1039, 1039, 1040, 1040, 1040,
1040, 1040, 1041, 1041, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042, 1042,
1043, 1043, 1043, 1043, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044, 1044,
1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045, 1045,
1045, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1048,
1048, 1048, 1048, 1048, 1049, 1049, 1049, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1050, 1051, 1051, 1051,
1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051,
1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1052, 1052, 1052, 1052, 1052, 1052,
1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1056, 1056,
1056, 1056, 1056, 1056, 1056, 1056, 1056, 1056, 1057, 1057, 1059, 1062, 1062, 1062,
1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062,
1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062,
1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062, 1062,
1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063,
1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063,
1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1063, 1064, 1064, 1064, 1064, 1064, 1064, 1076, 1077,
1080, 1080, 1080, 1084, 1084, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1090, 1090, 1091, 1094, 1097, 1121,
1121, 1121, 1121, 1121, 1121, 1121, 1121, 1203, 1231, 1553
A.7 Spamrelay data
A.7.1 Original time interval
363, 552, 703, 728, 740, 755, 764, 768, 768, 775, 778, 791, 799, 800, 802, 803,
803, 806, 807, 807, 817, 818, 820, 822, 824, 824, 824, 824, 831, 831, 831, 831, 831,
831, 831, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 838, 839, 839, 839, 839, 839, 840, 840, 840, 840,
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840, 840, 841, 841, 842, 842, 842, 847, 853, 853, 859, 911, 928, 966, 966, 971, 975,
978, 1000, 1020, 1021, 1023, 1023, 1027, 1028, 1030, 1034, 1034, 1034, 1040, 1042,
1044, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1054, 1055, 1057, 1057, 1057, 1059, 1059, 1063, 1064, 1066,
1076, 1090, 1093, 1103, 1121, 1127, 1153, 1171, 1172, 1172, 1172, 1174, 1174, 1175,
1175, 1175, 1175, 1175, 1175, 1181, 1184, 1199, 1203, 1208, 1216, 1275, 1280, 1312,
1312, 1312, 1313, 1313, 1321, 1323, 1325, 1328, 1337, 1339, 1339, 1353, 1359, 1366,
1366, 1366, 1366, 1366, 1366, 1385, 1385, 1385, 1409, 1409, 1414, 1415, 1419, 1420,
1420, 1420, 1421, 1421, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1423, 1434, 1434, 1434, 1434, 1434, 1434,
1434, 1434, 1434, 1434, 1434, 1435, 1435, 1435, 1435, 1435, 1436, 1436, 1448, 1450,
1450, 1454, 1462, 1476, 1476, 1478, 1479, 1489, 1496, 1496, 1496, 1514, 1531, 1532,
1536, 1546, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1556, 1557, 1557, 1558,
1558, 1558, 1562, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1567, 1567, 1567, 1568, 1568, 1570, 1570, 1570,
1573, 1573, 1573, 1575, 1575, 1580, 1582, 1582, 1587, 1589, 1590, 1590, 1590, 1591,
1596, 1596, 1602, 1602, 1602, 1609, 1611, 1611, 1611, 1612, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1619,
1622, 1628, 1629, 1629, 1629, 1629, 1631, 1636, 1636, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640, 1640,
1646, 1648, 1649, 1653, 1655, 1671, 1672, 1673, 1685, 1685, 1686, 1686, 1686, 1687,
1687, 1688, 1689, 1692, 1692, 1692, 1700, 1702, 1705, 1708, 1710, 1710, 1713, 1714,
1714, 1714, 1714, 1715, 1720, 1720, 1721, 1721, 1721, 1723, 1735, 1735, 1735, 1735,
1735, 1736, 1748, 1762, 1762, 1769, 1769, 1769, 1786, 1786, 1786, 1786, 1786, 1786,
1786, 1786, 1819, 1829, 1834, 1836, 1855, 1867, 1883, 1889, 1894, 1896, 1902, 1904,
1904, 1904, 1904, 1904, 1904, 1904, 1904, 1904, 1906, 1916, 1916, 1916, 1916, 1916,
1916, 1918, 1918, 1918, 1918, 1918, 1924, 1924, 1924, 1924, 1924, 1924, 1924, 1926,
1926, 1926, 1926, 1927, 1927, 1937, 1938, 1944, 1944, 1947, 1948, 1951, 1951, 1951,
1951, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1972, 1982,
1982, 1983, 1983, 1983, 1983, 1983, 1993, 1993, 1995, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2000, 2004,
2007, 2007, 2010, 2017, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2045, 2051, 2052, 2059, 2059, 2063, 2065,
2066, 2070, 2071, 2071, 2073, 2073, 2092, 2092, 2092, 2092, 2092, 2095
A.7.2 Additional time interval
2101, 2113, 2115, 2115, 2115, 2137, 2148, 2154, 2154, 2161, 2205, 2205, 2206,
2248, 2284, 2284, 2302, 2302, 2302, 2302, 2311, 2323, 2324, 2360, 2378, 2390, 2430,
2430, 2430, 2430, 2430, 2430, 2430, 2431, 2431, 2435, 2438, 2541, 2554, 2651, 2658,
2658, 2660, 2670, 2711, 2721, 2721, 2738, 2826, 2830, 2830, 2830, 2917, 2940, 2941,
2973, 3000, 3010, 3030, 3033, 3050, 3050, 3050, 3106, 3106, 3106, 3106, 3232
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Appendix B: R code for SIR models
B.1 Description
Example of R code used for SIR models.
B.2 R code example for SIR models
1 # R Script to do simulate stochastic SIR models
2 #########################################
3
4 ### PARAMETER LIST ###
5 modelType <- c("A") # STANDARD VACCINATION
6 seedVal <- 2014062611
7 Npop <- 1000 # Total population size
8 betaVal <- 1.0
9 gammaVal <- 0.5
10 alphaVal <- 0.025
11 TotalTVal <- 30
12 nReps <- 5
13
14 # Create fully connected adjacency matrix
15 Nvec <- rep(1,(Npop*Npop))
16 NmatA <- matrix(Nvec , nrow = Npop , ncol = Npop)
17 NmatID <- diag(Npop)
18 NmatB <- (NmatA - NmatID)
19
20 # Specify a random seed value
21 set.seed(seedVal)
22 seedList <- runif(Npop , 0, 999999)
23
24 #####################################################################
25 ####### BELOW TO GENERATE SIR EXAMPLE WITH VACCINATION ##############
26 #####################################################################
27
28 ####### START SIMULATION REPETITIONS #######
29
30 for (i in 1:nReps) {
31
32 seedVal2 <- seedList[i]
33 set.seed(seedVal2)
34
35 # Specify a starting vector of susceptibles (1 = susc., 0 = not susc.)
36 Svec <- rep(1, Npop)
37
38 # Specify a starting vector of infected nodes (1 = infected , 0 = not infected)
39 Ivec <- rep(0, Npop)
40
41 # Specify a starting vector of recovered nodes (1 = recovered , 0 = not recov.)
42 Rvec <- rep(0, Npop)
43
44 # Add a state vector for vaccinated nodes (S -> R transitions)
187
45 VacRvec <- Rvec
46
47 # Specify state vectors --initial infected node and remove from it from susceptible
list (and subpop list)
48 Ivec [1] <- 1
49 Svec [1] <- 0
50
51
52 # Specify recovery rate --gamma
53 gamma <- gammaVal
54
55 # Specify infection rate --beta (can vary for external by setting a "ro" value)
56 beta <- betaVal
57
58 # Specify vaccination rate --alpha (alpha2) for internal network
59 alpha <- alphaVal
60
61 # Average degree of node; needed for S -> I transition check
62 # mvalue <- (Npop - 1)
63 mList <- rep(1, Npop)




68 # Specify total time and time steps and calculate number of iteration
69 ##############################################
70 ## Specify duration and storage for simulation
71 TotalT <- 30
72 # Specify time step --deltaT
73 deltaT <- 0.1
74 niter <- (TotalT/deltaT)
75 Starray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
76 Itarray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
77 Rtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
78 Ktarray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
79 VacRtarray <- matrix(,Npop , (niter +1))
80
81 Starray [,1] <- Svec
82 Itarray [,1] <- Ivec
83 Rtarray [,1] <- Rvec
84 Ktarray [,1] <- (NmatB %*% Ivec)
85 VacRtarray [,1] <- VacRvec
86





92 for (j in 1:niter) {
93
94 ###################################################################
95 ## Branch "B" code files reverse the order of transition checks ##




100 ## Check for transitions from Susceptible to Infected
101 # Somewhere calculate an "mvalue" (average degree of network), but just specify for
102 # now (or "Npop - 1" for fully connected)
103
104 # Calculate the number of infected neighbors (K) for each node
105 Kvec <- NmatB %*% Ivec
106
107 # Loop through and look for transitions
108 for (i in 1:Npop) {
109 if (Svec[i] == 1) {
110 randvalue <- runif (1,0,1)
111 if (randvalue < ((beta/mvalue)*(Kvec[i])*deltaT)) {
188
112 Ivec[i] <- 1






119 ## Check for transitions from Infected to Recovered
120
121 # Add a delay for first recovered
122
123 if (j < (2.0/deltaT)) {
124 gamComp <- 0
125 } else {




130 # Loop through and look for transitions
131 for (i in 1:( Npop)) {
132 if (Ivec[i] == 1) {
133 if (runif (1,0,1) < (gamComp*deltaT)) {
134 Ivec[i] <- 0






141 ## Check for transitions from Susceptible to Recovered (vaccination)
142
143 # Loop through and look for transitions
144 for (i in 1:( Npop)) {
145 if(Svec[i] == 1) {
146 if (runif (1,0,1) < (alpha*deltaT)) {
147 Svec[i] <- 0
148 Rvec[i] <- 1






155 ## After iteration , add Svec , Ivec , Rvec , Kvec to storage array
156
157 Starray[,(j+1)] <- Svec
158 Itarray[,(j+1)] <- Ivec
159 Rtarray[,(j+1)] <- Rvec
160 Ktarray[,(j+1)] <- Kvec
161 VacRtarray [,(j+1)] <- VacRvec
162
163 ### First need to add an iteration loop to the transition checks ,
164 # use "j" as iterator
165






172 ### SAVE SOME VALUES AND OUTPUTS TO A FILE ###
173
174 recoveredIValues <- (colSums(Rtarray) - colSums(VacRtarray))
175 recIValues <- recoveredIValues[seq(1, length(recoveredIValues), (1/deltaT))]
176 finalInfected <- tail(recoveredIValues , 1)
177 totalTimeInf <- sum(colSums(Itarray)*deltaT)
178 paramValues <- c(modelType , Npop , TotalTVal , niter , gammaVal , betaVal , alphaVal ,
seedVal2 , finalInfected , totalTimeInf)
189
179
180 write(paramValues , ncolumns = 10, file = "poutputA.txt", append = TRUE)
181 write(recIValues , ncolumns = c(niter +1), file = "recIValuesA.txt", append = TRUE)
182
183




Appendix C: R code for Email models
C.1 Description
Example of R code used for Email models.
C.2 R code example for Email models
1 # R script to simulate stochastic SIR model for Email virus/worm propagation
2 ###############################################
3
4 # Load "igraph" package
5 library(igraph)
6
7 ### PARAMETER LIST ###
8 modelType <- c("D")
9 seedVal <- 21406051
10 NpopMax <- 10000 # Total population size
11 ePowerVal <- 1 # Scale -free topology parameter
12 avgContactsVal <- 513 # Scale -free topology parameter [513 -> 0.1]
13 openVecDefault <- 0.10
14 expLH <- 0.10 # expected value exponential for user -likelihood for opening
messages
15 gammaVal <- 0.3
16 betaVal <- 1.0
17 alphaVal <- 0.0
18 blockRate <- 0.0
19 blockDelay <- 0 # number of iterations to delay blocking
20 roVal <- (1 - blockRate) # 1 - (block rate)
21 TotalTVal <- 90
22 nReps <- 1 # Number of simulation repetitions to run
23
24
25 ## Specify a random seed value
26 set.seed(seedVal)
27 seedList <- runif(NpopMax ,0 ,999999)
28
29 ####### START SIMULATION REPETITIONS #######
30
31 for (i in 1:nReps) {
32
33 iterCount <- i
34
35 seedVal2 <- seedList[i]
36 set.seed(seedVal2)
37
38 #### SET DYNAMIC PARAMETER VALUES ####
39 gammaVal <- runif(1, min=0.2, max =1.0)
40 betaVal <- runif(1, min=0.2, max =1.2)
41 alphaVal <- runif(1, min =0.005 , max =0.2)
42 avgContactsVal <- runif(1, min=513, max =1056)
43 expLH <- runif(1, min =0.05, max =0.15)
191
44 Npop <- 10000
45
46 ### SCALE -FREE GRAPH using "igraph" package functions
47 ePower <- ePowerVal
48 avgContacts <- avgContactsVal
49 NmatA <- barabasi.game(Npop , power=ePower , m=avgContacts , out.pref=TRUE ,directed=
FALSE)
50 NmatB <- get.adjacency(NmatA , sparse=FALSE)
51
52 ## Specify initial starting states of MACHINES (S, I, R)
53
54 # Susceptibles (1 = susc., 0 = not susc.)
55 Svec <- rep(1, Npop)
56
57 # Infecteds (1 = infected , 0 = not infected)
58 Ivec <- rep(0, Npop) # Infected nodes
59
60 # Recovereds (1 = recovered , 0 = not recovered)
61 Rvec <- rep(0, Npop)
62
63
64 ## Specify number of infected messages (per node)
65 KNvec <- rep(0, Npop) # New infected messages
66 KOvec <- rep(0, Npop) # Previously unopened infected messages
67 KTvec <- rep(0, Npop) # Total infected messages
68
69 ## Storage vector for infection transition value check
70 iValueVec <- rep(0, Npop) # Store value that is compared to random number for
transition check
71
72 ## Specify a node (associated user) likelihood to open infected emails
73 #### Set low value default (except when testing "always" open scenario)
74 #OpenVec <- rep (0.001 , Npop)
75
76 OpenVec <- rep(openVecDefault , Npop)
77
78 #### For user LH based on a uniform random distribution
79 #for (i in 1:Npop) {
80 # OpenVec[i] <- (runif (1,0,(2*openVecDefault)))
81 #}
82
83 #### For user LH based on an exponential distribution
84 for (i in 1:Npop) {
85 OpenVec[i] <- (1-pexp(runif (1,0,1) ,(1/expLH)))
86 }
87
88 ## Specify initial infection start --first node transitions from Susceptible to
Infected
89 Ivec [1] <- 1
90 Svec [1] <- 0
91
92
93 ## Specify some generic worm/virus parameters
94
95 # Recovery rate --gamma
96 gamma <- gammaVal
97
98 # Infection rate --beta
99 beta <- betaVal
100
101 # Patching rate --alpha
102 alpha <- alphaVal
103
104 # Mail server passing rate (1 means all pass , no blocking; 0 means all blocked/
deleted)




108 ## Specify total time and time steps and calculate number of iterations
109 TotalT <- TotalTVal
110 numTSteps <- 1
111 deltaT <- (1/numTSteps)
112 niter <- (TotalT/deltaT)
113
114 # Define some parameter rates , distributions , etc.
115 infMessRate <- 0.1*deltaT
116
117 #### Create Counter for I -> R transitions ####
118 countIR <- 0
119 counterIR <- rep(0, (niter +1))
120
121 ## Create storage Arrays
122 Starray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
123 Itarray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
124 Rtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,( niter +1))
125 KNtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,(niter +1))
126 KOtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,(niter +1))
127 KTtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,(niter +1))
128 CVtarray <- matrix(,Npop ,(niter +1))
129 iValueArray <- matrix(,Npop ,(niter +1))
130
131 ## Initialize storage Arrays for t=0
132 Starray [,1] <- Svec
133 Itarray [,1] <- Ivec
134 Rtarray [,1] <- Rvec
135 KNtarray [,1] <- (NmatB %*% Ivec)
136 KOtarray [,1] <- KOvec
137 KTtarray [,1] <- KNtarray [,1] + KOtarray [,1]
138 iValueArray [,1] <- iValueVec
139
140 ## Go ahead and create full array for email checking
141 # For Uniform Random Checking
142 for (i in 1:Npop) {
143 for (j in 1:( niter +1)) {




148 ## TESTING ALTERNATE TIMINGS FOR EMAIL CHECKING
149 ## binomial distribution where each node has different binomial probability
150 ## that is exponentially distributed
151 #CVXtarray <- matrix ( ,100 ,100)
152 #binProb <- rep(0.5, 100)
153 #for (i in 1:100) {
154 # binProb[i] <- pexp(runif (1,0,1) ,2)
155 #}
156 #
157 #for (i in 1:100) {
158 # for (j in 1:100) {











170 for (j in 1:niter) {
171
172 ######################################################
173 ## Proposed order of transition checks ##




177 ## Delay I -> R transitions for first few iterations
178
179 if (j < (2.0)) {
180 gamComp <- 0
181 } else {




186 ## Check I -> R transitions
187 for (i in 1:Npop) {
188 if (Ivec[i] == 1) {
189 if (runif (1,0,1) < (gamComp*deltaT)) {
190 Ivec[i] <- 0
191 Rvec[i] <- 1







199 ## Check S -> I transitions
200
201 # Calculate number of infected neighbors for susceptibles
202 nIvec <- (NmatB %*% Ivec)
203
204 # Calculate number of newly received infected messages for susceptibles
205 for (i in 1:Npop) {
206 KNvec[i] <- rbinom(1, nIvec[i], infMessRate)
207 }
208
209 ## If mail server not blocking (i.e. if "ro" = 1), add new infected messages
210 ## to existing infected messages
211
212 # Add a delay for when blocking is implemented
213
214 if (j < (( blockDelay +1)/deltaT)) {
215 roComp <- 1.0
216 } else {




221 for (i in 1:Npop) {
222 KTvec[i] <- KOvec[i] + (ro * KNvec[i])
223 }
224
225 # If node is susceptible and user checked messages , did user open any
226 # infected messages?
227
228 for (i in 1:Npop) {
229 if ((Svec[i] == 1) & (CVtarray[i,j] == 1) & (KTvec[i] > 0)) {
230 KOvec[i] <- 0
231 for (k in 1:( KTvec[i])) {
232 randvalue <- runif (1,0,1)
233 iValue <- (beta*OpenVec[i])
234 iValueVec[i] <- iValue
235 if (randvalue < iValue) {
236 Ivec[i] <- 1








244 ## Check S -> R transitions
245 for (i in 1:Npop) {
246 if (Svec[i] == 1) {
247 if (runif (1,0,1) < (alpha*deltaT)) {
248 Svec[i] <- 0








257 ## After iteration , add KNvec , KTvec , KOvec , Svec , Ivec , Rvec to storage array
258 Starray[,(j+1)] <- Svec
259 Itarray[,(j+1)] <- Ivec
260 Rtarray[,(j+1)] <- Rvec
261 KNtarray[,(j+1)] <- KNvec
262 KOtarray[,(j+1)] <- KOvec
263 KTtarray[,(j+1)] <- KTvec
264 iValueArray [,(j+1)] <- iValueVec
265










276 ### SAVE SOME VALUES AND OUTPUTS TO A FILE ###
277 linkCount <- ecount(NmatA)
278 finalRecovered <- tail(colSums(Rtarray) ,1)
279 totalTimeInf <- sum(colSums(Itarray)*deltaT)
280 recoveredValues <- colSums(Rtarray)
281 finalIR <- tail(counterIR , 1)
282
283 paramValues <- c(iterCount , modelType , Npop , TotalTVal , ePowerVal , avgContactsVal ,
linkCount , gammaVal , betaVal , alphaVal , expLH , seedVal2 , finalIR ,
finalRecovered , totalTimeInf)
284
285 write(paramValues , ncolumns =15, file="poutputEX4_S1.txt", append=TRUE)
286 write(recoveredValues , ncolumns=c(TotalT +1), file="recValuesEX4_S1.txt", append=
TRUE)
287 write(counterIR , ncolumns=c(TotalT +1), file="IRtransValues_EX4_S1.txt", append=TRUE
)
288




Appendix D: R code for Time series models
D.1 Description
Example of R code used for Time series models.
D.2 R code example for Time series models
1 # ARMA/ARIMA models for UMD Incident Data
2
3 # Read in original (weekly) data from text file , difference it, subtract
4 # mean , and convert to time -series object. Also , create cumulative values
5
6 orig.data=scan("data.txt")
7 orig.data <- c(0, orig.data)
8 data0 <- ts(cumsum(orig.data), start =1)
9 nobs <- length(data0)
10 plim <- 3
11 qlim <- 3
12 season <- 52
13 sdiff <- 0
14
15 # ADDED FOR SQUARE -ROOT TRANSFORMATION
16 # ip = inverse power , 2 means sqrt , 3 means cube root , etc.
17 ip = 2
18
19 data <- (data0)^(1/ip)
20
21 # data <- diff(orig.data)
22 # data.mean <- mean(data)
23 # data <- data - data.mean
24 # data=ts(data , start =1)
25 # data
26 # cumul.orig.data <- cumsum(orig.data)
27
28 # Create matrices for desired output values
29 # aics.r = AIC values reported by R function "arima"
30 # aics.m = AIC values calculated according to equation in Shumway (2000) and defined
by his "sarima.R" function
31 # aicc.m = AICc values calculated according to Shumway ’s "sarima.R" function
32 # bics.m = BIC values calculated according to Shumway ’s "sarima.R" function
33
34 aics.r <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
35 aics.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
36 aicc.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
37 bics.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
38 rmsc.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
39
40 # "for" loop for calculating models and stats
41 # Double structure needed to avoid case where "p = q = 0"
42
43 n = length(data)
196
44
45 for(q in 1:qlim) {
46 tmp.arima <- arima(data , c(0,2,q),optim.control = list(maxit = 1000),
47 include.mean=FALSE , method=c("ML"),seasonal=list(order=c(1,sdiff ,0),period=
season))
48 k = length(tmp.arima$coef)
49 aics.r[1, 1+q] <- tmp.arima$aic
50 aics.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n+2*k)/n)
51 aicc.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n+k)/(n-k-2))
52 bics.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+(k*log(n)/n)
53 tmp.fit <- data - tmp.arima$resid
54 tmp.fit0 <- (tmp.fit)^ip
55 rmsc.m[1, 1+q] <- sqrt(sum((data0 - tmp.fit0)^2)/(n-1))
56 }
57 for(p in 1:plim) {
58 for(q in 0:qlim) {
59 tmp.arima <- arima(data , c(p,2,q),optim.control = list(maxit = 1000) ,
60 include.mean=FALSE , method=c("ML"),seasonal=list(order=c(1,sdiff ,0),period=
season))
61 k = length(tmp.arima$coef)
62 aics.r[1+p, 1+q] <- tmp.arima$aic
63 aics.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n+2*k)/n)
64 aicc.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n+k)/(n-k-2))
65 bics.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+(k*log(n)/n)
66 tmp.fit <- data - tmp.arima$resid
67 tmp.fit0 <- (tmp.fit)^ip
68 rmsc.m[1, 1+q] <- sqrt(sum((data0 - tmp.fit0)^2)/(n-1)) }
69 }
70
71 # Look at matrices where the min value has been subtracted (makes it easier to
72 # to see which model(s) to select based on AIC , AICc , or BIC values
73 #
74 # PUT THE OUTPUT DOWN WITH OUTPUT FOR 2/3, 1/3 and FORECASTS
75 #
76 # round(aics.r - min(aics.r, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
77 # round(aics.m - min(aics.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
78 # round(aicc.m - min(aicc.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
79 # round(bics.m - min(bics.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
80 # round(rmsd.m - min(rmsd.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
81 # round(rmsc.m - min(rmsc.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
82
83
84 # Now repeat above , but do with 2/3 of original data and compare forecast to
85 # remaining 1/3 (using RMS values for comparison)
86
87 split <- floor((nobs -1)*2/3)+1
88 num.forecast <- (nobs) - split
89 data.train <- ts(data [1: split], start =1)
90 data.test <- data[(split +1):nobs]
91
92 data.train0 <- data0 [1: split]
93 data.test0 <- data0[( split +1):nobs]
94
95
96 aics.train.r <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
97 aics.train.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
98 aicc.train.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
99 bics.train.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
100 rmsc.train.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
101 rmsc.test.m <- matrix(, 1+plim , 1+qlim , dimnames=list(p=0:plim , q=0: qlim))
102
103 # "for" loop for calculating models and stats
104 # Double structure needed to avoid case where "p = q = 0"
105
106 n.train = length(data.train)
107
108 for(q in 1:qlim) {
109 tmp.arima <- arima(data.train , c(0,2,q),optim.control = list(maxit = 1000),
197
110 include.mean=FALSE , method=c("ML"),seasonal=list(order=c(1,sdiff ,0),period=
season))
111 k = length(tmp.arima$coef)
112 aics.train.r[1, 1+q] <- tmp.arima$aic
113 aics.train.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n.train+2*k)/n.train)
114 aicc.train.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n.train+k)/(n.train -k-2))
115 bics.train.m[1, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+(k*log(n.train)/n.train)
116 tmp.fit <- data.train - tmp.arima$resid
117 tmp.fit0 <- (tmp.fit)^ip
118 rmsc.train.m[1, 1+q] <- sqrt(sum((data.train0 - tmp.fit0)^2)/(n.train -1))
119 tmp.fore <- predict(tmp.arima , n.ahead = num.forecast , se.fit = FALSE)
120 tmp.fore0 <- (tmp.fore)^ip
121 rmsc.test.m[1, 1+q] <- sqrt(sum((data.test0 - tmp.fore0)^2)/num.forecast)
122 }
123 for(p in 1:plim) {
124 for(q in 0:qlim) {
125 tmp.arima <- arima(data.train , c(p,2,q),optim.control = list(maxit = 1000),
126 include.mean=FALSE , method=c("ML"),seasonal=list(order=c(1,sdiff ,0),period=
season))
127 k = length(tmp.arima$coef)
128 aics.train.r[1+p, 1+q] <- tmp.arima$aic
129 aics.train.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n.train+2*k)/n.train)
130 aicc.train.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+((n.train+k)/(n.train -k-2))
131 bics.train.m[1+p, 1+q] <- log(tmp.arima$sigma2)+(k*log(n.train)/n.train)
132 tmp.fit <- data.train - tmp.arima$resid
133 tmp.fit0 <- (tmp.fit)^ip
134 rmsc.train.m[1+p, 1+q] <- sqrt(sum((data.train0 - tmp.fit0)^2)/(n.train -1))
135 tmp.fore <- predict(tmp.arima , n.ahead = num.forecast , se.fit = FALSE)
136 tmp.fore0 <- (tmp.fore)^ip





142 # Look at matrices where the min value has been subtracted (makes it easier to
143 # to see which model(s) to select based on AICc or BIC values
144
145 # round(aicc.m - min(aicc.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
146 # round(bics.m - min(bics.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
147
148
149 # Look at matrices where the min value has been subtracted (makes it easier to
150 # to see which model(s) to select based on AIC , AICc , or BIC values
151
152 round(aics.train.r - min(aics.train.r, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
153 round(bics.train.m - min(bics.train.m, na.rm=TRUE), 3)
154









Appendix E: R code for Logistic regression models
E.1 Description
Example of R code used for Logistic regression models.
E.2 R code example for Logistic regression models
1 # R script to create logistic regression models and test them using simulation
2 # *** FOR MODELS BUILT FROM SINGLE YEAR ’S DATA ***
3 # *** INDIVIDUAL MODELS -- MODEL 1
4 #
5 ## LOAD NEEDED PACKAGES
6 library("epicalc")
7 library("simFrame")
8 ## SET A RANDOM SEED VALUE SO TESTS ARE REPEATABLE?
9 set.seed (20081)
10 ## READ IN DATA TO BUILD MODELS WITH
11 data <- read.table("data1.txt", header=TRUE , as.is=TRUE)
12 use(data)
13 ## EXTRACT ROW INDEX NUMBERS FOR INCIDENTS IN DATA
14 inclist.fit <- which(data [ ,6]==1)
15 #### BUILD LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS
16 ### (1) DURATION
17 system.time(glm0.single <- glm(Incident~
18 Duration ,
19 family=binomial , data=.data))
20 #####
21 ## THIS SECTION STARTS THE VALIDATION OF FORECASTS PART
22 #####
23 ## READ IN DATA TO FORECAST
24 f.data <- read.table("data2.txt", header=TRUE , as.is=TRUE)
25 ## CREATE LIST OF ROWS IN FORECAST DATA WITH INCIDENTS
26 f.inclist <- which(f.data [ ,6]==1)
27 ## CREATE FORECASTS USING EACH OF THE MODELS
28 f0.single <- predict.glm(glm0.single , f.data , type="response")
29 ## CREATE ARRAYS TO STORE NUMBER OF MATCHES BETWEEN FORECAST & ACTUAL
30 forematch0.single <- rep(NA ,1000)
31 ## DO SAMPLES AND MATCHING
32 system.time(for (i in 1:1000) forematch0.single[i] <- length(intersect(f.inclist ,
ups (246142 , 24132 , prob=f0.single))))
33 ## SHOW SUMMARY (MEAN , STD) OF FORECAST & ACTUAL MATCHES
34 summ(forematch0.single)
35 ## SAVE LIST OF FORECAST & ACTUAL MATCH COUNTS TO TEXT FILE
36 write(forematch0.single ,file="output1.txt")
37 ## CREATE LIST OF CUMULATIVE AVERAGES OF FORECAST & INCIDENT MATCH COUNTS
38 avg.forematch0.single <- cumsum(forematch0.single)/seq_along(forematch0.single)
39 ## SAVE LIST OF CUMULATIVE AVERAGES TO TEXT FILE
40 write(avg.forematch0.single ,file="output2.txt")
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